Lecture Notes - Benjamin Fordham PDF

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Benjamin Fordham...

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Saturday, May 1, y

Intro to World Politics The Evolution of the State I.

Intro A. Commonalities often come from living within state B. For majority of history, people have lived in hunter-gatherer relations not states 1. Only modern states for about 500 years, mostly only European part of the globe 2. Used to be messy and complicated with undefined borders, but evolved into simplified, defined borders C. Entities often eliminated by methods, such as war D. Everybody on the planet today lives under some form of state

II. Characteristics of a State A. States are organizations 1. Human creations, not natural entities a) Agriculture led people to stay in one place and know one another b) Alternative to the state: Hanseatic League (1) Alliance of city-states with a central decision-making body, based on trade c) Europe is unique: many leaders fighting one another, resulting in numerous states - not one large empire (1) Difficult to conquer and control entire state due to geographical barriers d) Formation of modern states was not a conscious process - rulers actually were competing for a global empire 2. Offices and institutions, not individuals a) Romans were ideologically against idea of monarchy 1

Saturday, May 1, y (1) Augustus of Prima Porta had authority, but couldn’t officially declare - wasn’t a real office (a) No rules for succession i) States like this don’t last - creates vulnerability, instability over future B. Coercive control of population 1. Obedience is not based on consent - it’s required a) Not always coercive, but it lurks in the background so people are aware b) Olson argues that coercion may be only effective method of ensuring loyalty (1) Temptation to free ride c) Coercion was necessary in Europe in order to maintain strength and prevent loss to another state d) Leaders are not portrayed as heroes, being villains gives them power 2. Monopoly on the use of force in state’s territory a) Must eliminate alternative sources of coercion in territory (1) Drawing revenue from territory, can’t let others threaten this b) Unification of government (1) Elimination of fortification and privatization of military forces (2) Suppression of alternative religions - eliminating disputes, creating unification (3) Promotion of an official language C. Territorial sovereignty 1. Sovereignty: supreme legal authority a) Alternative: rule-making bodies still had to subject themselves to a higher authority

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Saturday, May 1, y 2. Authority confined to geographic area a) Implies that there are other sources of authority in different areas - not supreme authority 3. Emerges by accident in the Peace of Westphalia (1648) after stalemate a) Peace of Münster recognized existence of other states and leaders’ choices b) Rulers are responsible for acts of violence within their own territory D. Functional differentiation 1. Branches of the state are specialized 2. War creates pressure for differentiation a) Collecting taxes creates need for bureaucracy E. Centralization and coordination 1. Single executive authority at top a) Dividing executive power creates terrible coordination problems 2. Defined hierarchy among units of state F. International recognition 1. Arbitrary rules for membership in system a) Non-European entities were often not treated the same way as European states 2. Importance of “recognition” by other states a) Sovereignty provides protection from invasion by other states (1) Iran invasion of Kuwait (1990) - Saddam Hussein forced to leave by UN, who recognized Kuwait’s sovereignty (2) Russian seizure of Crimea - sanctions on Russia due to Crimea’s recognized sovereignty b) Not every territory recognized as a state

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Saturday, May 1, y (1) political situation in Somalia - territorial dispute (2) Taiwan - China claims sovereignty over Taiwan, but Taiwan claims to be the legitimate government (a) 1972: UN kicks Taiwan out, gives territorial claim to China (b) 1979: US de-recognizes Taiwan as a state i) Today it is only recognized as a state by 16 small states (c) China can legally invade Taiwan according to international law, but US would fight this due to ties with Taiwan

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Saturday, May 1, y

Nationalism, Democratization, and State Power I.

