Causation and Concurrence PDF

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Criminal law causation and concurrence of acts....

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Class 22 – Causation & Concurrence Causation I.

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Example a. Dillon points a gun at Vince intending to kill him. A few seconds before Dillon pulls the trigger, Xavier jumps out of the bushes & shoots & instantly kills Vince. Dillon then fires his gun, & his bullet enters the already dead body of Vince. Is Dillon guilty of murder? i. Dillon fired a bullet into a dead body – you cannot kill a dead person. ii. Actus Reus: voluntary act of shooting iii. Mens Rea: Intent to murder iv. Causation: Dillon’s intentional act did not cause the social harm – causation not met. b. Must show that Defendant is the “but-for” cause of the social harm & the proximate cause of the social harm. Introduction a. Requires a causal connection between the voluntary act & social harm. b. Actus Reus: Consists of (1) a voluntary act (or omission when the defendant has a legal duty to act) that (2) causes (3) the social harm. i. Because causation analysis can become quite complicated, courts tend to treat causation as a separate element of the crime. c. Some courts expressly provide that a tort conception of causation is insufficient to impose criminal responsibility. Instead, a stricter test, requiring a closer connection between the defendant’s conduct & the resulting harm, may be applied. d. Two types of causation must be proven to establish criminal liability: i. Defendant’s conduct must be an actual or but for cause of the social harm. ii. Defendant’s conduct must be the proximate or legal cause of the social harm. Actual (Or “But For”) Causation a. Actual Cause Inquiry: Determines whether the defendant’s voluntary act or omission is one of those causal factors It does not show that the defendant is the primary cause of the social harm. b. “But for D’s voluntary act (or omission where D had a duty to act), would the social harm have occurred when it did?” If the answer to this question is “no” (w/o D’s conduct, the social harm would not have occurred when it did), then D is an actual cause. c. Example: D1 intentionally shoots V in the stomach. Medical testimony says V would have died within an hour from the gunshot wound. But simultaneously & independently of D1, D2 intentionally shoots V in the stomach. As a result of the two wounds, V died in 5 minutes. Who is the but for cause of V’s death? i. D1 & D2 are both but for causes of death. W/o both gunshots, V would not have died w/in 5 minutes. d. Example: D1 shoots V in the heart; simultaneously & independently, D2 shoots V in the head. V dies instantly. Medical evidence shows either attack alone would have killed V instantly. Who caused V’s death? i. Rare issue, resolved by some courts as “would V have died when & how he did?” Proximate Causation a. Courts & juries select a more direct, morally justifiable actor or actors. b. When the defendant’s conduct is the direct cause of the social harm (when there are no intervening causes), courts tend to find that it is fair & just to hold the defendant criminally liable for the resulting harm. i. Direct Cause Examples: (1) D shoots V & V dies instantly; (2) D shoots V & V dies after proper medical care

1. In both cases, D was the direct cause of V’s death – there was no casually significant intervening factors 2. Bright-line Rule: If D is the direct cause of the social harm, D is the proximate cause. c. When intervening causes are present, many courts apply intervening cause analysis to decide whether to hold the defendant criminally liable. i. Dependent (Responsive) Intervening Cause: One that is dependent upon or responsive to the defendant’s voluntary act. General rule is that defendant is the proximate cause unless the intervening cause is extremely unusual or bizarre. A force that occurs in reaction or response to the defendant’s prior conduct. 1. Most cts hold D liable despite poor medical care unless care is grossly & abnormally negligent 2. Most courts hold D liable for harm caused by a victim fleeing D’s aggression or a dangerous situation caused by D, even if the victim also acts negligently. Commonwealth v. Rementer 3. D1 drives boat at unsafe speed, causing it to capsize. V1, drunken passenger, drowns foolishly attempting to swim to shore. V1’s actions were taken in response to D1’s wrongful conduct. 4. D2 seriously wounds V2. V2 receives poor medical treatment from the ER doctor & V2 dies. The negligent medical treatment was given in response to D2’s wrongful conduct. ii. Independent (Coincidental) Intervening Cause: One that is independent of or coincidental to defendant’s voluntary act. Defendant is generally relieved of criminal liability unless the intervening cause is foreseeable. A force that occurs independent of the defendant’s prior conduct. 1. One Exception: The “intended consequences doctrine” – if you intend a certain consequence and it happens as a result of an unforeseen independent cause, you may not be absolved of liability. Intended consequences can never become too remote. 2. D1 robs V1, a passenger in D1’s car, then abandons V1 on a rural road. Later, driver X1 strikes & kills V1, who is standing by the side of the road where she was left. D1’s actions DID NOT cause X1 to strike V1. 3. D2 seriously wounds V2. At hospital, V2 is stabbed to death by X2, knifewielding maniac who runs into hospital & kills everyone in sight. X2 DID NOT act in response to D1’s conduct. But-For Test Was the defendant’s action the “actual cause” or “factual cause” of the social harm? Test: But for D’s voluntary act, would the social harm have occurred when it did? There can be multiple causes for a death

