Unit 4 - Essay - Kwame Gyekye Main Arguments PDF

Title Unit 4 - Essay - Kwame Gyekye Main Arguments
Author Lexta 073
Course Introduction To African Philosophy
Institution University of South Africa
Pages 4
File Size 67.1 KB
File Type PDF
Total Downloads 7
Total Views 122

Summary

Download Unit 4 - Essay - Kwame Gyekye Main Arguments PDF


Description

Gyekye’s communitarianism is an attempt to strike a balance between an extreme individualism and communitarianism pertaining to human rights. Does he succeed in doing so? Discuss. Discuss critically Kwame Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism. In your discussion do show if Gyekye’s an attempt to strike a balance between an extreme individualism and communitarianism was successful or not. Kwame Gyekye is regarded as a 'moderate' communitarian What is the main argument in Gyekye's communitarianism? In his paper "Person and community in African thought" Kwame Gyekye (2002) uses the concept of a moderate communitarianism. In your paper discuss thus concept and what makes it so different from an extreme form of communitarianism Introduction This essay discusses Kwame Gyekye’s essay, Person and community in African thought to establish the main arguments put forward by the author. Gyekye’s advocates for a moderate communitarianism which is built on three main tenets: (1) the social and rational nature of the individual, (2) the recognition of individual rights, and (3) the moral supremacy of the community. In exploring his main argument, this essay shall give a brief definition and or description of communitarianism. It shall distinguish between radical (unrestricted) and moderate (restricted) communitarianism. Lastly it shall explorer individual rights versus duties towards the community as highlighted by Kwame Gyekye. Gyekye and Person and community in African thought Gyekye in his article Person and community in African thought, highlights the different approaches to the problem of personhood and community in African thought, he brings into the debate the problem of rights. His primary concern is with the space that is given to the human person for the exercise of his or her individual rights within the terrain of communitarianism. He examines the question of rights in relation to duties. The relationship between the community and the individual which forms the basis of Gyekye’s criticism, of which he explores Menkiti’s ideas of personhood in Africa; A brief definition or description of communitarianism Gyekye argues that a human person in African cultures is a communitarian being (p. 24). He or she is born into a community and is shaped and influenced by it. But what is communitarianism? Communitarianism is a philosophy that emphasizes the connection between the individual and the community. Its overriding philosophy is based upon the belief that a person's social identity and personality are largely moulded by community relationships, with a smaller degree of development being placed on individualism. This can be seen in Gyekye argument that a human person in African cultures is a communitarian being (2002: 24). They are born into a community and are shaped and influenced by it. Gyekye claims that the community plays a vital role in the formation of the individual’s personhood or identity. This claim emanates from his belief that a person when born

finds themselves, not in isolation, but among other individuals and this establishes the social or relational nature of a person. According to Gyekye (p.37), communitarianism can generally be described as an “ethical and political theory, which considers the community as a fundamental human good [and] advocates a life lived in harmony and cooperation with others, a life of mutual consideration and aid and of interdependence, a life in which one shares in the fate of the other…”. In other words, A communitarian, thus, is someone who considers the community to be of central importance, which emphasizes the moral supremacy of the common good, the good of the community as a whole, and an individual as a social being that can only flourish in the community. Since individuals differ in their outlook and the actual living out of their lives, tensions are bound to arise in communities. How one resolves these tensions can lead one to be labelled a radical or moderate communitarian. Distinction between radical and moderate communitarianism It seems that there are many shades of communitarianism. However, Gyekye distinguishes between two, namely, radical and moderate communitarianism. The crux of radical communitarianism also known as unrestricted or extreme communitarianism is spread over three main issues: (1) The individual is naturally a social being who is embedded in the community. (2) The community is morally superior to the individual. In other words, common good (social responsibilities) is preferable to individual rights and (3) Individual rights are superfluous in any community that is regulated by shared values, mutual understanding and love. In analysing these tenants, radical communitarianism seems to over overemphasizes the importance of community life at the expense of individual rights. The implication is that in the case of a moral clash between the community and the individual, the community ought to be favoured. Gyekye citing Menkiti’s proponents of this communitarianism, suggest it is the community that defines the person as person. This is because the community has priority over the individual person. According to Gyekye the individual is wholly moulded by his/her immediate community. Menkiti further suggest that personhood is something that must be acquired in community. In other words, a person becomes a person if they fulfil all the norms and values laid down by the community and that personhood is achieved and not given simply because one is born of man and woman, therefore one can fail in an attempt to become a person. Menkiti, observes Gyekye, reasoned his idea of an acquisition of personhood, between child “it” and adult burial ceremony and ritualised grief. He states that when a child dies, the funeral ceremonies are brief. However, when an older person dies, elaborate funeral celebrations take place, which implies that a new born and children are not yet human persons whereas older individual has achieved personhood and has now become an ancestor who lives among the people. Gyekye rejects this, in that the African people (Akan) people believe excessive demonstrations of grief over the death of a child may result in (1) the mother becoming infertile or (2) the dead child being driven away, thus inhibiting reincarnation and rebirth. Gyekye argues, a human person is a person regardless of age. In light of this, Gyekye articulates what he believes to be the actual relationship between the individual and the community. He argues that this position of radical communitarianism is erroneous as it confuses the cultural structure and the person who is supposed to function within that structure. The moderate communitarianism or restricted communitarianism has come to represent Gyekye’s own position on the subject which is built on three main tenets: (1) the social and rational

