Why Athens Lost The War - AHIS 100 PDF

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Why Athens Lost the War...

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Why Athens Lost the War – AHIS 100 (GRADE: CREDIT) The Peloponnesian was war fought in 431 – 404 BC between the two superpowers of the Hellenes, Sparta and Athens. Almost all of the Greek city poleis were involved and even the Persians. Sparta was the reigning superpower, where they dominated in hoplite warfare. Athens was the rising superpower, where her strength lay in her naval superiority. Despite Athenian resilience and their favourable chances, they were not able to win against the Spartans. Their loss can be attributed to four factors – politics, poor military decisions, economic strife and religious factors. For the Athenians the beginning of the end was after the disaster at Sicily. One of the factors that contributed to the defeat of Athens was the politics that occurred in the Peloponnesian War. Alcibiades was a prime example, where his defection influenced Sparta’s political decisions, which led to the death of four experienced Athenian generals, the loss of manpower and Sparta’s decision to ally with the Persians. Alcibiades told the Spartans that if Sicily fell to the Athenians their next stop would be the Peloponnese and that they should fortify Decelea which would economically affect Athens (Thuc, 6.91). McGregor (1965), argues there were two actions that caused the defeat in Sicily, the first was the recall of Alcibiades and the dispatch of Gylippus. Gylippus defeated the Athenians and the success of his efforts was the death of four experienced generals – Nicias, Lamachus, Demosthenes and Eurymedon – a resource they desperately needed in 406 BC after the trial of the generals. The second outcome of the recall of Alcibiades was the fortification of Decelea (Thuc, 7.19), which had in stifling effects on the Athenians (McGregor, 1965). The Athenians lost twenty thousand slaves as a result they lost the revenue from their silver mines (Kagan, 2013 pg3). The influence of Alcibiades on Spartan policy re-ignited the war, where he helped place Sparta at a great advantage. After the disaster at Sicily the Athenians had lost experienced generals and were financially starving – they could not afford to fight a long-drawn-out war. Another political decision that cost the Athenians in the near future was the rejected treaty offered by the Spartans around the year 413/12BC after the battle at Cyzicus (Diod. 13.52.2). Kagan (2013) states that many modern scholars have argued that the rejection of the treaty was a mistake and that every year without war would count as an invaluable gain – where they could build up their resources. However, another Spartan defeat at Arginusae forced the them to offer another peace offer which the Athenians again declined (kagan, 2003). Kagan (2013) argues that the terms were similar, however the accepting the offer now would be best due to their extremely low funds. He also argued that if the Athenians suffered another defeat, it would be the end of their navy – for they had no more funds to build a new one and the longer the war continued the poorer the Athenians were (Kagan, 2013). Twice the Athenians did not settle for truces where they might have replenished their funds for future campaigns. With the rejection of the last treaty offered by the Spartans, the Athenians surrendered after the battle at Aegospotami. Economic strife was a recurrent theme for the Athenians in the Decelean War and one of the primary reasons why they had lost the war. Thucydides documents the economic state of Athens at the start of the Archidamian War, stating that the Athenians had an annual income of 6000 talents and that the maximum their treasury held was 9700 talents (Thuc. 2.13). However, by 413

the Sicilian expedition had cost the Athenians 4000 talents (Pritchard, 2015), whereby Kagan (2003) states that of the 5000 expendable talents in 431BC there were fewer than 500 talents that remained in the treasury after the Sicilian expedition. Thus, demonstrating the Athenian’s financial setback at the start of the Decelean War. The lost revenue from the silver mines limited their economic resources and their allies started to revolt – thus, collection of sufficient tribute became a problem (Kagan, 2013 pg3). Pritchard (2015) argues that with the naval commitment and the efforts to defend Attica from raids, it would have cost the Athenians at least 60% of the average level they had in the 420s. The fortification also forced their citizens into the city walls, this prevented farmers from tending their fields, where the Athenian efforts of importation to feed their citizens and the continuation the war further drained their treasury (Kagan, 2003). A prime example of how dire the financial situation is represented in Kagan’s (2013) statement, where the Athenians melted down their gold statues of Nike to make coins in order to build another fleet to rescue Conon. This demonstrated the Athenians scraping the bottom of the barrel, where they had used the last of their funds. If the Spartans destroyed the remainder of Conan’s fleet and the newly constructed fleet, they would win the war. The dire financial situation in Athens was not the only financial factor that contributed to their defeat, the Persians’ role in the war bolstered Spartan finances at a rate the Athenians could not keep up. Cyrus the younger promised that he would provide as much financial aid to the Spartans (Xen. 1.5). After the loss at Arginusae, Cyrus advised the Spartans not to attack because he feared the 180 Athenian ships at Samos (Hyland, 2017). According to Hyland (2017), Cyrus had invested in around 2006 – 2248 talents, of those talents approximately 221 ships were built – between the year 405/4. Kagan (2013) concurs with Hyland (2017) stating that the Athenians’ exhausted treasury would not be able to compete with the Persian wealth – where every Spartan ship that was sunk could be easily replaced. Thus, the intervention of Persia allowed the Spartans to fight at sea and added immense pressure to Athens and their economy. In addition to the shortage of resources the Athenians were also short on experienced generals. There were instances where the loss of generals could have been easily avoided, if not for superstition and religious customs. If these deaths were avoided and exiled generals were recalled, the outcome of the war may have differed. The first folly of the Athenians was at Sicily, where Nicias could have escaped with Demosthenes – a successful general during the Archidamian war. Nicias was prepared to sail and escape back to Athens, but a lunar eclipse caused Nicias to cancel the escape, which led to the Spartans surrounding them (Thuc. 7.50). The Athenians lost 9000 hoplites, 11000 thetes, 3000 metics – fewer than half before the start of the war – and also lost 236 triremes (Kagan, 2013). In spite of the losses the Athenians were able to rebuild their navy later in the war. However, his escape might have alleviated some economic burden with whatever they had left and also kept two experienced generals that was desperately needed in the near future. Thus, Nicias’ decision cost the Athenians, manpower, experienced generals and financial implications which were unrecoverable – albeit this was not the sole cause of their defeat. The loss of the generals at Sicily was not the only avoidable loss, the folly of the Athenian demos after the trial of the generals at 406 BC led to the execution of six and ostracism of two of their remaining experienced generals (Xen. 1.7.34). The reason for their execution was the Athenian navy’s inability to recover the dead after their battle at Aegospotami (Kagan, 2013, pg354). Immediately after

