Kant, Immanuel, and John Stuart Mill - The Role of Happiness in Ethics PDF

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Cover Sheet for Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill’s “The Role of Happiness in Ethics” Main Text 1 Author

Immanuel Kant

Chapter/Article Title

“Preface,” “Chapter 1,” “Chapter 2”

Publication Details

Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals Trans. Jonathanan Bennett. First launched: July 2005; Last amended: September 2008. pp. 1-40.

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https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/authors/kant

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© 2017 Jonathan Bennett

Main Text 2 Author

John Stuart Mill

Chapter/Article Title

“What Utilitarianism Is,” “What Sort of Proof Can Be Given for the Principle of Utility”

Publication Details

Utilitarianism Trans. Jonathanan Bennett. pp. First launched: September 2005; Last amended: April 2008. pp. 4-11, pp. 24-26.

Accessed

https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/authors/mill

Copyright/Notes

© 2017 Jonathan Bennett

Rights and Policies Governing Use This material has been abridged, edited, formatted, and annotated for Utah Valley University’s online PHIL205G: Ethics and Values course by © 2020 Jeffrey Pannekoek. © original texts as indicated. This text is subject to UVU Policy 136 “Intellectual Property,” and may not be distributed without permission from all of the copyright holders. Doing so is in violation of federal copyright law, as well as UVU Policy 135 “Use of Copyrighted Materials,” and subject to the sanction set out in UVU’s Student Code of Conduct (section 4.7 “Sanctions”).

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Introduction to Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill’s “The Role of Happiness in Ethics” Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill are two of the most prominent philosophers of the modern period. The influence of their ethical works in particular cannot be overstated, and in many ways both Kant and Mill have come to define their respective traditions in ethics. And while we certainly read them with an eye on their historical significance, our interest in them is not limited to historicity. Kant and Mill, as well as Aristotle from our previous reading, each captures something essential about our moral lives. In spite of this similarity in their importance, Kant and Mill’s respective views are very different. Particularly relevant for our purposes is the radically different role happiness plays in their accounts, as well see below. Another notable difference is their style. Mill’s writing is generally considered more accessible, whereas Kant’s writing is notoriously dense. In light of this, the upcoming section on Kant is an explanation of Kantian ethics, featuring embedded excerpts from primary and secondary sources. The subsequent section on Mill follows the traditional pattern of primary text with annotations. Kant and Mill are, each in their own way, able to articulate aspects of our moral existence that often remain implicit. Paying attention to these features of our lives allows us to be better moral thinkers and decision-makers. And in this respect, these figures are invaluable.

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About the Authors Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is one of the most influential philosophers in the history of Western philosophy. His contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics have had a profound impact on almost every philosophical movement that followed him. Indeed, Kant’s contributions to ethics have been substantial. He is the most important proponent in philosophical history of deontological, or duty based, ethics. In Kant’s view, the sole feature that gives an action moral worth is not the outcome that is achieved by the action, but the motive that is behind the action. And the only motive that can endow an act with moral value, he argues, is one that arises from universal principles discovered by reason. The categorical imperative is Kant’s famous statement of this duty: “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) profoundly influenced the shape of nineteenth century British thought and political discourse. His substantial corpus of works includes texts in logic, epistemology, economics, social and political philosophy, ethics, metaphysics, religion, and current affairs In his writings, Mill argues for a number of controversial principles. He defends radical empiricism in logic and mathematics, suggesting that basic principles of logic and mathematics are generalizations from experience rather than known a priori. The principle of utility—that “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness”—was the centerpiece of his ethical philosophy. On Liberty puts forward the “harm principle” that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.” In The Subjection of Women, he compares the legal status of women to the status of slaves and argues for equality in marriage and under the law.

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Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill’s “The Role of Happiness in Ethics” KANT’S DEONTOLOGICAL ETHIC Due to the fact that Kant notoriously difficult to understand, especially on one’s first encounter, this section of the text features an explanation of Kantian ethics, with embedded excerpts from the original text. Annotation 1. Translator’s note. For the original texts, [Brackets] enclose editorial explanations by Jonathan Bennett. Small ·dots· enclose material that has been added, but can be read as though it were part of the original text. Occasional •bullets, and also indenting of passages that are not quotations, are meant as aids to grasping the structure of a sentence or a thought. Every four-point ellipsis . . . . indicates the omission of a brief passage that seems to present more difficulty than it is worth.

