Elements of A Crime - Revision Notes Final PDF

Preview

Summary

Elements of A Crime Notes...

Description

Elements of (Most) Criminal Offences In order to be guilty of a crime, it is necessary to show: 1. Actus Reus (guilty act) (external elements of the offence) 2. Mens Rea (guilty mind) (internal elements of the offence) - An act is not sufficient: it must coincide with the mens rea. - Omissions do not generally constitute the actus reus of a crime, unless there was a duty to act. Lanham [1976] suggests a third essential ingredient: 1. Actus Reus 2. Mens Rea 3. The absence of a valid defence Actus Reus The actus reus means more than ‘act’: it may comprise conduct, circumstances, and/or results: - The AR of result crimes requires proof of human conduct and the results thereof (e.g. murder or criminal damage). - The AR of conduct crimes requires only proof of proscribed conduct (e.g. perjury… and theft? Or attempts?). - The AR may also require certain circumstances to be true (e.g. property belonging to another, rape requires the absence of consent) Omissions - English criminal law does not require people to do good; it merely prevents them from behaving badly. Example: D sees V, who cannot swim, drowning in the local river. D is a very competent swimmer but decides to go home rather than helping V. V subsequently drowns. D has not committed an offence. - However, omissions can constitute the AR if a person was under a duty to act. - G Williams: ‘We omit to do everything in the world that is not done. Only those of us omit in law who are under a duty to act. Statutory and Common Law Omissions Statutory • Road Traffic Act 1988 – failing to provide a breath test, being in charge of a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or after commission of a traffic offence • Education Act 1996 – failure of child to attend school (parental liability) • Terrorism Act 2000 – failure to disclose to police when a person believes or suspects another person has committed a terrorism activity related offence • Domestic Violence, Crime and Vulnerable Victims Act 2004 – failing to protect a child or vulnerable adult from the risk of death or serious physical harm Common law Five Duty Situations 1) Voluntary assumption of duty to act: R v Stone & Dobinson [1977]

2)

3)

4)

5)

o By taking the ill sister into their home, the defendants had assumed voluntary responsibility and therefore were under a duty of care to ensure that she was eating and cared for, thus liable for manslaughter. R v Instan [1983] o D, the victims niece, failed to get medical treatment or care for her aunt despite living with her – instead continued to eat her food, liable for manslaughter. Close or special relationship giving rise to a duty to act: R v Gibbons & Proctor [1918] o Father and his female partner convicted of murdering his daughter by starving her to death, had a parental duty to act R v Lowe [1973] o Father convicted for manslaughter for failing to call a doctor when his 9-week daughter was ill. Creation of a situation of danger R v Miller [1983] o Squatter setting fire to a mattress and left the building, liable for arson. Withholding medical treatment in best interests of the patient (Act or Omission?): Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] o Tony Bland had been in a vegetative state, unanimous decision that he would not improve, were seeking whether they could stop treating him and turn off the life support, held that this would be an omission. Contractual, official or statutory duty: R v Pittwood [1902] o Railway crossing guard, forgot to shut the gate and caused a cart to be hit with a train; a man might incur criminal liability from a duty arising from a contract) R v Dytham [1979] o Policeman failed to protect a man being beaten to death.

Causation • Applies to result crimes – the act (or omission!) must be followed by a result or consequence • The particular conduct caused the particular outcome • Causation is a set of rules by which a court determines whether D’s conduct has caused (or significantly contributed) to the result • If causation cannot be proved, the AR is incomplete and D is acquitted. Two Types 1) Factual – ‘But for’ 2) Legal Factual Causation ‘But for test’ - Before establishing legal causation, must prove D’s conduct was the factual cause of the result - But for D’s conduct, would the result have happened?

