BP oil spill - it is an essay PDF

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Technical and Ethical Analysis of an Industrial Accident Group number 5 Felipe Castro, Shair Sekhar, Sohyun Jeon, Taylor Boozer, Zachary Mailliard Date: April 18 2020 To: Anthony Bryan Hayward, Chief Executive Officer From: Advising Department Subject: Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig On April 20th , 2010, at approximately 22:00 UTC-6, the Deepwater Horizon rig suffered an explosion. The rig, situated over the Macondo oil prospect in the Mississippi canyon, was located over an oil well 4,993 feet below the surface, where it extended approximately 18,000 feet. On the night of April 20th , a surge of natural gas burst through the concrete core in an event similar to that of one of the rigs in the Caspian Sea. This core was also installed by contractor Halliburton for the purpose of sealing the well for later use. According to the report from the response team, the core seemed to be too weak to hold out against this pressure due to its concrete composition, whose curing was accelerated by nitrogen gas (Pallardy, 2020). Once the natural gas broke through the core, it rose to the rig and became ignited, resulting in an explosion that killed 11 workers and left 17 injured. (11 Facts About the BP Oil Spill ,2020) Subsequent to the explosion, on April 22nd  , the damage to the rig caused it to capsize, resulting in the riser breaking and releasing the drilling mud. The rig’s main failsafe in this situation, the blowout preventer, failed to cut off the rising oil as the blind shear rams, blades that were intended to chop through the pipes carrying the oil, were unable to slice through the pipe due to them being bent from the rising pressure. With no method of counteracting the pressure of the oil and natural gas, oil began to leak into the gulf at a rate of 60,000 barrels per day (Mullins, 2010). In the first month, over 30 million gallons of oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico, a quantity that was three times bigger than the Exxon Valdez oil spill (Amadeo, 2019). BP engineers attempted to quickly execute “top kill”, where drilling mud is pumped into the well to staunch the flow of oil, which also failed. Soon after, a solution was found through “static kill”, where drilling mud is placed through the blowout preventer at a low pressure after the riser is capped by a permanent seal to clear the way for “bottom kill” which effectively seals the well (Pallardy, 2020). Although the solution proved successful, it took more than a month to execute, resulting in an end quantity of 168 gallons of oil that leaked into the gulf. Eleven workers went missing and were not found even after a three-day search. As a result, they were presumed dead (Jarvis, 2010). Furthermore, the costs of the spill were sizable; in total, it cost the company approximately $65 billion (Bousso, 2018). This figure takes into account the value of the oil and the cost of cleanup efforts, as well as payments for fines and other legal claims. Unsurprisingly, there was a large environmental cost to the surrounding ecosystem. Various species, including seabirds, sea turtles and dolphins were killed due to the oil

(Smithsonian Ocean, 2018). Additionally, some coral reefs deep below the surface were observed to be covered with oil from the spill. Shrimp with various deformities were also found, which impacted the operations of shrimp fisheries in the area for about a year (Smithsonian Ocean). The spill also contributed to the erosion of about 1000 miles of the shoreline along the Gulf Coast. Because of all of these environmental impacts, there was also a negative impact on local economies in Louisiana and Florida since they relied on fishing, oil and tourism (Ulrich, 2011). In the aftermath of the spill, there was a six-month moratorium on all offshore drilling until the full effects of the spill had been investigated and recommendations for the future could be made. Future recommendations included having all Blowout Preventers (BOPs) on the oil rigs re-inspected and recertified by independent organizations. Additionally, suggestions were made for additional regulations relating to oil well design and drilling operations, as well as increased safety training (U.S. Department of the Interior, 2016). BP engineers made critical design flaws that allowed for the failure of the drilling rig. Consider this event as failing to adhere by swiss cheese risk modeling. After boring to the payzone, they assumed the number of centralisers required to keep the casing in place to allow for sufficient cementing was six (Hoffman, 2017). A centraliser is a device meant to keep the casing located in the borehole straight so that the area around the casing is uniform and annular (ring shaped) allowing for proper sealing around the casing. Twenty-one centralizers was considered the optimal amount for cementing the wellbore (Hoffman, 2017), so it was decided that six centralizers would ensure proper sealing is baffling. Additional assumptions were made throughout the cementing process. Fracturing the rock formation surrounding the wellbore was a serious concern, so several compromises were made to the mechanical strength of the cement in exchange for lowering the risk of formation fracturing (Maitland, 2020). The cement column was kept lower than standard (only 500 feet above the hydrocarbon zone) and the flow rate of the cement required to displace drilling mud still in the bore was kept lower than optimal to reduce stress on the rock formation (Maitland, 2020). All of which played a role in compromising the mechanical strength of the cement which already showed instability in the lab of the contractor hired to design the cement (Maitland, 2020). As such, it is readily apparent that some rupturing of the cement seal was likely to occur. Additionally, pressure levels observed in the drillpipe indicated that sealing of the casing was insufficient and that a leak was occuring were ignored in preference for more desirable pressure readings collected in an alternative route (Maitland, 2020). The subsequent rupturing of the core and leak could have been easily predicted by indication of the pressure differentials. A culture of tighter safety and more experienced regulators might have prevented the BP Deepwater Horizon leak. But equipment modifications and new technology will be needed to minimize the risk of such deepwater oil leaks. Engineers criticized BP's decision to install a continuous set of threaded casing pipes from the wellhead down to the bottom of its well (Fairley, 2010). “The only thing I can figure is they must have thought it was a cost-cutting deal,” says Bommer of BP’s well design (Bommer, 2010). This can be problematic in deep, high-pressure wells for two reasons. First, it seals off the space between the casing and the bore hole, leaving one blind to leaks that sneak up around the casing pipe. Second, the long string