One way in which we often talk about morality, is in terms of rules. A very clear example of this is the Ten Commandments, but even in a secular context we might hold that “torture for fun is wrong.” Moreover, when we think about what it means to act ethically, we want to do the right thing for the right reason. That is, we should do our moral duty, and we should be properly motivated to do so. Annotation 2. The concern for duty is where this view gets its name, namely from the greak deon, which means duty. A unique feature of moral rules is that they are universal: they apply to everyone, in every place, at every time. As an illustration of the importance of universality, consider Case 1 – Loud Neighbors: Let’s assume that there is a moral rule that says murder is wrong (a pretty good candidate for a moral rule if there was one!). And let’s say that I live in a nice, quiet neighborhood. At one point, a new neighbor moves in, and they have a habit of mowing the lawn at 6am every Saturday morning. This annoys me to no end, and having approached the issue in several ways to no avail, I decide I should murder them. While I recognize that there is a moral rule against murder, and I generally want to live my life in away that accords with the moral rules, I think that in this case I can make an exception for myself. After the murder, a new neighbor moves in. As it turns out, they do not like my habit of watching action movies at high volume, and I’m unwilling to change anything about my habit. Soon, they figure that while they generally think murder is wrong and they want to live 4

their lives the right way. Nevertheless, they decide that just this time they can make an exception for themselves. The case of the loud neighbor shows why moral rules cannot permit any exceptions. If I can justify an exception for myself, then someone else can justify it for themselves, and so on, until the moral rule has lost all of its force. In other words, if we allow for exceptions to moral rules, there may just as well be no moral rules. This realization gives rise to the first formulation of what Kant calls the Categorical Imperative, or the fundamental moral rule. This is called the Formula of the Universal Law: “I ought never to act in such a way that I couldn’t also will that the maxim on which I act should be a universal law” (Kant 11). So an action’s moral value doesn’t lie in •the effect that is expected from it, or in •any principle of action that motivates it because of this expected effect. All the expected effects—something agreeable for me, or even happiness for others—could be brought about through other causes and don’t need •the will of a rational being, whereas the highest good—what is unconditionally good—can be found only in •such a will. So this wonderful good, which we call moral goodness, can’t consist in anything but the thought of law in itself that only a rational being can have—with the will being moved to act by this thought and not by the hoped-for effect of the action. When the person acts according to this conception, this moral goodness is already present •in him; we don’t have to look for it •in the upshot of his action. [In passages like this, ‘thought’ translates Vorstellung = ‘mental representation’.] So we have a law the thought of which can settle the will without reference to any expected result, and must do so if the will is to be called absolutely good without qualification; what kind of law can this be? Since I have robbed the will of any impulses that could come to it from obeying any law, nothing remains to serve as a ·guiding· principle of the will except conduct’s universally conforming to law as such. That is, I ought never to act in such a way that I couldn’t also will that the maxim on which I act should be a universal law. In this context the ·guiding· principle of the will is conformity to law as such, not bringing in any particular law governing some class of actions; and it must serve as the will’s principle if duty is not to be a vain delusion and chimerical concept. Common sense in its practical judgments is in perfect agreement with this, and constantly has this principle in view. (Kant 10-11) In more straightforward words, Kant suggests that each of our actions is potentially motivated by a maxim, or a rule. In the case above, the rule might be “I should not murder, except in cases where it is the last resort in getting what I want.” In order to figure out whether this is a moral rule, we need to know whether it can be a universal rule, because as we have seen, moral rules are universal. So the hypothetical rule would be “One should not murder, except in

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cases where it is the last resort in getting what one wants.” Think of implementing this as a universal rule in our world—what would that world look like? We might think that in a world where this rule exists and is consistently followed, soon there would be very few (if any) people left. This would entail that no one could get their way, and so it seems that, ultimately, the rule is self-defeating. As such, it cannot be a moral rule. This gives us a decision-procedure for Kantian deontology: 1. Identify the action under consideration. 2. Identify the maxim or rule behind the action. 3. Ask: Can this maxim be universalized? i.e. Can everyone act according to this rule in similar circumstances? a. If not, then the maxim fails the test and is not a duty. The action would be immoral. b. If so, then move on to the next step. 4. Ask: Would a rational person want to live in a world where this maxim is universally followed? a. If not, then the maxim fails the test and is not a duty. The action would be immoral. b. If so, then move on to the next step. 5. If the answer to both questions is YES, then the maxim is a duty and the action is right. This decision procedure allows us to determine what action we ought to perform, i.e. what our moral duty is. However, merely performing our moral duty—that is, doing what is right—does not necessarily entail that we are a good person. Beyond doing our moral duty, we must be motivated in the right kind of way. To clarify the importance of proper motivation, consider Case 2 – Life Saver? Chris is out late at night, and wants money to buy cigarettes and gas. They see someone, Alex, walking down the street by themselves, and decide to mug them. Chris draws a knife, and demands their valuables. While Alex is reaching for their wallet, someone else approaches, and Chris panics and stabs their Alex. The approaching stranger finds Alex down on the ground and calls for an ambulance. Alex is transported to the hospital, where x-rays reveal that they have a potentially lethal yet operable tumor, about an ⅛ of an inch from where the knifepoint was. Alex receives surgery to remove the tumor and repair the stabwound. They make a full recovery. Had Alex not been stabbed, the tumor would likely have gone undiscovered until it was too late. In effect, Chris saved Alex’ life. Is Chris a good person for saving Alex?