But-for test narrows pool of candidates responsible

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Proximate Cause Test Was the defendant’s action the “legal cause” of the social harm? No one test, but at roots asks if it is fair/just/socially permissible to hold someone accountable Many factors, perhaps none as large as “foreseeability” Was it foreseeable that D’s action would result in the harm? More stringent than tort law.

Commonwealth v. Rementer a. Facts: Rementer (D) & girlfriend, Berry, left a bar in the middle of a heated argument. Berry got into driver’s seat of her cab, which she drove for work. D pushed Berry into passenger’s seat, climbed into the cab, & drove off. Many witnesses saw D punch & beat Berry & pull her hair as she tried to escape through passenger side window. Berry escaped & ran from the cab twice. Each time, D stopped vehicle, caught, hit, &

VI.

dragged her back to cab. Berry was able to escape the cab a 3rd time & & to a passing vehicle for help. Driver became scared, pushed Berry away, locked doors, & sped off. Berry was crushed to death beneath the wheels of the vehicle. As a result of Berry’s death, D was charged with murder in 3rd degree. At trial, many witnesses testified to the ferocity of D’s assault on Berry during the several minutes prior to her death. D testified that he only intended to calm Berry down & take her home & did not intend to injure or cause her death. D was convicted of 3rd-degree murder. D appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence of causation, because it was unforeseeable that the vehicle would kill Berry. b. Issue: May a defendant be held criminally liable for a victim’s death if his conduct was a direct, substantial, & operative cause of the death, without an intervening act breaking the chain of causation? c. Two Part Test: (1) The court must examine the threshold question of whether the defendant’s conduct was an operative cause of the victim’s death. (2) The court must determine whether the result of the defendant’s actions was so extraordinarily remote or attenuated that imposing criminal liability would be unfair. d. Holding: D argues that his actions were not the cause of Berry’s death, because it was not foreseeable that she could have been killed by a passing vehicle. Several witnesses testified that D consistently hit & beat Berry from the time they left the bar until she finally escaped from the cab & was crushed by the passing vehicle. Based on evidence presented, no intervening act broke the chain of causation. D’s conduct in hitting Berry was the direct cause of her attempt to avoid his beatings by fleeing, which in turn was a substantial & operative factor in causing her death. D may be held criminally liable for Berry’s death. Affirmed. e. Rule of Law: A defendant may be held criminally liable for a victim’s death if his conduct was a direct, substantial, & operative cause of the death, without an intervening act breaking the chain of causation. State v. Govan a. Facts: Govan (D) moved into a home w/ Keeble & her daughter. D & Keeble had a tumultuous relationship & regularly argued. Keeble accused D of molesting her daughter & fired a handgun at D. After Keeble missed, D left & returned with another handgun. Keeble was attempting to call the police when D shot her in the neck, paralyzing her from the neck down. D insisted that he did not intend to shoot Keeble. During her hospitalization, the two reconciled & married. 5 years later, Keeble contracted pneumonia while still paralyzed, but did not seek medical treatment for 2 weeks despite knowing that she was ill. Keeble had been suffering from extreme pain due to the quadriplegia & eventually died from pneumonia. D was indicted for 2 nddegree murder. At trial, two physicians testified that Keeble’s death was caused by pneumonia stemming from the quadriplegia, which was in turn caused by the gunshot wound fired by D. D was convicted of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. D filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to show that his gunshot caused Keeble’s paralysis & subsequent death. The trial court denied D’s motion. D appealed, arguing that Keeble broke the chain of causation by giving up her will to live. b. Issue: May a defendant may be held criminally liable for a victim’s injury or death if his illegal conduct is a proximate cause of the injury or death? c. Holding: Although a victim may break the chain of causation by voluntarily harming self, D’s conduct is still regarded as the proximate cause of the injury if the victim harms herself b/c of D’s illegal conduct. D claims his illegal conduct in firing a handgun at Keeble did not cause death from pneumonia. If an unforeseeable intervening act broke the chain of causation, D’s conduct would not be the proximate cause of Keeble’s death. There was overwhelming evidence produced at trial that Keeble’s gunshot wound resulted in her quadriplegia. 2 physicians testified that Keeble’s paralysis

