Why did the Spartans win the Peloponnesian War PDF

Preview

Summary

Why Spartans won the Peloponnesian war...

Description

xxxxxxxxxx

zxxxxxx

ARTS2283

Essay Topic: Why did the Spartans win the Peloponnesian War?

It has long been asked as to how and why exactly the Spartans were victorious in the Peloponnesian War. Spartan warriors were famous for their skills in battle and tactics in war. Can their victory however be attributed to just that? Is it that simple? The answer is no, it’s more complicated than that. Sure the Spartans are considered to be some of the greatest warriors of all time. The whole fabric of their society was training to become a warrior. However, the Athenians had a strong reputation as effective warriors as well. The decisive victory over the Persians at the Battle of Marathon shows us just that.1 Fearing the recent growth of Athenian power Sparta and its allies decided to take action. This action of course being what we know today as the Peloponnesian War.2 This essay will explain why courageous Spartan leaders, Athenian mismanagement, and even Persian influence were crucial factors in the outcome of the war. Proving that it took more than just perceived superior Spartan warriors to defeat the powerful Athenian forces. The Peloponnesian War was a Greek war fought between the Delian League and the Peloponnese League in the years 434 to 404 BC. The Delian League was headed by Athens, and the Peloponnese League headed by Sparta.3 From Thucydides’ opening statement in his very own History of the Peloponnesian War, he expected the war to be a great one and more noteworthy than any that had gone before.4 The first ten years were called the “Archidamian

1. Dillon, M., & Garland, L. (2010). Ancient Greece: Historical and social document from archaic times to the death of Alexander (3rd ed.). New York: Routledge, pp. 363-68. 2. Brunt, P. A. (1965) “Spartan Policy and Strategy in the Archidamin War.” Phoenix, vol. 19, no. 4, p. 255. 3. Hornblower, Simon (2011). The Greek World 479-323 BC (4th ed.). London: Routledge, p. 121. 4. Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. 1.1-1.2

xxxxxxxxxx

zxxxxxx

ARTS2283

War” named after the Spartan king who warned against it. This phase was followed up by an armistice in 423 and then by the Peace of Nicias in 421, which lasted for 6 short years.5 From 415 to 413 the expedition to Sicily was underway and finally the Ionian War which resulted in the Spartan victory later in 404 BC. Most of what we know today about the war and the people in it is based on the account of Thucydides. Thucydides was impartial, trustworthy, and he left facts clearly stated.6 Exactly what you would expect in a good historian. It’s also important to know that Thucydides was an Athenian general in the early stages of war as well. Thucydides understood that the democratic form of government had certain advantages when it came to war. It aided their capacity to overcome collective-action and assisted more effective knowledge-management.7 Thucydides seems to hint that in fact Athens could have won the war. Pericles, Athens most influential leader at the time, was confident that Athens would prevail if and only if they could avoid foolish strategic mistakes.8 The Delian League clearly had the advantage in human and material resources. Athens however, even with this perceived advantage still managed to make mistake after mistake.9 The Sicilian expedition was a strategic failure full of missteps. In the year 415 Athens invaded Syracuse, a city that was significantly larger than its own. Syracuse was also a democratic city, not so much as Athens but they both practiced a similar democratic style of rule.10 For the people of Athens this gave discredit to the thought that the Peloponnesian War was on a large part ideological. This being the resistance the foreign-

5. Hornblower, Simon (2011). The Greek World 479-323 BC (4th ed.). London: Routledge, p. 156. 6. Hornblower. The Greek World 479-323 BC (4th ed.). p. 157. 7. Balot, Ryan K., Sara Forsdyke, and Edith Foster. (2017) The Oxford handbook of Thucydides. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 21. 8. Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. 2.65.13 9. Hanson, Victor Davis. (2005) “Why Did Athens Lose?” National Review www.nationalreview.com/article/215949/why-did-athens-lose-victor-davis-hanson. 10. Ober, Josiah. (2016) The rise and fall of classical Greece. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 182.

