David T. Runia - Studia Philonica Annual Studies in Hellenistic Judaism, Vol. XVII, 2005 (Brown Judaic Studies 344) (2005 ) PDF

Title David T. Runia - Studia Philonica Annual Studies in Hellenistic Judaism, Vol. XVII, 2005 (Brown Judaic Studies 344) (2005 )
Course Historia de la Psicología
Institution Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso
Pages 273
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Summary

Reconocer como válida la pretensión singular del ciudadano, la eticidad las produce y las contiene. El pueblo es un sujeto, por el otro, la movilidad del pueblo moderno viene de los particulares, que tiene este elemento singular que es su movilidad pura. La movilidad proviene, se nos viene encima po...


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THE STUDIA PHILONICA ANNUAL Studies in Hellenistic Judaism Volume XVII 1999

edited by David T. Runia Gregory E. Sterling

Brown Judaic Studies 344

THE STUDIA PHILONICA ANNUAL Studies in Hellenistic Judaism

Program in Judaic Studies Brown University BROWN JUDAIC STUDIES Edited by David Jacobson Ross S. Kraemer Saul Olyan Michael L. Satlow

Number 344

THE STUDIA PHILONICA ANNUAL Studies in Hellenistic Judaism edited by David T. Runia Gregory E. Sterling

T H E ST U DIA P H IL ON IC A A N N U A L Studies in Hellenistic Judaism

VOLUME XVII

2005

Editors: David T. Runia Gregory E. Sterling

Associate Editor David Winston Book Review Editor Hindy Najman

Brown University Providence

THE STUDIA PHILONICA ANNUAL Studies in Hellenistic Judaism The financial support of C. J. de Vogel Foundation, Utrecht Queen’s College, University of Melbourne University of Notre Dame University of Toronto is gratefully acknowledged

© 2005 Brown University ISBN: 1-930675-24-0 ISSN : 1052-4533

THE STUDIA PHILONICA ANNUAL STUDIES IN HELLENISTIC JUDAISM Editorial Board Editors: David T. Runia, Queen’s College, University of Melbourne Gregory E. Sterling, University of Notre Dame Associate editor: David Winston, Berkeley Book review editor: Hindy Najman, University of Toronto Advisory board David M. Hay, Atlanta (chair) Hans Dieter Betz, University of Chicago Peder Borgen, Oslo Jacques Cazeaux, CNRS, University of Lyon Lester Grabbe, University of Hull Ellen Birnbaum, Cambridge, Mass. Annewies van den Hoek, Harvard Divinity School Pieter W. van der Horst, Utrecht University Jean Laporte, Paris Burton L. Mack, Claremont Birger A. Pearson, Escalon, California Robert Radice, Sacred Heart University, Milan Jean Riaud, Catholic University, Angers James R. Royse, Berkeley Dorothy Sly, University of Windsor Abraham Terian, St. Nersess Armenian Seminary Thomas H. Tobin S.J., Loyola University, Chicago Herold D. Weiss, St. Mary’s College, Notre Dame The Studia Philonica Annual accepts articles for publication in the area of Hellenistic Judaism, with special emphasis on Philo and his Umwelt. Contributions should be sent to the Editor, Prof. G. E. Sterling, Associate Dean of the Faculty, College of Arts and Letters, 100 O’Shaughnessy, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA; email: [email protected]. Please send books for review to the Book Review Editor, Prof. H. Najman, Dept. of Near and Middle Eastern Civilizations, University of Toronto, 4 Bancroft Ave, Toronto, Ontario M5S 1C1, Canada; email: [email protected]. Contributors are requested to observe the ‘Instructions to Contributors’ located at the end of the volume. These can also be consulted on the Annual’s website: http://www.nd.edu/~philojud. Articles which do not conform to these instructions cannot be accepted for inclusion. The Studia Philonica Monograph series accepts monographs in the area of Hellenistic Judaism, with special emphasis on Philo and his Umwelt. Proposals for books in this series should be sent to Prof. David M. Hay, 1428 Airline Road, McDonough, GA 30252, USA; email: [email protected].

