Maritime Surveillance: an integral part of maritime security PDF

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Maritime Surveillance: an integral part of maritime security Hesham M.Helal1 and Osama I.Hassan2 1 Maritime Postgraduate Studies Institute Arab Academy for Science, Technology and Maritime Transport, EGYPT 2 Maritime Postgraduate Studies Institute Arab Academy for Science, Technology and Maritime Tr...

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Maritime Surveillance: an integral part of maritime security Hesham M.Helal1 and Osama I.Hassan2 1

Maritime Postgraduate Studies Institute Arab Academy for Science, Technology and Maritime Transport, EGYPT 2 Maritime Postgraduate Studies Institute Arab Academy for Science, Technology and Maritime Transport, EGYPT

Abstract Today's complex and evolving maritime threats place a great premium on the knowledge and the understanding of all parameters that can pose a threat to the security in the maritime domain. In fact, it is well acknowledged that the key element to effectively countering any threat is its early detection. This latter, could not be achieved unless gaining a persistent awareness of what happened, is happening and will happen in the maritime domain. To achieve this end, there will be need to a set of activities, the ultimate goal of which is to properly identify maritime threats for appropriate action in an earlier stage. The cornerstone of any process involving knowledge and understanding is with no doubt the persistent surveillance that provides a comprehensive maritime situation picture, containing true and timely full detailed information in a given area, including details of activities, infrastructure, facilities, people, cargo, vessels, or other means of transport. So that appropriate operational responses can be initiated in good time at the right place. Early threat detection adds time and space to potential enforcement response options, affording securityin-depth and optimizing the advantages of assets. Factually, this is the core of the maritime surveillance system. This paper seeks to investigate the need for maritime surveillance; also the legal, operational and structural frameworks will be examined to gain an understanding of the overall concept of the maritime surveillance. Finally, the nexus between maritime surveillance and security will be explored to address the question “where does maritime surveillance fit in the maritime security context?”

Keywords

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Maritime surveillance, Maritime security, Maritime domain, Legaloperational-structural framework

Introduction

In light of the diversity of the core definition of the maritime surveillance, terminology used in this context differs both in terms of wording and meaning, therefore a short glossary is necessary. Surveillance is defined by the Maritime Affairs of the European Commission as:

“Maritime Surveillance is the effective understanding of all activities carried out at sea that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the European Union and its’ Member States”. (European Commission, 2010)

It is clear that this definition of the EU was taken unchanged from the original IMO definition, which states that Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is: “The effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact upon the security, safety, economy, or environment”. (IMO, 2012) Instead of the term “maritime surveillance”, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) uses the term “sea surveillance” which is defined as: “The systematic observation of surface and sub-surface sea areas by all available and practicable means primarily for the purpose of locating, identifying and determining the movements of ships, submarines, and other vehicles, friendly and enemy, proceeding on or under the surface of the world's seas and oceans”. (Sea surveillance, 2017) In fact, applying surveillance definition in the maritime domain is fundamental and daunting challenges. However, strides in this direction can be attained with the amount of technological development and the state of the art technologies in this area. 2

The need for maritime surveillance

The current maritime surveillance need must be understood within the context of its historical development. Accordingly, prior the advent of the so-called constitution of the oceans, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 12 nm territorial seas were the norm and there was little requirement for extensive maritime patrolling, as most of the area within national jurisdiction could be visually observed by an observer on shore. Any vessel suspected of contravening national jurisdiction could be investigated by specific interventions by the coast guard or by the navy as appropriate. The extension of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) increased the area under national jurisdiction well beyond line of sight (200 nm), and in order to monitor activities beyond visual range, expensive marine and aerial patrols were required. The costs of such patrols were and continue to be excessive for developing countries as well as developed ones and in many cases patrols were not undertaken and criminal actors took advantage of this gap and could normally ran with impunity and free of consequences. This fact drove several countries in searching for new solutions and procedures for developing an approach of monitoring and surveillance of the vast maritime area under jurisdiction. An effective tool in dealing with this problem, while reducing costs, was the implementation of maritime surveillance system. Nowadays, many fears are increasing with the recent developments in the sphere of maritime security due to the emergence of new maritime challenges, such as the wide and complex array of threats, risks and vulnerabilities in the current globalized maritime economy era. Because of these worries, measures are being taken both nationally and internationally to meet these threats. Among others, maritime surveillance was a key measure that significantly improves maritime security while reducing costs thanks to “the