xxxxxxxxxx

zxxxxxx

ARTS2283

imposed oligarchies. So despite the fact that they were at war and surrounded by three of the strongest city-states in Greece, Sparta, Thebes, and Corinth, Athens still sent a vast amount of resources to Sicily. This is foolish at best. One could say that Athens more so lost the war than Sparta won the war.11 Athens was responsible for exiling, executing, or fining almost every general it ordered on campaign. A clear example of this was the case of the Battle of Arginusa. On arrival back to Athens six of the eight generals were executed, despite the fact that they were victorious.12 Athens intentions were to hold commanders more accountable but it resulted in leaders that were timid and more prone to mistakes. Any sort of setback, whether it be the Delium campaign or Arginusa, the generals would likely flee rather go back to Athens, in fear of facing trial. Thucydides was exiled for his failure to save Amphipolis from the grips of Brasidas. However, later when Brasidas failed to reach Torone in time he was not called back to Sparta to face consequences.13 Athens unnecessary treatment towards its generals was a crucial downfall in the later outcome of the war. In the beginning of the war Athens had the plan that they would gather its people and use the city walls to its advantage. At face value this seems like a wise decision as Sparta had the upper hand in land battle outside the protection of the cities walls. However, with so many people so close together a plague soon broke out that claimed a third of all the lives in Athens. Pericles, an esteemed Athenian general, included.14 No one could have predicted this but none the less resulted in disaster. The Spartan triumph cannot be solely attributed to their sense of superiority 11. Hornblower, Simon (2011). The Greek World 479-323 BC (4th ed.). London: Routledge, p.121. 12. Cartledge, Paul. (2004) The Spartans: the world of the warrior-heroes of ancient Greece, from utopia to crisis and collapse. New York: Vintage Books, pp.21-30. 13. Hanson, Victor Davis. (2005) “Why Did Athens Lose?” National Review www.nationalreview.com/article/215949/why-did-athens-lose-victor-davis-hanson 14. Balot, Ryan K., Sara Forsdyke, and Edith Foster. (2017) The Oxford handbook of Thucydides. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 87-88

xxxxxxxxxx

zxxxxxx

ARTS2283

in battle but it most surely played a part. It was the agoge which gave the Spartans their primacy in the Peloponnese and the reputation for invincibility. Only three of the remarkable human phenomena of Greek history are regularly called invincible. They are Alexander the Great, the Silver Shields of Macedon, and the Spartans up to their defeat by the Thebans at Leuktra in 371.15 Sparta’s entire culture was centered around war and fighting. A lifelong dedication to military discipline and precision fighting no doubt gave them an advantage over other Greek civilizations in their time.16 Thucydides himself emphasizes how rare capable men like Brasidas, Gylippus, and Lysander were at Sparta.17 When Alcibiades rejoined the Athenian side towards the end of the Peloponnesian War, Lysander was made commander of the Spartan fleet in the Aegean. He realized that with the Spartan army being mostly a land based force it was going to be hard to overcome the intimidating Athenian navy. He needed gold to build a naval fleet, pay rowers, and also to pay pirates to interfere with Athenian shipping. Lysander persuaded Cyrus, the Great King's son, to help the Spartans. He asked for Cyrus to fund an increase in the sailors' pay. Athenian sailors whose loyalty lied nowhere almost imminently left for the higher paying Spartan fleet. Thucydides consistently argued that the Spartans would prove to be poor students of naval warfare. Phormio predicted that the Peloponnesian ships would behave more like a hoplite army than a navy and would prove unable to maintain their formation like a force on land.18 It was Lysander later who proved them wrong with the defeat of the Athenian navy

