Title | Unit 10- Lesson 34- Games With PSNE and MSNE |
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Course | Politics and Strategy |
Institution | University of California Los Angeles |
Pages | 1 |
File Size | 33 KB |
File Type | |
Total Downloads | 70 |
Total Views | 128 |
Spring 2016
Prof. Kathleen Brown...
Unit 10: Mixed Strategies, Part 2 Lesson 34: Games with PSNE and MSNE Basic System for finding NE in mixed strategies. 1. Use variables to represent probabilities associated with each player pure strategies. 2. Write out the expected values of player A’s strategies as a function of player B’s (variable) probabilities. 3. Set A’s expected pay-offs equal and solve for B’s probability. 4. Repeat for the other player. Key is to find the probability that leaves opponent indifferent between two pure strategies. Some games can have NE in both pure and mixed strategies. Chicken A/B
Swerve
Don't
Swerve (0,0)
(-1,1)
Don’t
(-10,-10)
(1,-1)
In addition to Don’t Swerve/Swerve, and Swerve/Don’t there is a NE in mixed strategies. Let q = prob(A swerves) EU(B)(swerve) = q*0 + -1*(1-q) = q-1 EU(B)(Don’t Swerve) = q*1 + (-10)*(1-q) = q-10 + 10q = 11q - 10 11q - 10 = q -1 10q = 9 q = 9/10 A swerves with .9 prob, doesn’t with .1 prob. B is same. Expected outcomes are A swerve, B swerve .81 A swerve, B doesn’t .09 B swerve, A doesn’t .09 Nobody Swerve .01 EU(A) = .81*0 + 0.9*-1 + 0.9*1 + 0.01B*-10 = -0.1 Battle of the sexes, Assurance, Pure Coordination also have MSNE in additional to PSNE...