White [1910]: D put poison in mother’s milk, she took a few sips and died of natural causes rather than from the poison, D not liable for her murder, couldn’t say that ‘but for’ his actions his mother would not have died. Legal Causation D is responsible for all the nature and probably consequences of his act Third Party Interventions: NAIS - Must be voluntary to break chain of causation: R v Pagett (1983) o D shot a police officer who tried to arrest him, police officer returned fire and D used his pregnant girlfriend as a human shield, killing her; did the police officer’s action act as an NAI in her death? o HELD: The shot fired was for self-preservation, not a voluntary act, not enough to break the chain) Established the following principles:  D’s act need not be the sole or even the main cause of V’s death  D’s act need only to contribute significantly to that result  In order to constitute an NAI, a third party intervention has to be voluntary in the sense of being ‘free, deliberate and informed’ (Lord Goff)  A reasonable act performed in self-preservation or in pursuance of a legal duty is not voluntary  Causation is a question of fact for the jury. - Victim autonomy and doctrine of responsibility: R v Kennedy [2007] o D prepared a solution of heroin to his friend, who injected himself and died, D convicted of supplying the drug o Held CofA: upheld the appeal because we cannot say that where someone makes an autonomous decision, this can be attributed to someone else) - Strict liability: Environment Agency v Empress Car Co[1998] o Despite the general principle that a chain of causation will be broken by a NAI, this does not apply to pollution cases Medical Cases - D’s act need not be the only/main cause of the result: R v Dyson [1908] o D inflicted serious head injuries on a child on two occasions. o By the time of the second assault, the child was suffering from meningitis (the result of earlier head injuries) which he would have died from. o The second blow exacerbated the disease, accelerating death. o Held: It was no defence to say that the blows would not have caused death but for the meningitis. R v McKechnie (1992) o D’s attacked an elderly man o Due to the risk of death from anaesthetic owing to V’s injuries, doctors were unable to perform surgery and V died.

o Held: Decision not to operate was reasonable and the injuries were the significant cause of death. - But it must be a substantial, operating and significant cause: R v Smith [1959] o D stabbed V twice, however as V was being carried to receive medical treatment he was dropped twice. o V also received harmful and inappropriate medical treatment and died. o Held: Original wound still an operating and substantial cause, therefore D still liable. o Lord Parker: Only if the second cause is so overwhelming as to make the original wound merely part of the history can it be said that the death does not flow from the wound. R v Malcherek, R v Steel [1981] o M has stabbed his wife and S had attacked a girl – both V’s were placed on life support machines. o Life support machines were switched off after medical confirmation of brain death. o Held: No evidence that at the time of death, the original wounds were other than a continuing, operating and substantial cause of death. o The Drs had merely ceased artificially to sustain lives which had been ended by the original injuries. o Irreversible death of the brain stem rather than the heart constituted the medical diagnosis of death. R v Cheshire [1991] o D shot V wo later developed respiratory problems in the hospital and required a tracheotomy. o V then died and it was revealed that this was a result of obstruction by scar tissue o Consultant surgeon stated that the Drs had not been grossly negligent or reckless, however V would not have died had the condition been properly diagnosed and treated. o Held: A jury should not regard medical negligence as the cause of death unless the medical treatment was so independent of D’s original acts and so potent in causing death that D’s contribution can be regarded as insignificant. However, R v Jordan (1956) o V was stabbed, however he died as a result of an allergic reaction to a drug which he was intolerant to. o Although treatment was stopped, it was continued the next day by another Dr who administered it in such large quantities D developed pneumonia. o Held: Hallet J: ‘Palpably wrong’ medical treatment can be enough to break the chain. Interventions by V - Take your victim as your find him: - Transfers ‘egg shell skull’ tort principle to criminal law in respect of physical and psychological abnormalities