their executions the Athenians had regret their decision (Xen. 1.7.35). This loss was much more significant than the last, by this stage the Athenians had exiled also Alcibiades – which meant they had to face the Spartans, for the first time, with inexperienced generals at sea (Kagan, 2003, pg466). The consequences of their religious actions were immediate, the inexperienced replacement generals lost their navy to the Spartans at Aegospotami – thus without provisions and money to build a new fleet the Athenians had lost (kagan, 2003 pg476). Religious mistakes by the Athenians were not the only cause of their downfall – military aspects also played a part. Despite Athenian successes their adversary the Spartans – in particular Lysander – deserved much credit for Spartan the Spartan victory. Lysander overcame the Athenian navy when Alcibiades left Antiochus – a helmsman – in charge during his absence (Xen. 1.5.11). Before Alcibiades departed Antiochus was given strict directions not to attack the Spartans - he disobeyed his orders and lost to Lysander (Xen, 1.5.11). The loss at Notium was not too significant apart from the consequences derived from the battle – where the Athenians hearing of the loss deposed Alcibiades of his office and did not command for the rest of the war (Kagan, 2013). This is a significant loss because it was Alcibiades who brought most of the Athenian victories during the Decelean war. His departure was just another addition to the list of exiled or executed experienced generals. By 405 BC the Athenians had lost the generals from the Sicilian expedition – which could have been avoided. They had deposed Alcibiades of his duties and lost eight of their most capable generals after the trial in regard to the battle of Arginusae. The inexperience of the newly elected generals was demonstrated during the battle of Aegospotami. Alcibiades advised to set their base at Sestos for it was much more convenient to operate from (Xen 2.1.25). He also told them that he was friends with the Thracian King, who too wanted to be rid of the Lacedemonians, and would be able to bring an army to help them – in return he would share a part of the command (Diod. 13.105.3). The Athenians were careless and contemptuous because Lysander had refused battle many times (Kagan, 2013, pg 391). On the fifth day the Athenians sailed thirty ships possibly to gain provisions, Kagan (2013, pg393) argues that thirty was too small a number, and Lysander seized the opportunity cut off their ships and pursued the retreating Athenian fleet. The Athenians caught unprepared were decimated by the Spartans and had lost the war – for they had run out of provisions, funds and allies. Kagan (2013, pg377) argues that the from the beginning the Athenians should have sought out a battle as soon as possible before, Lysander could build up his fleet to defend the Hellespont and before their funds dried out. The Athenians were at a disadvantage from the start of the war with the fortification at Decelea they had lost manpower, funds and allies. In order for them to win the war they needed to eliminate the Spartans quickly and capture the Hellespont so that their grain route would be secure, where possibly they would retain their allies. However, their attempts to keep the allies in check and cost to rebuild their navy constantly drained them of all their funds. Their political decisions cost them dearly with Alcibiades pairing the Spartans with Persian financial support. As the Athenians struggled to build new ships the Spartans were able to replace any that were sunk. On top of their financial dilemma they weakened their own military due to religious decisions such as the eclipse in Sicily, the trial of the generals and finally the removal of Alcibiades. Overall it was a contribution of factors that led to the downfall of Athens, the

final blow was the Athenian loss at Aegospotami, where they were cut of their grain supply which starved the Athenians to surrender.

Ancient References: Diodorus (1989). Diodorus of Sicily in Twelve Volumes. Translated by CH. Oldfather. Harvard University Press: William Heinemann vol.4-8 Thucydides. (1954) History of the Peloponnesian War. Translated by R.Warner. Penguin Group Xenophon. (1921) Xenophon in Seven Volumes. Translated by CL. Brownson. Harvard University Press: William Heinemann vol.1-2 Modern References: Hyland, J.O., 2017. Persian Interventions: The Achaemenid Empire, Athens, and Sparta, 450− 386 BCE. JHU Press. Kagan, D. and Wallace, B., 2003. The Peloponnesian War. New York: Viking. Kagan, D., 2013. 'The Restoration'. The fall of the Athenian empire. Cornell University Press. McGregor, M.F., 1965. The genius of Alkibiades. Phoenix, 19(1), pp.27-50. Pritchard, D.M., 2015. 'The Cost of War'. Public spending and democracy in classical Athens. University of Texas Press. pp.91-113...