Chapelton v Barry Urban DC PDF

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Chapelton v Barry Urban DC [1940] 1 KB 532 Appellant – Chapelton (Plaintiff) Respondant – Barry Urban DC (Defendant) Court - Court of Appeal Date - 30 January 1940 Judge - Slesser, L.J.; Goddard, L.J.; MacKinnon, L.J. Facts and Procedural History:

On June 3 1939, the plaintiff, C. went to the beach at a place called Cold Knap and he wished to hire a deck chair. By the side of a café, was a pile of deck chairs belonging to the defendant council, and a notice was displayed nearby written the following terms: "Barry Urban District Council. Cold Knap. Hire of chairs 2d. per session of 3 hours." The notice went on to state that the public were requested to obtain tickets for their chairs from the chair attendants and that those tickets should be retained for inspection. C. hired 2 deck chairs, one for himself and one for Miss Andrews (who was with him), and received two tickets. He then glanced at them and slipped them into his pocket; he did not recognize that some conditions were printed on the other side of the ticket. He put the chairs up in the ordinary way on a firmly flat part of the beach, and then sat down on a chair which gave way, the canvas tearing from the top of the chair and he went through the canvas , causing him a bad jar (painful/damaging shock) and injured. He brought an action against the council; the county court judge (Cardiff and Barry County Court) found that the accident was due to the negligence of the defendants in providing a chair which was unfit for use, but that liability was exempted by the ticket as the plaintiff had sufficient notice of the special contract printed on it. C appealed; Court of Appeal reversed the decision, held that the ticket was a mere voucher or receipt for the money paid for the hire of the chairs, and the conditions between the special contract were those terms printed in the notice nearby the chairs rather than on the tickets, which contained no any exemption clause, therefore the council was liable to the plaintiff. Arguments for the appellant, C: 1. The decision of the country court holding that C had sufficient notice of the conditions printed on the back of the ticket was wrong. Henderson v. Stevenson considered. 2. Case of Thompson v. London, Midland and Scottish Ry. Co. was distinguishable from the present case because there was nothing on the face of the ticket to call attention to the

conditions printed on the back of the ticket. 3. The ticket was acts mere as a receipt for a chair hired. Mellish L.J. in Parker v. South Eastern Ry. Co. considered. Arguments for the respondent, DC: 1. There was a written contract concluded between the parties, containing terms which were brought to the notice of C. 2. C was not entitled to the use of a chair without first obtaining a ticket from the attendant; the notice which was exhibited was no more than an offer to treat, it was the ticket which constituted a contract with the binding terms and thus the ticket was not a mere ticket. Thompson v. London, Midland and Scottish Ry. Co. considered. 3. The council had already taken reasonable steps to bring the conditions to the notice of C at the time the tickets were issued; therefore the exemption clause was a binding term which could exclude the liability of DC. Judgment – Slesser L.J.: 1. Question of law in contracts with railway company: How far that condition has been made a term of the contract; whether it has been sufficiently brought to the notice of the person entering into the contract. The present case does not come within this category and thus should be distinguished from the Thompson case. 2. The notice exhibited with the price and duration of hiring was the whole of the offer which the DC made in this case; no suggestion of any restriction of the DC’s liability appeared in that. 3. The language of that ‘respectful request’ contained in the notice shows clearly that the public were asked to obtain tickets from the attendants, which were mere receipts showing how long a person hiring a chair is entitled to use the chair. 4. It is wrong to assume that C would check the ticket and notice the modification of the terms at the same time take the chairs away after obtaining the tickets from attendants. 5. Though it ‘respectfully requests’ the public to obtain receipts for their money, there was no reason why anybody taking one of the chairs should necessarily obtain a receipt at the moment he took his chair; if the resort was a very popular one, somebody might have already sat for a long period before paying the money and getting a ticket. 6. The county court judge misunderstood the nature of this agreement, the contract was made at the time C paid and received his ticket, so any words included in the ticket were not amounted to contractual terms. Mellish L.J. in Parker v. South Eastern Ry. Co. cited.

7. The aim of the giving and the taking of ticket was to ensure the person taking it has evidence at hand by which he could show that he has already paid the money and fulfilled his obligation. 8. The ticket is no more than a receipt, and is quite different from a railway ticket. Mackinnon L.J.: No evidence showing the DC had taken any steps to bring the terms of their proposed contract to the mind of the plaintiff. Goddard L.J.: 1. Being asked to take a ticket was just a form of a receipt for the purpose of having the right to hire a chair as the face of the ticket showed nothing except that the man had the right to hire it until 730pm on the day and the fact that it was not transferable.

2. It is unreasonable to think of people receiving the ticket and sitting on a chair would notice it was in fact a contract limiting his ordinary rights....