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Our response in this case is likely that Chris is not a good person, in spite of the fact that they saved Alex. If we reflect on why we don’t judge Chris to be a good person, we likely arrive at the conclusion that we’re not evaluating the morality of their action based on its consequences (saving Alex), or on whether or not Chris performed their moral duty (on some formulation of the rule of action, one that involves saving someone’s life, they certain performed their duty), but on their intention. What matters in this case is that Chris did not intend to save Alex’ life, rather they intend to steal from them and possibly kill them. This recognition of the importance of motivation in moral action leads Kant to formulate his three propositions of morality: 1. For an action to have genuine moral worth it must be done from duty. 2. An action that is done from duty doesn’t get its moral value from the purpose that’s to be achieved through it but from the maxim that it involves (Kant 9) 3. a consequence of the first two … To have a duty is to be required to act in a certain way out of respect for law. (Kant 10) The third proposition—a consequence of the first two—I would express as follows: •To have a duty is to be required to act in a certain way out of respect for law. (1) As for what will result from my action, I can certainly prefer or be drawn to it, but I can’t have respect for it; to earn my respect it would have to be something the will does, not merely something that its doings lead to. (2) Similarly, I can’t •respect any want or preference: if the preference is mine, the most I can do is to •endorse it; if it is someone else’s I can even •love it—i.e. see it as favourable to my interests. What can get respect and can thus serve as a command is •something that isn’t (1) a consequence of my volition but only a source for it, and isn’t (2) in the service of my preferences but rather overpowers them or at least prevents them from being considered in the choice I make; •this something is, in a word, law itself. Suppose now that someone acts from duty: the influence of his preferences can’t have anything to do with this, and so facts about what he might achieve by his action don’t come into it either; so what is there left that can lead him to act as he does? If the question means ‘What is there objectively, i.e. distinct from himself, that determines his will in this case?’ the only possible answer is law. And if the question concerns what there is in the person that influences his will—i.e. what subjectively influences it—the answer has to be his respect for this practical law, and thus his acceptance of the maxim I am to follow this law even if it thwarts all my desires. (A maxim is a subjective principle of volition. The objective principle is the practical law itself; it would also be the subjective principle for all rational beings if reason fully controlled the formation of preferences.) (Kant 10).

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Third proposition of morality, which follows from the preceding ones, states that having a duty means you must act in a particular way if you are to respect moral laws or rules. This respect for moral laws can only attach to the action itself, and not the results that follow from it. In other words, we must do the right thing for the right reason. So what does it mean to be good, in the Kantian sense? (1) We have to figure out what our duty is and act accordingly, and; (2) we have to be motivated in the proper way, namely by our good will, i.e. the part of yourself that desires goodness for its own sake. Every other motive must yield to duty, because it is the condition of a •will that is good in itself, and the value of •that surpasses everything. (Kant 12) There is an important distinction here between actions from duty, which are actions that not only conform to our moral duty but are enacted purely out of our good will, i.e. doing the right thing for the right reason, and; actions in accordance with duty, in which case we are motivated to perform the right kind of action, but not purely by our good will. We are doing the right thing for ulterior reasons. In both cases, we are doing what is morally required—the action is still right—but only in the former case do we deserve moral credit. Now that we have developed Kant’s basic understanding of morality, it might stand out that we haven’t encountered any reference to happiness. According to Thomas Hill, in “"Happiness and Human Flourishing in Kant's Ethics:”1 Viewing happiness as personal contentment and success in achieving the ends we want, [Kant] argues that morality is a constraint on the pursuit of a happy life rather than a means to it or an element of it. Even the moral duty to contribute to the happiness of others is more limited in Kant's moral theory than in most other modern theories that (like Kant) abandon the common ancient conceptions of "happiness." (Hill 143) Kant seems to shift between several ideas of happiness. In all cases, though, happiness is conceived as something more subjective, indeterminate, and variable from person to person than human flourishing is typically thought to be. Kant agrees with Aristotle and others that virtue (at least as Kant understands this) requires much more than satisfying our desires and feeling content. We must use practical reason to determine objectively what is morally right and virtuous to choose. But by sharply distinguishing virtue and happiness, Kant splits elements that are apparently combined in Aristotle's idea of human flourishing. The moral element (virtue) Kant then treats as objective, common to 1

Hill Jr., Thomas E. "Happiness and Human Flourishing in Kant’s Ethics.” Social Philosophy and Policy. Volume 16, Issue 1; Winter 1999; pp. 143-175. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500002284

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all human beings, distinct from desires, and discerned by reason. But the other element (happiness) he treats as subjective, relative to individuals, desire-based, and not very well served by reason. (Hill 146).

Indeed, Kant is not particularly interested in happiness. He thinks the concern for happiness is often a distraction to contentment and, more importantly, a morally good life. Power, riches, honour, even health, and the over-all well-being and contentment with one’s condition that we call ‘happiness’, create pride, often leading to arrogance, if there isn’t a good will to correct their influence on the mind. … Not to mention the fact that the sight of someone who shows no sign of a pure and good will and yet enjoys uninterrupted prosperity will never give pleasure to an impartial rational observer. So it seems that without a good will one can’t even be worthy of being happy … What we find in fact is that the more a cultivated reason devotes itself to the enjoyment of life and happiness, the more the person falls short of true contentment. (Kant 5, 6) Kant does think we have duties related to our own happiness, but it is not because happiness is itself inherently good. To secure one’s own happiness is a duty (at least indirectly), becaus...