R v Blaue [1975] o D attempted to rape V, eventually stabbing her. V required a blood transfusion, however V was a Jehovah’s witness and refused the treatment, subsequently dying. D convicted of manslaughter D appealed. o HELD: The stabbing wound was the operating cause of death not her refusal. - Victim escape: - If D has created a risk of harm or danger to V from which V escapes, provided the escape is reasonably foreseeable it will not break the chain of causation (reasonable foreseeability): R v Robert (1971) o Young woman had a lift from D who attempted to sexually assault her, D then drove off at speed and to escape, V jumped out of a moving car. o D appealed arguing that he did not intend that she would suffer actual bodily harm, o Held: No need to establish intention of the abh the intention of sexual advances was enough for all of the injuries sustained Reasonable Foreseeability Test confirmed in: Mackie (1973) o Three year old died from falling down stairs while running away from D in fear of ill-treatment. R v Williams and Davis (1992) o V was a hitchhiker who jumped from D’s car and sustained head injuries and died. o D’s convicted of manslaughter on the basis that they had planned to rob V. o Ds appealed. o Held: Stuart Smith LJ: “The jury should consider two questions: First whether it was reasonably foreseeable that some harm was likely to result from the threat itself and second whether the deceased’s reaction in jumping from the moving car was within the range of responses which might be expected from a V in that situation, bearing in mind the V’s characteristics. Whether an escape is reasonably foreseeable is an objective one: R v Marjoram [2000] o V escaped from Ds knocking on her hostel room by jumping from a window ledge, sustaining severe injuries. o Held: Rock LJ: “The prosecution do not have to prove that the accused actually foresaw as a possibility to establish causation” Mens Rea - State of mind of the accused - Entails some actual intention, knowledge, belief or realisation on the part of D or an objective analysis of what he should have been thinking. - Different crimes have different mentes reae: some require intention, others recklessness, negligence or knowledge. - Some crimes, known as strict liability offences do not require proof of any mental state of the defendant. - MR plays the crucial role of ensuring that only blameworthy defendants are punished for their crimes.

Coincidence and Correspondence of MR and AR The AR and the MR must coincide in point of time. The AR can, in certain circumstances, be regarded as a continuing transaction. Thabo Meli [1954]: o Ds planned to murder V, attacked him and then thinking he was dead, threw him off a cliff. o V still technically alive when thrown off the cliff; however later died from exposure. o Ds argued there was a lack of correspondence, did not intend to kill him when throwing him on the cliff. o HELD: impossible to divide up the actions, the MR applied to the whole course of actions and behaviours. Fagan [1968]: o D accidentally drove onto V’s foot, V told D and D refused to move, could the MR be applied? o Argued that the Act did not have any MR, only afterwards was aware o HELD: if there is a continuing act of assault, as long as MR occurs at some point that is sufficient. Le Brun [1992]: o D was walking home with his wife and decided to punch her in the face, causing her to become unconscious, argued that he did not cause her harm. o Then picked her up and dropped her, causing skull fractures, leading to her death. o Argued that his MR of harm did not apply to the dropping. o HELD: Part of the same event, MR did coincide as all part of the same thing. AG REF No 4 1981: o D pushed V down the stairs, then placed her in a bath, cut her throat and then cut into pieces. o Argued that as so many acts there was no MR present o HELD: when so serious to cause the outcome, doesn’t matter as all behaviours were capable of killing her. MR must correspond to every element of AR, with a few exceptions where the MR consists of recklessness/intention as to a different and less serious AR: - E.g. AR of malicious wounding or infliction of GBH contrary to s20 OAP 1861 requires MR of recklessness or intention (malice) as to some harm rather than GBH Two Tests Subjective: What the court finds D was actually thinking (not necessarily what he says he was thinking). - R v G [2003] UKHL 50 at 32. o Lord Bingham: “Conviction of serious crime should depend on proof not simply that the defendant caused (by act or omission) an injurious result to another but that his state of mind when so acting was culpable”

Objective: What the court finds the reasonable person would have been aware of (i.e. the circumstances comprising the AR). - Some sexual and terrorism offences, proceeds of crime etc. Forms of MR Intention: Where D intends (result is their aim/purpose) or foresees consequences as a virtual certainty Recklessness: Where D foresees consequences as a possibility (conscious taking of an unjustifiable risk) Gross negligence: Very serious breach of a duty, tested objectively, i.e. D ought to have been aware Strict Liability: No MR is required, merely satisfying the AR will suffice.

Intention Numerous cases require proof of intention to cause specified results: - Murder (intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm) - S18 OAPA (intention to cause GBH); and - Rape (intention to penetrate). Finding Intent Intention is concerned with the law of evidence, not substantive law: Lord Bridge, Moloney: The Golden Rule should be that, when directing a jury on the mental element necessary in a crime of specific intent, the judge should avoid any elaboration or paraphrase of what is meant by intent, and leave it to the jury’s good sense to decide whether the accused acted with the necessary intent. Direct Intention When the actor’s main aim/purpose was to cause a specific result. Indirect Intention Albeit that it was not the actor’s purpose to cause the result: 1) the result is a virtually certain consequence of the act; and 2) the actor knows that it is a virtually certain consequence.