CONTENTS* ARTICLES Walter T. Wilson, Pious Soldiers, Gender Deviants, and the Ideology of Actium: Courage and Warfare in Philo’s De Fortitudine................... 1 Frank Shaw, The Emperor Gaius’ Employment of the Divine Name .... 33 Allen Kerkeslager, The Absence of Dionysios, Lampo, and Isidoros from the Violence in Alexandria in 38 C.E. .............................................. 49 James R. Royse, Three More Spurious Fragments of Philo....................... 95 Maren R. Niehoff, Response to Daniel S. Schwartz................................... 99 SPECIAL SECTION: PHILO AND THE TRADITION OF LOGOS THEOLOGY Gregory E. Sterling, Introduction................................................................ 102 Harold W. Attridge, Philo and John: Two Riffs on One Logos............... 103 Gregory E. Sterling, ‘Day One’: Platonizing Exegetical Traditions of Genesis 1:1–5 in John and Jewish Authors ............................................... 118 REVIEW ARTICLES David T. Runia, A Conference on Philo in Germany................................. 141 Ishay Rosen-Zvi, Joining the Club: Tannaitic Legal Midrash and Ancient Jewish Hermeneutics .................................................................... 153 BIBLIOGRAPHY SECTION D. T. Runia, E. Birnbaum, K. A. Fox, A. C. Geljon, H. M. Keizer, J. P. Martín, R. Radice, J. Riaud, D. Satran, G. Schimanowski, T. Seland, Philo of Alexandria: An Annotated Bibliography 2002...... 161 Supplement: Provisional Bibliography 2003–2005 ..................................... 198 BOOK REVIEW SECTION David E. Aune, Torry Seland, and Jarl Henning Ulrichsen (edd.), Neotestamentica et Philonica: Studies in Honor of Peder Borgen. Reviewed by Thomas H. Tobin ................................................................ 215 Daniel Boyarin, Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity. Reviewed by Adele Reinhartz ................................................................ 217

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Laura Gusella, Esperienze di comunità nel giudaismo antico: esseni, terapeuti, Qumran. Reviewed by Silvia Castelli ..................................................................... 223 Bruce W. Winter, Philo and Paul Among the Sophists: Alexandrian and Corinthian Responses to a Julio-Claudian Movement. Reviewed by Matt Jackson-McCabe...................................................... 225 Francesca Calabi (ed.), Italian Studies on Philo of Alexandria. Reviewed by Leslie Baynes ....................................................................... 230 Kåre Fuglseth. A Comparison of Greek Words in Philo and the New Testament. Reviewed by Karl-Wilhelm Niebuhr....................................................... 236 Kathy L. Gaca, The Making of Fornication: Eros, Ethics and Political Reform in Greek Philosophy and Early Christianity. Reviewed by David T. Runia.................................................................... 237 Stephen Weitzman, Surviving Sacrilege. Cultural Persistence in Jewish Antiquity. Reviewed by John J. Collins .................................................................... 243 Philip Bosman, Conscience in Philo and Paul: A Conceptual History of the Synoida Word Group. Reviewed by Gregory E. Sterling........................................................... 246 News and Notes............................................................................................ 252 Notes on Contributors .............................................................................. 254 Instructions to Contributors ................................................................. 258

*

The editors wish to thank the typesetter Gonni Runia once again for her tireless and meticulous work on this volume. They also wish to thank Eva Mroczek (Toronto) for her assistance with the book reviews, Michael Champion (Melbourne) for his assistance with the bibliography, and Kindalee DeLong for the outstanding work she has done in the Philo of Alexandria Office at the University of Notre Dame.

The Studia Philonica Annual XVII (2005) 1–32

PIOUS SOLDIERS, GENDER DEVIANTS, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF ACTIUM Courage And Warfare In Philo’s De Fortitudine Walter T. Wilson

‘It remained for him to gain a reputation for éndre¤a , nearly the most important virtue in every polite¤a, and especially in Rome.’1 Claims regarding éndre¤a permeated the discursive systems of political power in Greco-Roman society. While the term could be employed to denote various dimensions or instances of ‘courage,’ regardless of the circumstances surrounding its use in any specific situation, it seems that at its root éndre¤a always came down to the business of being éndre›ow (‘manly’). Of course, there was much more to this than biological gender. Manliness was a quality imputed to one by others, an achievement that had to be continually earned and defended, especially in public, agonistic venues. As a number of recent studies have shown, such competitiveness played a normative role in the construction of moral identity both among those who constituted ‘the male establishment class’ in antiquity and among those who aspired to do so.2 Yet, as these same studies suggest, the processes undergirding such identity formation were messy and uncertain, not least of all because the meaning of éndre¤a itself was never explicated according to some unambiguous essence or fixed set of behavioral rules. Rather, both the definition and attribution of courage were matters of contention between different groups vying for honor and control, each insisting that they were uniquely equipped to face risk, endure adversity, and wield power in a manner that was supremely masculine.3 Given the vagaries of such ideological debates, in analyzing any particular case it is important to discern the criteria and motivations that 1

Polybius 31.29.1. E.g., R. M. Rosen, I. Sluiter (edd.), Andreia: Studies in Manliness and Courage in Classical Antiquity, Mnemosyne Sup. 238 (Leiden 2003). The quotation is from S. Swain, Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World AD 50–250 (Oxford 1996) 65. 3 ‘In a society where men competed for honor, or were in conflict with each other, there was an incentive to dispute what courage actually meant and how risk should be properly faced.’ J. Roisman, ‘The Rhetoric of Courage in the Athenian Orators’, in Rosen and Sluiter, Andreia , 131. 2

