Briefs of Steinburg, Skebba, Jasdip, and Lefkowitz Oct. 20 PDF

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Completed case brief of Steinburg, Skebba, Jasdip, and Lefkowitz...

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Alaina White Professor Girasa Business Law October 20, 2016 Steinburg v. Chicago Medical School Case Brief I.

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Facts Robert Steinburg applied to the Chicago Medical School, as a first year student and paid the $15 application fee. His application was rejected and Steinburg filed an action against the school, claiming that it had failed to evaluate his application according to the academic entrance criteria printed in the school’s bulletin. His complaint alleged that the schools decision to accept or reject a particular applicant for the first-year class was primarily based on such nonacademic considerations as the prospective student’s familial relationship to members of the school’s faculty and to members of its board of trustees, and the ability of the applicant or his family to pledge or make payment of large sums of money to the school. The complaint further alleged that, by using such unpublished criteria to evaluate applicants, the school had breached the contract which Steinburg contended was created when the school accepted his application fee. Issue Whether a school informational bulletin is considered an offer to an applicant. Decision The court agreed with Steinberg’s position. The dismissal was reversed and remanded. Reason Steinberg contends that the Chicago Medical School’s informational brochure constituted an invitation to make an offer that his application and the submission of the $15 fee to the school amounted to an offer; that the school’s voluntary reception of his fee constituted an acceptance and because of these events a contract was created between the school and himself. The school counters that no contract came into being because the informational brochures do not constitute offers, but are construed by the courts to be general proposals to consider, examine, and negotiate. The school also pointed out that the doctrine had been specifically applied in Illinois to university informational publications. The Court believed that Steinburg and the school entered into an enforceable contract; that the school’s obligation under the contract was stated in the school’s bulletin in a definitive manner and that by accepting his application fee, the school bound itself to fulfill its promises.

Alaina White Professor Girasa Business Law October 20, 2016 I.

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Case Brief for Skebba v. Kasch Facts Skebba, a salesman, worked for a company that eventually experienced financial difficulties. Kasch, owned M.W. Kasch Co. Kasch hired Skebba as a sales representative, and over the years eventually promoted him to vice president of sales. When M.W. Kasch Co. experienced serious financial problems, Skebba was solicited by another company to leave Kasch and work for them. When Skebba told Kasch he was accepting the new opportunity, Kasch asked what it would take for him to stay. Skebba told Kasch that he would stay if Kasch agreed to pay Skebba $250,000 if one of these three conditions occur: the company was sold, Skebba lawfully terminated, or Skebba retired. Skebba reports that Kasch agreed to this proposal and Kasch promised to have the agreement drawn up. Over the years, Skebba repeatedly asked Kasch for a written summary of this agreement; however, none was forthcoming. Kasch sold the business and received $5.1 million. Skebba then asked Kasch for the $250,000 Kasch had previously promised to him, but Kasch refused and denied ever having such agreement. Instead, Kasch gave Skebba a severance agreement which promised two years salary continuation on the sale of the company, but only if Skebba was hired by the successor company. Issue Whether primary estoppel fulfills the details of a verbal promise. Decision Order reversed and cause remanded in favor of Skebba. Reason The jury found that there was no contract, but Kasch had made a promise upon which Skebba relied to his detriment, that the reliance was foreseeable, and that Skebba was damaged in the amount of $250,000. Kasch did not promise to pay Skebba more than Skebba would have earned at the job Skebba turned down. Kasch did not promise that total income Skebba would be greater in the turned down job, no matter how long he remained with Kasch. Kasch only promised that if Skebba stayed, Kasch would pay Skebba $250,000 when Kasch sold the business and Skebba stayed. Kasch refused to pay as promised. The purpose of primary estoppel is to enforce promises where the failure to do so is unjust. The court concluded that the trail court erred in holding that specific performance was not available on this promissory estoppel claim. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