nature of the individual, (2) the recognition of individual rights, and (3) the moral supremacy of the community. Gyekye wants us to believe that his moderate communitarianism accords respect to individual rights, which he criticizes radical communitarians for failing to do. Gyekye asserts that the goal of moderate communitarianism is the reconciliation of rights and social responsibilities, that is, the balancing of social forces and individual autonomy. It aims to ascribe to both the community and an individual an equal moral standing (social responsibilities and individual rights are reconcilable). Gyekye, is to show that individual rights and by extension individuality, are recognized in a communitarian framework. Gyekye believes that this is what the radical version has failed to realize. Gyekye begins, by pointing out that the person is constituted, but only partly by social relationships in which they necessarily find themselves. This implies that a person is a person before they enter a community even though they may not be self-sufficient (p. 25). Therefore, a person is constituted partly by social relationships in a community. Gyekye rejects the unrestricted communitarian view on the ground that the individual is only partly, not wholly, defined by the community, he argues, that an individual possesses other attributes, such as rationality, autonomy and the capacity for evaluation and making moral judgments, that will that determines one’s destiny and may also be said to constitute their nature. This suggests that an individual is therefore both a communal and an autonomous being capable of self-determination, and it is an individual’s moral achievement that earns them the status of a person. Individual rights versus duties towards the community On the issue of rights, for Gyekye rights and duties are not polar concepts in themselves. This means that individuals can exercise their rights while at the same time fulfilling their obligations or duties to the community. For Gyekye, rights belong primarily and irreducibly to the individual, for they (rights) are a means of expressing an individual’s talents, capacities, and identity. Gyekye’s argues further, for the recognition of rights rests on his understanding that if his moderate communitarianism acknowledges individual autonomy, then this acknowledgement must involve the recognition of rights. Individual rights are not always secondary as Menkiti especially claims. Rights become secondary only when they clash with some communal values such as peace, harmony, stability, solidarity, and mutual reciprocities and sympathies. Though Gyekye recognizes the rights of the individual, he never considers them to be the primary social value. Instead, the good of the community takes precedence over that of the individual. As a matter of fact, the recognition of individual rights under Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism is for the sake of the community, not that of the individual. (moral supremacy of the community over the individual). For Gyekye the two aspects go hand-in-hand. The community needs the individual and the individual the community. This is where Gyekye emphasizes the idea/theory of the common good, which according to him everyone should strive for. Insofar as Gyekye is concerned, the common good is the goal of the community.

Conclusion In concluding, Gyekye believes, make his theory more acceptable than the radical version, as the radical communal thesis paints only a partial portrait of the dialectic between individualism and communitarianism, however, this essay suggests that there is no substantial difference between Gyekye’s moderate version and radical communitarianism, or should we say they are not far apart. In Gyekye’s own admission, a communitarian society will not be overly obsessed with rights, as it is the good of the community takes precedence over that of the individual. On closer scrutiny of this, it is seen as the common good for which he believes must be what everyone is striving for and all sacrifices must be made in order to promote the common good. Gyekye criticized radical communitarianism for placing more emphasis on the importance of the community over that of the individual while he does the same. Therefore, Gyekye fails to show how the individual can prosper outside the community and still ties the individual to the community in the same way radical communitarianism has done....


Similar Free PDFs