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guide a group in cultivating certain understandings of courage, including how such understandings are developed vis-à-vis the discursive systems of other groups. To take a well-known example, it has long been recognized that the rhetoric of Pericles’ funeral oration (Thucydides 2.35–46) is animated by competing corporate professions about the best form of éndre¤a. 4 At 2.39.4, for example, the observation that the Athenian polite¤a instills courage in its citizens through trÒpow (‘ habit ’ or ‘custom ’), rather than through arduous compulsory training, is offered as proof that it is superior to other political systems. As Karen Bassi observes, the notion here of ‘an innate and collective Athenian manliness’ supports the broader objective of the speech to idealize the pÒliw by characterizing it as an autochthonous and transcendent reality. 5 This visioning is achieved in part through a transvaluation of traditional heroic norms (with their emphasis on valor in individual combat), repositioning the significance of éndre¤a so that it functions as a fundamentally civic virtue, ‘an abstract concept and a defining characteristic of the city.’6 Insofar as its argument is constructed contrastively, Pericles’ (or Thucydides’) oration typifies ancient evaluations of courage. The same can be said of the speech’s emphasis on the battlefield as the prototypical setting for its demonstration.7 At the same time, any effort to grasp the full significance of éndre¤a must take into consideration the interest ancient people took in understanding non-martial forms of courage as well, a fact that testifies to the capacity of ‘manly’ rhetoric to serve a variety of social functions. 8 Within the domain of the ever popular gumnãsion culture, for example, athletic training was advertised to urban elites as an effective means of fashioning a virile and courageous character.9 Greco-Roman orators claimed expertise in ‘making men’ as well, though the calisthenics in this instance focused on ‘control of one’s voice, carriage, facial expression, and gesture, control of one’s emotions under conditions of competitive stress — in a word, all the arts of deportment necessary in a face-to-face society where one’s adequacy as a man was always under suspicion.’10 4

E.g., N. Loraux, The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City (Cambridge 1986) 172–262; cf. E. Rawson, The Spartan Tradition in European Thought (Oxford 1969) 12–55. 5 K. Bassi, ‘The Semantics of Manliness in Ancient Greece’, in Rosen and Sluiter, Andreia, 48. 6 Bassi ‘Semantics of Manliness’ 49, cf. 32–46. 7 Cf., e.g., Aristotle, Eth. nic. 3.6.6–12. 8 I. Sluiter and R. M. Rosen, ‘General Introduction’, in Rosen and Sluiter, Andreia , 1–24. 9 O. van Nijf, ‘Athletics, Andreia and the Askêsis-Culture in the Roman East’, in Rosen and Sluiter, Andreia, 263–86. 10 M. Gleason, Making Men: Sophists and Self-Representation in Ancient Rome (Princeton 1995) xxii. Cf. J. Connolly, ‘Like the Labors of Heracles: Andreia and Paideia in Greek

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Even ancient physicians could in their self-representations draw on contemporary debates about éndre¤a, advocating a prognostic approach that ‘examined a given situation in which such qualities as daring and endurance might be called for, assessed the risks, and considered what the benefits of ‘courageous’ action were likely to be.’11

Philosophical Courage: Plato’s Respublica From early on, the question of how philosophical conceptions of the best life required or bestowed courage was a topic of critical reflection as well. In his Polite¤a, or Respublica, for example, arguments about éndre¤a figure prominently in Plato’s grand quest to explain the arrangements by which both political communities and human souls can be morally good. The central sections of this dialogue merit attention, at least in outline form, on account of the profound impact their ‘remodelled version of andreia’ had on the subsequent history of moral and political thought in Greco-Roman antiquity.12 Plato assumes that even for the ideal state warfare will be an ongoing reality. A standing army is required, therefore, to defend the state’s freedom and train its future leaders. The presence of éndre¤a in the state as such, he says, will depend not on the manifestation of courage among its individual citizens, but only among those who serve in the military, an elite class known as the Guardians, which is distinguished from the larger, money-making class, the Producers (429B). Given its critical function, admission to the former group is restricted to the best individuals, who are selected according to various criteria. Naturally, they must be young, quick, and strong. They must also demonstrate éndre¤a, of course, though this must be combined with high-spiritedness (ı yumÒw or tÚ yumoeid°w), by which Plato denotes a complex cluster of tendencies encompassing fearlessness, assertiveness, indignation, and ambition for glory and revenge. 13 These tendencies are treated with a certain ambivalence, however, since it is likely that recruits thus endowed will end up being savage not only to the

Culture under Rome’, in Rosen and Sluiter, Andreia, 290: imperial orators ‘w ea v e together certain negative stereotypes about teachers’ femininity and passivity into a subtly new conception of andreia, one that favors diplomacy and endurance over active risk and daring.’ 11 R. M. Rosen and M. Horstmanshoff, ‘The Andreia of the Hippocratic Physician and the Problem of Incurables’, in Rosen and Sluiter, Andreia , 113. 12 A. Hobbs, Plato and the Hero: Courage, Manliness and the Impersonal Good (Cambridge 2000) 234. 13 375A–B, cf. 440A–41C; Hobbs, Plato and the Hero, 6–37.