Development of the Test for Indirect Intention Moloney: First, was the death or really serious injury in a murder case a natural consequence of D’s voluntary act? Secondly, did D foresee that consequence as being a natural consequence of his act? Hancock and Shankland: - Two striking miners decided to push a concrete block over a bridge - Argued that it was part of the strike action, to protest yet not to harm - Taxi driver killed and D’s were convicted on the basis of Maloney Held - Judges unsure that this was a natural consequence - Lord Scarman: In my judgement, therefore, the Moloney guidelines as they stand are unsafe and misleading. They require a reference to probability. They also require an explanation that the greater the probability of a consequence the more likely it is that that consequence was also intended. But juries also require to be reminder that the decision is theirs to be reached upon consideration of all the evidence. Nedrick - D poured paraffin in the letterbox of V and set it alight killing her child - Judge told the jury, in accordance with Hancock, that D was guily of murder if he knew that it was highly probable that his act would result in serious harm. Held - On appeal, Lord Lane introduced the element of virtual certainty: A man may intend to achieve a certain result whilst at the same time not desiring it to come about…..where the charge is murder, the jury should be directed that they are not entitled to infer the necessary intention unless they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty as a result of D’s actions and that D appreciate that such was the case. Woollin - Stephen Woollin killed his three-month-old son after throwing him onto a hard surface in a fit of temper. - The trial judge directed the jury that if they were satisfied that the appellant had realised that there was a substantial risk that the child would suffer serious harm, they could convict him of murder. - Appellant unsuccessfully appealed to the CofA - Appellant then appealed to the HofL Held - Appeal Allowed. - Lord Steyn: ‘Members of the jury, you are not entitled to find the necessary intention unless you feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) and D foresaw it as such. The decision is one for you to be reached on a consideration of the all of the evidence.’ - Where it is not the purpose of the defendant to cause death or grievous bodily harm only rarely will the defendant be found to have the MR for murder. Only if the death or grievous bodily harm was a virtually certain consequence of the defendant’s

actions and the defendant realised this was so, can the jury find that the defendant intended death or grievous bodily harm.

Parliament has made it clear that just because a defendant foresaw death was a likely result of his actions does not mean that he necessarily intended death. S8 Criminal Justice Act 1967 A court or jury in determining whether a person has committed an offence – a) Shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reason of its being a natural and probable consequence of those actions but b) Shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances. Intention vs Motive Law generally draws a distinction between the two: • R v Steane [1947] • D broadcast Nazi Propaganda. • Had no intention of assisting the enemy, only did so to protect his wife and children from being sent to a concentration camp. • Motive removed intention as D had been effectively brainwashed. • Chandler v DPP [1964] • D convicted for breaching the Official Secrets Act and breaking into a nuclear base, said that his motive was one of political protest. • HELD: Motive was irrelevant, only focused on his actions. • Yip Chiu-Cheung v R [1994] • Trafficker and undercover agent convicted with conspiracy to traffic drugs, argued that he did not have intention due to his undercover operation. • HELD: His involvement with the police did not negate the fact he did want to traffic drugs. -

Motive does not reduce culpability Would lead to inconsistency and opens floodgates enabling people to kill others as long as they have a good reason to.

Transferred Malice - D’s MR transfers – where D’s MR for one crime causes the AR of the same crime but either mistakenly or accidentally causes an unintended consequence: Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) o D stabbed V, killing her and her baby (who died due to infection as a result of premature birth). D convicted of murder. o HELD: CofA: Foetus was as much a part of the mother’s body as an arm or leg, therefore intention to harm could be transferred to baby. o HofL: D did not have intention for murder, could therefore not transfer it to the foetus.

-

-

Doctrine applies only where the actus reus committed by D and the mens rea with which he acts are for the same offence Pembilton o D The defendant threw some stones into a crowd of people. He wanted to disperse the crowd. A st...