11. Hornblower, Simon (2011). The Greek World 479-323 BC (4th ed.). London: Routledge, p.121. 12. Cartledge, Paul. (2004) The Spartans: the world of the warrior-heroes of ancient Greece, from utopia to crisis and collapse. New York: Vintage Books, pp.21-30. 13. Hanson, Victor Davis. (2005) “Why Did Athens Lose?” National Review www.nationalreview.com/article/215949/why-did-athens-lose-victor-davis-hanson 14. Balot, Ryan K., Sara Forsdyke, and Edith Foster. (2017) The Oxford handbook of Thucydides. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 87-88

xxxxxxxxxx

zxxxxxx

ARTS2283

at Aegospotami, thus ending the Peloponnesian War. When Athens finally surrendered after the long siege, Lysander was ultimately responsible for installing the government of the thirty, later remembered as the Thirty Tyrants.19 During the first phase of the Peloponnesian War Sparta produced a commander whose tactics, strategy and personality would be modeled by many later leaders to come. Both Xenophon and Alexander the Great must have studied his campaigns, for his signature is indelibly marked on their exploits. Lysander may be the best known Spartan commander of the war, but no other leader represented the flexibility, bravery, intelligence, persuasiveness or skill in combat as Brasidas.20 He gained recognition for his assault on Pylos in 425. As the Spartans attacked the Athenian positions by their ships many of the commanders were weary of the ships running aground. According to Thucydides, Brasidas encouraged the sacrifice their ships in order to achieve victory. He forced his own ship ashore and was beaten back by the Athenians and after receiving many wounds.21 The commander united in himself the stereotypical Spartan courage with those virtues in which regular Spartans were most signally lacking. Brasidas was quick about forming his plans and carried them out without hesitation or second guessing. Exactly the ability which many Athenian commanders lacked. Furthermore, the rhetoric in the speech of Brasidas is of noticeably higher quality than the other Spartans recorded by Thucydides Brasidas was buried in Amphipolis and was recognized as the town's second founder. The Spartan commander received heroic honors and was always held in great esteem.22 Despite the importance of Brasidas’ military exploits, perhaps his most important legacy was the damage he

15. Dillon, M., & Garland, L. (2010). Ancient Greece: Historical and social document from archaic times to the death of Alexander (3rd ed.). New York: Routledge, pp. 441-46. 16. Kagan, Donald. (2005) The peloponnesian war: Athens and Sparta in savage conflict 431-404 BC. London: Harper Perennial, pp.476-78. 17. Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. 4.12 18. Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. 4.85-4.87.

xxxxxxxxxx

zxxxxxx

ARTS2283

did to the military reputation of the historian Thucydides. If Thucydides was angered about Brasidas’ destruction of his career, his depiction of Brasidas would not be as he told. His description was purely beneficial to the Spartan cause.23 Not to mention this furthers the notion that Thucydides was unbiased in his depictions of the war. When Alcibiades urged the Spartans to send a general to lead a resistance in Syracuse against the Athenian expedition, Gylippus was chosen. His arrival proved to the turning point of what was becoming quite the struggle. More adept than Nicias, the Athenian commander which he faced, he was able to drive the Athenians from key strategic locations essentially breaking the siege.24 When Athens learned of this defeat they soon sent reinforcements at the command of Demosthenes. Gylippus soon made short work of him as well, that ultimately put an end to the Athenian Campaign for Syracuse. Although Gylippus proved himself to be very effective on the battlefield his moral character was a bit lacking. Like his father he met his downfall in a financial scandal. Entrusted by Lysander with a cash of silver coins for delivery to the Ephors at Sparta, he could not resist the urge to take a part that he thought was rightfully his. Upon discovery of this theft, Gylippus was exiled and never returned to Sparta.25 Sparta and Persia shared a dislike of Athens so they had something to offer to each other. Persia’s dislike stemming from the Athenian supported rebellion led by Amorges. It violated the agreement between the Achaemenid king and the Delian League not to interfere in each other’s sphere of influence. In 412, the two former enemies reached a treaty agreement. Thucydides in his book the History of the Peloponnesian War describes this treaty as being revised three

19. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War. 7.7-7.3. 20. Grote, George. (1899) Greece: I, Legendary Greece ; II, Grecian history to the reign of Peisistratus at Athens. New York: Collier, pp. 268-71. 21. Kagan, Donald. (1996) The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian expedition. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, p. 258.