Steady increase in global democracy G. Peak after WWI due to democratic victory 1. Falls pre-WWII; raises after and falls until late Cold War H. Democracies are more likely to win wars than non-democracies

III. Why is there more state power and more democracy? A. States develop as a way to extract wealth for military purposes B. States centralize power C. Successful early states are absolute monarchies IV. Growth of State Power Since 1800 A. Increasing military power 1. Battle of Agincourt: battle between French and English kings with large numbers of troops; ~ 5,000 deaths 2. Battle of Waterloo: 100x as many troops as Agincourt; ~ 50,000 deaths 3. Battle of the Somme: bloodiest: 10x as many troops as Waterloo; ~ 1.1 million deaths a) First day was bloodiest day in British history b) Lasted long due to ability of mobilization B. Increasing revenue extraction 1. Introduction of income tax and other taxes a) War increases ability of state to collect money C. Increasing intervention in economy 1. State has to channel services into urban areas - change from rural life V. Advantages of Democracy

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Saturday, May 1, y A. Faster economic growth (exceptions, i.e. China) 1. States with institutions protecting property rights grow faster than those without institutions protecting them a) People are more willing to invest when they have security checks in place and think they can keep what they have (1) Problem with non-democracies: dictators can’t promise credibly that they won’t steal all of your wealth; thus, there would be less investment a) People need other institutions in order to feel safe and remain productive (1) Crime-protecting institutions (2) Court system capable of enforcing contracts and resolving disputes b) Institutions emerge through a process of trial and error; not naturally B. Extraction of revenue 1. Taxation a) Example: Habsburg effort to control the Netherlands 2. Borrowing a) The more risky you are, the higher interest rate you are charged b) Lower interest rates among democratic states C. Superior decision-making institutions 1. Incentives for broadly beneficial policies a) Autocratic leaders only need to please the people with the power to remove them from power 2. Better information processing a) More difficult for an autocratic leader to get honest information because people only want to tell you what you want to hear 3. Democratic armies fight better? 6

Saturday, May 1, y a) However, some autocracies have created some great forces (i.e. Nazi Germany) D. Nationalism 1. What is it? A psychological commitment to a set of common beliefs that emphasize commonality among people a) Everyone has a sense of community, but nationalism its way broader b) Benedict Anderson: Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (1) Literacy is the root of nationalism; language creates sense of community c) Nationalism will always be focused around symbols of national identity d) National identities are often developed in opposition to other states; often associated with wars 2. Military advantages a) Gives people a reason to join army b) Common language increases communication ability c) Taxation increases military budget and strength 3. Potentially radical political implications

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Saturday, May 1, y

Contemporary State Formation and State Failure I.

Contemporary v. Early Modern State Formation E. Presence of existing states as models 1. Potential pitfalls better understood 2. Expectations higher (of population and state bureaucrats) F. Different international institutions 1. Institutions regulating political relations between states 2. Institutions regulating economic interaction between states G. Extent of international inequality of wealth

VI. The Problem of State Failure A. Definition: inability of state to exert effective control over its territory and population 1. Syria: borders drawn up by Britain and France, more likely to fail? a) Areas where rebels controlled, and areas where central government controlled B. Why do other states worry? 1. Inability to fulfill obligations to other states 2. Source of conflict among other states 3. Humanitarian concerns: civil war, genocide, famine, etc. 4. State failure is contagious VII.Causes of State Failure A. Characteristics of State 1. Democracy v. autocracy

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Things to Remember About Statistical Relationships in Social Science: 1. Relationships are probabilistic, not deterministic 2. Correlation is not causation

Saturday, May 1, y 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. 2. Openness to international trade

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Saturday, May 1, y 3. Elite polarization 4. Past episodes of state failure a) South Vietnam: General Duong Minh became president after overthrowing and assassinating Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963. He was overthrown by another coup in January 1964 B. Grievances of Population 1. Failure to deliver basic services a) Correlation between state failure and infant mortality 2. Large-scale inequality C. Ease of Resistance to State 1. Terrain: difficult terrain facilitates resistance to the state (i.e. northern Pakistan, Philippines) 2. Lootable resources (i.e. selling resources to finance guerrilla war) 3. Homogeneity among group with grievances: becomes more likely to collaborate (i.e. ethnic groups, religious groups, etc.) 4. Availability of external support VIII.

Is failure more likely for new states?

A. Reduced threat of foreign conquest B. Higher levels of wealth and trade (pathways to become wealthier to avoid failure) C. Availability of external support D. The bad side of good things… 1. Leaders can take advantage of political climate to remain in power 2. Mobutu Sese Seko: infamously corrupt; used foreign assistance and took advantage of unlikeliness of international states’ intervention

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Saturday, May 1, y

Explaining War I.