gives gas more time to percolate into the well. A preferred alternative in high-pressure deepwater is a “liner” design in which drillers install and then cement in place a short string of casing in the lower reaches of the well before casing the rest of the well (Fairley, 2020). This design enables the driller to watch for leaks while the cement is setting. Attention has also focused on the failed blowout preventer, or BOP, that could have saved the Deepwater Horizon. The Interior safety review calls for upgrades to BOPs to address various failure mechanisms that may have doomed the Deepwater Horizon, such as placement of redundant shear rams strong enough to cut through the toughened threading between casing pipes. In addition, the penalties for spilling should be strengthened. Impose meaningful financial penalties for deepwater spills. Enough to incentivize private industry to take environmental contingency planning seriously. The $75 million per incident liability cap associated with a deepwater spill was clearly insufficient to motivate BP and its peers to develop effective contingency plans. An obvious approach would be to repeal the Oil Pollution Act's $75 million per incident liability limit on deepwater drilling (Tobias, 2010). The Deepwater Horizon disaster suggests that deepwater drilling should be subject to equal or more rigorous penalties. Civil and criminal penalties in force under the Oil Pollution Act should also be re-examined for adequacy in ensuring deterrence. Regulatory ideas should be implemented on how to strengthen the converging safety culture, such as new drilling guidelines, operator certification requirements, and tougher inspection regimes (Fairley, 2020). Initially following the news of the oil leak, BP’s first mistake was downplaying the amount of oil actually being leaked into the ocean. At first, BP claimed it was 1,000 barrels a day, but the numbers turned out to be closer to 5,000 a day(Robertson & Kaufman,2010). This makes the company look less trustworthy and leads consumers to believe that BP had something to hide. BP then states in its first press release after the spill that the oil rig was not theirs, but was Transocean’s instead, so therefore the spill was not their fault. But, BP was using this rig at the time and claims that it is their responsibility to clean up the oil, and proceeds to call the spill the “Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill” (NBC News, 2010), trying to eradicate the use of the more common name for it, the “BP Oil Spill”. Using their first press release to say that the spill was not their fault when it’s their oil paints BP as not willing to take responsibility for its mistakes. In May 2010, during an interview with The Guardian, chief executive Tony Hayward claimed that the environmental effect of the spill was miniscule compared to the whole Gulf of Mexico, stating “The Gulf of Mexico is a very big ocean. The amount of volume of oil and dispersant we are putting into it is tiny in relation to the total water volume.”(Webb,2010). This tells other people that BP is seemingly wanting to sweep it under the rug and doesn’t necessarily care that the accident happened nor concerned about the environmental effects, but just wants the public to see it as not a big deal. One thing BP did handle well, however, was their efforts in actually cleaning up the oil spill and keeping the public updated. They had a whole section on their website dedicated to it, providing pictures of people helping out. They also launched a website, www.Deepwaterhorizonresponse.com, for all those involved in helping to clean up the mess, and posted constant updates on their twitter account(Beam, 2010). This helps prove to the public that they are at least trying to reconcile, and maybe even appeals to a more younger, politically active audience by using twitter. The BP oil spill was the largest marine oil spill in history, and BP did

not do much to take responsibility or apologize and seemed to have the worst PR team in history handling this accident.

Oil slick spreading out over the water (Beltra, 2010)

Graphic depicting the oil leak and containment process (BBC News, 2010)

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