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enemies of the state but also to their fellow citizens. Therefore, the seemingly opposed qualities of aggressiveness and gentleness must both be cultivated among the young Guardians through an intensive period of physical and intellectual preparation (375B–412B), or êskhsiw (404A, C). The trainees’ literary and musical curriculum in particular must be chosen with care, since this serves as the means by which they obtain a true and ‘holy’ conception of the gods and heroes (376E–98B), thereby learning to admire only what is brave, free, pious, and self-controlled (395C). Conversely, they are prohibited from emulating the roles of women or slaves (395D–E), or from participating in sloth or drunkenness, since such behavior will render them ‘soft’ (malak¤a). 14 By the same token, since the natures of men and women are intrinsically similar, the latter can be admitted with the former, provided they meet the same qualifications (451C–57C). All the Guardians are to live a common life together, unacquainted with private wealth, property, or even families — in short, with anything that might distract them emotionally from their service to the state. 15 The nature of their education, like their whole way of life, is designed to foster moderation (svfrosÊnh),16 which includes resistance to the desire for luxury that is so characteristic of the Producers’ class. 17 Ultimately, Plato assures us, this process will yield Guardians who are not only able warriors but also lovers of wisdom (375E), their high-spiritedness ordered (410D–E) so as to be obedient to reason (lÒgow, 401D). 18 At this point their courage is properly ‘civic’ in nature, by which he means that they will hold fast to beliefs inculcated in them by the state about ‘overall values and ends,’ which they will defend even in the face of manifold dangers, hardships, and temptations.19 Beginning at 412B, Plato introduces the process by which some of the Guardians will be selected for advanced education as potential rulers, distinguished from the military class from which they originate, the latter henceforth referred to as the Auxiliaries. These individuals are not only intellectually gifted, they also exhibit the greatest zeal for what is in the state’s best interest (412C–E). A lengthy philosophical curriculum makes them attentive to the eternal truths of the intelligible realm (503E–18B), culminating in an apprehension of the Form of the Good, to which they endeavor to assimilate (éfomoioËsyai) themselves. 20 Having thus achieved an understanding of the virtues ‘as they are in the nature of things,’ the 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

398E, cf. 410D–11B; and below , n. 95. 415E–17B, 457C–61E. 390A, 402C, E, 404E, 410A, cf. 399C. 399E, cf. 372E, 422A. 415E, 421A, 424E. Cf. R. W. Hall, Plato (London 1981) 81–102. 429B–D, 430A–B, cf. 433C; Hobbs, Plato and the Hero, 111. 500C, cf. 613B, Tim. 50C–D, Theat. 176A–B.

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philosopher rulers take this knowledge as a pattern for ordering the polite¤a and its citizens. 21 With this final course of study in place, Plato’s account of the state’s structure and defining qualities is complete. Its wisdom resides with the Rulers, its courage with the Auxiliaries. Meanwhile, all three classes exhibit moderation in agreeing that the Rulers ought to rule, thereby ensuring the state’s harmony. Finally, the polite¤a achieves justice when each class carries out its own function (427C–34C). However, in order to provide an adequate explanation of these defining qualities, it is incumbent upon Plato to probe also their psychological dimensions, since any quality in the state must derive ultimately from the citizens of the state who possess this quality and have the same form (435E). He theorizes, then, that the human personality is divided into three faculties (the reasoning part, the spirited part, and the appetitive part), corresponding to the three classes of the ideal state and (if similarly organized) manifesting the same virtues. 22 Accordingly, for the soul’s spirited faculty to exhibit the proper form of courage, it must, like its civic counterpart, be trained to ‘hold fast to the order of reason about what to fear’ (442B–C) and function as reason’s ally, especially when it comes into conflict with the appetitive faculty. If all the parts of the soul agree to follow the reasoning part, then the soul achieves svfrosÊnh. Similarly, the soul can be said to be just when each part sticks to its own function, rendering the cuxÆ harmonious and ‘healthy’ (441C–44E). Conversely, psychic injustice arises when one of the lower parts tries to usurp reason’s rule (444B– C). If domi...


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