Explanation in Social Science E. Theory: an abstract account of a casual process 1. Why theory is necessary a) Understanding reality without it is impossible 2. What makes a theory ‘scientific?’ a) Plausible causal process b) Observable implications c) Falsifiability of hypotheses; can’t be circular F. Evaluating Competing Theories 1. Is it scientific? 2. Parsimony (simplicity) a) Theories that make fewer assumptions are more likely to be true 3. Usefulness G. Limits of Social Science 1. Better at explaining outcome than suggesting outcomes a) Suggesting gets into values, which social science does not deal with 2. Values affect the questions you have and the answers you come up with

IX. Explaining War at Different Levels of Analysis A. The Problem of War 1. War used to be viewed as glorious (i.e. Theodore Roosevelt) 2. WWI changed views — bad for society as a whole a) Can cause social upheaval B. What are “levels of analysis”? 11

Saturday, May 1, y 1. How aggregated the units are that you’re using in your explanation C. Levels of analysis in international relations 1. Individuals a) The ‘Devil’ Theory: Bad Individuals Cause Wars b) Human Nature Causes War (1) Optimistic version: people can change (2) Pessimistic version: no, they can’t (a) Theoretical objection: education is not enough (b) Practical objection: altruism invites exploitation 2. States a) Democracies should be less warlike (1) Explanation: the people’s interests tend to be peace (2) Evidence: democracies rarely fight other democracies b) Economic development and war (1) War is not profitable for highly developed states c) Practical objection to state-level theories (1) Efforts to reform other states lead to war 3. The international system a) What is a ‘system’? (1) Comprised of interrelated parts (2) Parts do not explain outputs of the system (3) Actions have unintended consequences b) The role of international anarchy (1) Anarchy: a lack of central authority to resolve disputes (2) 'Security dilemma’ can lead to war c) Criticism of systemic theories 12

Saturday, May 1, y (1) Assumes rational behavior by states (2) Normative objection: theory used to absolve leaders of moral responsibility

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Saturday, May 1, y

War as a Bargaining Process I.

Why fight instead of making a deal? D. War is costly, even for the winner E. Many explanations focus on irrationality F. Focus of bargaining research on war: when would rational states fight? 1. Rationality —> selecting best option available, given your goals and information a) Does not mean goals are reasonable b) Rational actors may be uncertain, but not biased

X. When is war worth the cost? A. Value of prize = V B. Probability of winning = P C. Expected value of war before cost = P(V) D. Expected cost of war = C E. Expected value of war = P(V) — C 1. Suppose V = 100; P = 0.5; C = 20 2. Then, value of war = 0.5(100) — 20 = 30 A. Any deal that gives either side more than 30 is better than war! B. Bargaining range: (70, 30) to (30,70) C. If war is costly, there is always a bargain better for both sides F. Expected value of war: P(V) — C 1. Suppose V = 100; PA = 1; PB = 0; CA = 1; CB = 100 2. Value of war for State A: 1(100) — 1 = 99 3. Value of war for State B: 0(100) — 100 = -100 4. A should offer B (100, 0), and B should accept! 14

Saturday, May 1, y

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Saturday, May 1, y G. War between the US and Mexico, 1846-1848 1. US prewar offer: $25-30 million, plus $4.5 million in debt forgiveness 2. US payment after war: $15 million 3. Cost of war to US: ~$100; 13,721 dead 4. Cost of war to Mexico: ~25,000 dead; large but unknown economic losses XI. Reasons for bargaining failure A. Incomplete information 1. Value of war to each state is ‘private information’ a) Formula for value of war: P(V) — C (1) P: probability of victory (2) V: value of prize (3) C: expected cost of fighting b) Consequences of incomplete information (1) Demanding too much (Pearl Harbor) (2) Not conceding enough (Korean War) 2. Why not just tell the other side? a) Incentives to bluff b) Solving the credibility problem (1) Brinkmanship: increasing risk of war (2) Tying hands: increasing cost of backing down after making a threat (a) Audience costs: domestic political implications of backing down after making a statement B. Commitment problems 1. Will a war-avoiding bargain be kept?

