EC 403 Syllabus Fall 2019 PDF

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CAS EC 403 Game Theory Syllabus Fall 2019 Course description

This is an advanced undergraduate course in game theory aimed at students with no previous exposure to the subject, but with background in microeconomics and elementary mathematics (including some calculus and probability theory). The course covers both theoretical concepts and applications to economics. Instructor

Bjorn Persson Room 416B, 270 Bay State Road [email protected] O¢ce hours: MW 2.00 - 3.30 pm Teaching fellow

Yajie Tang Room 17B , 264 Bay State Road [email protected] O¢ce hours: F 4.00 - 5.30 pm Meetings

TR 3.30 – 4.45 pm in CAS B36 Blackboard website

Use your Kerberos password to access the class website on Blackboard Learn. Recommended text

Watson: , W. W. Norton 2013. Copies of the textbook have been ordered by the BU bookstore. Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory

Prerequisites

Basic calculus and basic probability theory. Examination

There will be a set of home assignments, a midterm exam, and one …nal examination. Assignments and their due dates will be provided on the course web site. The tests will be held on during regular class time. The …nal examination will be held at the regularly scheduled time shown below. This date and time cannot be changed. The location for the …nal examination will be announced later. Students are expected to attend classes and work on the homework assignments independently. Please turn them in on time. There will not be any make-up tests. Unless you have a documented health problem or family emergency, if you fail to take a test, your score for the missed test will be zero. Grading weights will be as follows: Assignments: 20% Midterm : 30% Final: 50% 1

Exam dates Midterm: 10/24 Final: 12/18

Academic conduct It is a student’s responsibility to know and understand the provisions of the CAS Academic Conduct Code. Cases of suspected academic misconduct will be referred to the Dean’s O¢ce.

Classroom conduct and participation Students are expected to attend all lectures.

Each lecture will build on the knowledge

acquired in the previous one and, if you miss a class, you are responsible for getting the lecture notes from your classmates.

Please do not use electronic devices such as

phones, ipads, computers, etc. during the lectures. Course outline Below is a preliminary list of topics.

Some deviations from the actual schedule may be

necessary as the class progresses. Students are responsible for attending classes and learning of any changes in the schedule.

I. Representing games Introduction Examples of games Strategies Normal form Beliefs and mixed strategies

Readings: Ch 2 - 5

II. Static games Dominated strategies Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies Best response Rationalizability Equilibrium Other equilibrium topics Applications

Readings: Ch 6 - 7, Ch 9 p 95 - 104, 106 - 108, Ch 10 - 11

III. Dynamic games Extensive form Backward induction Subgame perfection Bargaining Negotiation equilibrium and problems of contracting and investment Repeated games Applications

Readings: Ch 14 - 15 , Ch 16 p 204 - 206, Ch 18 - 23

IV. Information Random events and incomplete information Risk and contracting

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Bayesian equilibrium Perfect Bayesian equilibrium Applications Readings: Ch 24, Ch 26 - 29

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