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caused her to contract pneumonia, which led to her subsequent death. There was sufficient evidence that D’s illegal conduct caused Keeble’s death. D also claims that Keeble harmed herself by giving up her will to live, b/c she was in significant pain & did not seek medical treatment for 2 weeks despite knowing that she was ill. Keeble would not have suffered pain from her paralysis if not for the gunshot wound inflicted by D. Keeble did not break the chain of causation by failing to seek medical treatment. B/c D’s conduct is the proximate cause of Keeble’s death, he may be held criminally liable for her death. Affirmed. d. Rule of Law: A defendant may be held criminally liable for a victim’s injury or death if his illegal conduct is a proximate cause of the injury or death. Henderson v. Kibbe a. Facts: Kibbe (D) & co-defendant saw Stafford at a bar, intoxicated & displaying money. Ds agreed to give Stafford a ride & decided to rob him. D slapped Stafford, took his money, & made him lower his pants & remove his boots. Ds abandoned Stafford on a dark road in the snow, w/o his coat, shoes, & glasses, where he got hit & killed by a speeding truck. Driver testified that he was traveling 10 miles over speed limit & did not understand warnings about Stafford from other cars. Driver saw Stafford in the road but did not swerve or stop before hitting him. D was convicted pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(2), which provides that a person is guilty of 2nd-degree murder when “under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, & thereby causes the death of another person.” No jury instruction on causation was requested by either party, & none was given. Instead, the trial judge defined “recklessly” as being aware of & consciously disregarding a substantial & unjustifiable risk that a certain result will occur. NY CoA affirmed conviction, stating that it only must be shown that the ultimate harm is something that should have been foreseen. The court of appeals did not address D’s claim of inadequate jury instructions, because the issue was not raised in the trial court. D then filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, which was rejected. The USCoA for 2nd Circuit reversed, finding that failure to instruct on causation created an impermissible risk that the jury did not make the required finding of causation beyond a reasonable doubt. b. Issue: Whether the NY State trial judge’s failure to instruct the jury on the issue of causation was constitutional error requiring a Federal District Court to grant habeas corpus relief. c. Holding: B/c a determination of recklessness includes a conclusion that D was “aware of & consciously disregarded a substantial risk,” it necessarily includes a finding that the defendant foresaw the ultimate harm that the risk presented and therefore caused the result. To determine whether a jury instruction was erroneous, the given instruction must be compared to the one that should have been given. D’s claim of prejudice is based on the failure to explain “causation” statutory language. CoA found it sufficient that the ultimate harm was foreseeable, whether it was Stafford’s death in general or Stafford’s death by speeding truck. A causation instruction would have properly expressed that if the ultimate harm should have been foreseen as reasonably related to the defendant’s conduct, that conduct should be considered the cause of Stafford’s death. By returning a guilty verdict of a crime with a culpable mental state of recklessness, the jury necessarily found, in coordination with that definition, that D was “aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that death would occur. Jury’s determination that D acted recklessly inescapably included a finding that the ultimate harm was foreseeable and that therefore, D caused Stafford’s death. Likely jurors would have considered a causation instruction consistently w/ their consideration of the recklessness instruction, so the additional definition would not have influenced the verdict. Reversed. d. Rule of Law: The definition of recklessness includes a causation element.

Concurrence I.

Introduction a. Mandates a connection between the actus reus & the mens rea. Two types of concurrence must be present. i. Temporal Concurrence: Defendant must possess the requisite mens rea at the same time she engages in the actus reus ii. Motivational Concurrence: The mens rea must be the motivating force behind the actus reus....