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Saturday, May 1, y a) ‘Self-enforcing’ agreements: no reason to cheat b) Problem: some bargains affect state power, and thus future value of war c) Problem with US credibility of commitment: US replaces administration every 4 or 8 years 2. Wars stemming from commitment problems a) Preventative war: attacking another state in order to prevent another state from building up a threat (1) Example: war between US and USSR was inevitable; better to fight during Cuban Missile Crisis than to let USSR build up missile program and erode US’s nuclear advantage a) Preemptive war: taking away the other side’s first-strike advantage by instead being the one to strike first C. Issue indivisibility 1. Are there things that cannot be divided without losing their value? a) Symbolic places: Kosovo declaration of independence from Serbia on ethnic grounds; Kosovo still not recognized as independent state by Serbia 2. Reasons for skepticism a) Incentives to bluff about indivisibility (1) People can always change their mind about symbolic meanings b) Alternative ways of dividing things (Berlin during the Cold War)

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Saturday, May 1, y

The Realist Tradition I.

What is ‘Realism’? D. Body of thought stressing the pursuit of power by states in international anarchy 1. Pessimistic about what happens when groups of people interact E. ‘Power has its own logic’ — power forces people to do things F. Realism is not necessarily more ‘realistic’

XII.Historical Development of the Realist Tradition A. Thucydides (ca. 460-400 BCE) 1. Rejected ideological conflict as explanation for Polynesian War 2. Rejected specific causes of Polynesian War 3. Stressed amorality of power B. Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) 1. Didn’t witness idealized politics during his life 2. In order to maintain power, evil might have to be done 3. It is safer to be feared than to be loved C. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) 1. English Civil War: over religion, as well as whether power should go to monarch or Parliament 2. People are motivated by mostly fear and greed 3. No such thing as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ in state of war; only sovereign authority can decide what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ 4. States themselves exist in a state of war with one another; they must deal with the anarchy they are in just as people do D. 20th Century Realists 1. Importance of World War I

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Saturday, May 1, y a) Destroyed institutions that people thought would be around forever b) Made idealism of humans progressing toward a better society seem naive c) Undermined prevailing interests that there was a harmony among human beings d) Came to wonder whether or not competition is such a good thing 2. Reaction against ‘idealist’ solutions a) Rejected theory that people could be educated in order to avoid war b) Objected to idea that if all states became democracies there would be peace c) Rejected institutional systems at the state level; skeptical of League of Nations XIII.

Key Claims of 20th Century Realists

A. State is the most important actor 1. Other actors are dependent on states a) States are the ones who hold the weapons; therefore, they can make the decisions b) International organize rely on states’ commitment; can’t force it 2. States, unlike people, are inherently selfish a) Leaders must serve interests of constituents b) Majority of people in a group will always favor its interests over other groups c) State can channel individual altruism to collectively selfish ends B. Anarchy is the defining feature of the international system 1. Anarchy is the lack of central authority 2. Need for ‘self-help’ in anarchy

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Saturday, May 1, y a) The International Court of Justice and the Contra War; US asserted it would only comply with World Court jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis 3. Irrelevance of law, morality, and justice C. States pursue their national interests 1. Defensive realists: states seek security 2. Offensive: realists: states seek power 3. Moral and ideological concerns irrelevant a) Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin at Yalta: US+Britain were antiCommunist, but any enemy of Hitler was an ally b) Alliances disregarding morality and ideologies are expected to fall apart after conditions change D. States balance against the power of other states 1. Balance of power as description of how states behave a) Before Iraqi invasion of Kuwait: Gulf states back Iraq against Iran, no major US bases permitted in region b) After Iraqi invasion of Kuwait: Gulf states unite against Iraq, US bases subsidized by Saudi government c) Cooperation exists as long as the threat does 2. Balance of power as prescription of how states should behave a) States who choose incorrectly might be unable to defend themselves b) Kennan’s containment strategy to balance Soviet power

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Saturday, May 1, y

The Liberal Tradition I.

What is ‘Liberalism’ in international relations theory? E. Body of thought stressing possibility of cooperation among self-interested states F. Not ‘liberal’ in terms of American politics

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Historical Development of the Liberal Tradition

A. Realistic critique of classical liberal thought has lasting effects 1. The ‘Harmony of Interests’ 2. The management of power by reason B. Contemporary liberal thought is largely a reaction to realist arguments C. Liberal Responses to...