xxxxxxxxxx

zxxxxxx

ARTS2283

separate times in order for both Persia and Sparta to be satisfied.26 The main takeaway from this treaty is that the two powers would work jointly against their Athenian adversaries. Persia also made overtures to Sparta, offering money with which to build a fleet that could rival Athens, in return for Sparta recognizing Persian sovereignty in Asia Minor. The driving force behind the war was Persia. Persia feared a united Greece, and was wealthy enough to finance wars between the rival city-states. No matter how badly or frequently Sparta or Athens was defeated there was always enough Persian gold to convince them to go back to war. After all the war was eventually decided at the Battle of Aegospotami where under Lysander’s command 168 Athenian ships were destroyed and thousands of Athenian sailors captured.27 Without the Persian gold the Spartans most surely would have never achieved a sizable force at the seas thus never allowing such a battle to have even taken place. Sparta was able to starve out the people within the walls of Athens. Facing this starvation and disease from the prolonged siege Athens surrendered in 404 BC, with its allies soon following suit. The outcome of the war could have been entirely different and it very well may have lasted much longer, even though it had already been 27 years. According to Hornblower the Spartans were able to prevail only as a result of a change of mind by the Persian king who realized that Athenian dominance in Greece would be more dangerous to him than Spartan.28

22. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War. 8.5-8.8. 23. Pomeroy, Sarah B., Stanley Mayer Burstein, Walter Donlan, Jennifer Tolbert Roberts, and David W. Tandy. (2017) Ancient Greece: a political, social, and cultural history. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 317-327 24. Hornblower, Simon (2011). The Greek World 479-323 BC (4th ed.). London: Routledge, p.155.

xxxxxxxxxx

zxxxxxx

ARTS2283

In the end the Spartan victory threatened to wipe out all of Athens but within a year of its defeat Athenians had regained their city. They restored their naval fleet back to its former glory and reestablished democracy. Regardless the Peloponnese League was victorious and this is why. Persian money that allowed Sparta to build hundreds of ships that would overpower the Athenian navy. Strategic decisions from Spartan leaders like Lysander and Brasidas that gave way to many crucial steps on the way to Spartan victory. Lastly and most significant was Athens strategic errors and its mismanagement of its resources. After all it was Thucydides view that Athens should and could have won.

xxxxxxxxxx

zxxxxxx

ARTS2283

REFERENCES:



Balot, Ryan K., Sara Forsdyke, and Edith Foster. (2017) The Oxford handbook of Thucydides. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.



Brunt, P. A. (1965) “Spartan Policy and Strategy in the Archidamin War.” Phoenix, vol. 19, no. 4.



Cartledge, Paul. (2004) The Spartans: the world of the warrior-heroes of ancient Greece, from utopia to crisis and collapse. New York: Vintage Books.



Dillon, M., & Garland, L. (2010). Ancient Greece: Historical and social document from archaic times to the death of Alexander (3rd ed.). New York: Routledge.



Grote, George. (1899) Greece: I, Legendary Greece ; II, Grecian history to the reign of Peisistratus at Athens. New York: Collier



Hanson, Victor Davis. (2005) “Why Did Athens Lose?” National Review www.nationalreview.com/article/215949/why-did-athens-lose-victor-davis-hanson.



Hornblower, Simon (2011). The Greek World 479-323 BC (4th ed.). London: Routledge



Kagan, Donald. (1996) The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian expedition. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press,



Kagan, Donald. (2005) The Peloponnesian War: Athens and Sparta in savage conflict 431-404 BC. London: Harper Perennial.



Ober, Josiah. (2016) The rise and fall of classical Greece. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

xxxxxxxxxx 

zxxxxxx

ARTS2283

Pomeroy, Sarah B., Stanley Mayer Burstein, Walter Donlan, Jennifer Tolbert Roberts, and David W. Tandy. (2017) Ancient Greece: a political, social, and cultural history. New York: Oxford University Press.



Pownall, Frances. (2010) “Thucydides, Pericles, and the Idea of Athens in the Peloponnesian War by Martha Taylor.” Mouseion: Journal of the Classical Association of Canada.



Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War....