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Alaina White Professor Girasa Business Law October 20, 2016 Case Brief of JASDIP Properties SC, LLC v. Estate of Richardson Facts Stewart Richardson (seller) and JASDIP Properties SC, LLC (buyer) entered into an agreement for the purchase of a certain property on South Carolina. The purchase price for the property was to be $537,000. The buyer paid an initial earnest money deposit of $10,000. The remaining balance was due two months later, and the seller granted the buyer extensions to the closing date in return for additional payments of $175,000 and $25,000 each to be applied to the purchase price. The buyer was unable to close in a timely fashion, and the seller rescinded the contract. Thereafter, the buyer brought suit against the seller contending that the seller would be unjustly enriched if allowed to keep the money paid despite the rescission of the agreement and requesting $210,000 for the deposit and payments. Issue Whether there is a breach in contract if the seller of the property keeps payments when a buyer is putting that money towards the purchase price. Decision The trial court’s decision was reversed in favor of the buyer. Reason The $175,000 and $25,000 payments both explicitly stated that they were towards the purchase price of the property. Additionally, the buyer paid $10,000 in an earnest money deposit. To recover the restitution the buyer must show that he conferred a non-gratuitous benefit on the defendant, that the defendant realized some value from the benefit, and that it would be inequitable for the defendant to retain benefit without paying the plaintiff for its value. Based on the jury’s findings that the buyer did not breach, the court found that the buyer is entitled to the money paid towards the purchase price as well as half of the earnest money under the theory of restitution. The buyer paid the seller $205,000 towards the purchase price and the sale did not go through despite the fact that neither party breached. The seller kept the money although he retained the property. And, the seller keeping the money is inequitable because the seller still has the property. The court reversed the trial court’s determination that the buyer was not entitled to restitution and awarded the buyer $205,000.

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Alaina White Professor Girasa Business Law October 20, 2016 Case Brief for Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, INC. Facts This case grows out of the alleged refusal of the defendant to sell to the plaintiff a certain fur piece which it had offered for sale in a newspaper advertisement. The defendant published two ads proclaiming the sale of limited furs for only $1.00 on a first come first serve basis. The findings of the court record that on each of the dates of the sale, the plaintiff was the first to present himself at the appropriate counter in the defendant’s store and on each occasion demanded the furs and indicated his readiness to buy them for just $1.00. On both occasions, the defendant refused to sell the merchandise to the plaintiff, stating on the first occasion that by a “house rule” the offer was intended for women only and sales would not be made to men. Issue Whether a binding obligation may originate in advertisements addressed to the general public. Decision The judgement was affirmed in favor of the plaintiff. Reason The defendant contends that a newspaper advertisement offering items of merchandise for sale at a names price is a “unilateral offer” which may be withdrawn without notice. Whether in any individual instance a newspaper advertisement is an offer rather than an invitation to make an offer depends on the legal intention of the parties and the surrounding circumstances. The offer by the defendant was clear, definite, and explicit, and left nothing open for negotiation. The plaintiff, having successfully managed to be the first one to appear at the seller’s business to be served, and having offered the stated purchase price of the article, was entitled to the purchase.

Alaina White Professor Girasa Business Law October 20, 2016 Case Problems 4-6 for Chapter 9 4. A contract has been formed, but it is voidable because Maria can deny Calvin’s goods at any time. 5. Betty’s promise may be binding because of the doctrine of Primary Estoppel. There is no contract here, but Betty’s promise could be considered a Primary Estoppel. 6. Since Mary conferred the benefit of getting her abdominal aneurysm cured, she appreciated the benefit, and the retention of the benefit was inequitable, this established a quasi contract. The services generated by the hospital were required to help save Mary’s health and an emergency, so Mary did not need to consent to receive these services. Case Problems 4-6 for Chapter 10 4. Burchette should prevail because the irrevocable offer has already begun and she already sent in the down payment before Bleluck revoked the offer. 5. Since the seller made an option contract to end on November 30th, the seller prevails and does not have to sell the goblets to the buyer. 6. A contract has resulted between Melforth and Dallas. Dallas’ acceptance of the offer was mailed before the offer’s termination, therefore Melforth cannot sell the property to another buyer because Dallas has already confirmed and signed the letter/ contract....