apid increase in the affordability of data acquisition, storage and processing infrastructure and advances in intelligent techniques to learn from data”. (Tu et al., 2016) As such, Marco Guerriero et al. (2008) stated that recent global political changes have generated an increased interest in surveillance applications to tackle maritime terrorism, smuggling activities, and illegal immigration. This has led to a number of national and multinational initiatives in maritime surveillance to gain knowledge of all coastal and highseas activities relevant to national security. Summing up, while UNCLOS represented an important starting point in the development of the need for maritime surveillance; evolving threat to maritime security and global political changes have multiplied this need. 3

Maritime surveillance users

As it was discussed in the previous section, the need for maritime surveillance is proven by the growing maritime insecurity and the broad spectrum of threats, risks and vulnerabilities. Accordingly, it can be concluded that maritime surveillance is the responsibility and the task of all the stakeholders of the maritime domain including public and private actors, since they all could be affected by the lack of maritime security. Generally, maritime surveillance supports and responds to the needs of users from a wide range of public and private sectors. Public sectors refer to different ministries (Defence, Interior, Finance, Agriculture, Transport, and Environment). Lutz Feldt listed seven interests of the representatives of the sectors involved (Feldt, 2014): a. Border control at sea b. Fisheries control c. Defence d. Maritime safety and security e. Maritime environment f. Customs g. General Law enforcement. As such, a maritime surveillance system is a multi-mission system that is intended to support a multitude of stakeholders involved in the maritime domain according to their missions, interests and focus. 4

Legal framework: the rights of coastal state

Jurisdiction of a State is essentially its ability to validly make laws over activities. Wherever a State has jurisdiction, it has the right and the power to regulate and to enforce its laws. However, while jurisdiction of a coastal State over its land territory is absolute and uncontested, the situation at sea differs since vessels of diverse States can interact and may possess jurisdiction to regulate and enforce. As such, the UNCLOS has organized a series of maritime zones (internal and territorial waters, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone, the continental shelf and the high sea) over which States have jurisdiction, and has thereby created a framework of rights and obligations applicable to all States parties, including coastal and flag State. It is in the basis

of this framework that coastal States derive their powers of enforcement of technical standards and rules over different maritime zones and by ships flying their flag and by foreign ships. Based on this, the international legal framework regulating the rights and powers of coastal States to undertake maritime surveillance and to monitor vessels in the waters under jurisdiction is principally enshrined in the UNCLOS. For the purpose of understanding the legal framework of surveillance activities in the maritime domain, it is firstly useful to differentiate between two distinctly different types of operation, namely, the surveillance of cooperative vessels and that of non-cooperative vessels. Cooperative vessels are those, which actively participate in the maritime surveillance by providing information (automatically, manually or both) on their own position and identity, and continuously update this information to a specific agency. This type of surveillance is referred to as dependent surveillance since, in achieving an intended performance level, surveillance depends on the information supplied by the participating vessels. In contrast, independent surveillance, involves the tracking of non-cooperative vessels which do not provide such information and in extreme cases, may even attempt to take evasive and deceptive measures and try to conceal their presence, identity and intentions. (Ince, 2012) In terms of dependent surveillance, a flag State is entitled to impose, through its own legislation, the reporting requirements under a reporting regime of those vessels that fly its flag (in other words this is a flag State competence). That is why many reporting regimes, such as ship reporting systems (SRS), Automatic Identification System (AIS), Long Range, Range and Identification and Tracking (LRIT) and vessel monitoring system (VMS), are adopted through the auspices of International Maritime Organization (IMO). It is also evident that a coastal State may be entitled to introduce and enforce a reporting regime by reference to the passage or presence of foreign vessels within its maritime zones (a coastal State competence) or which seek to enter its ports (a port State competence). Such rights derive from the sovereignty or sovereign rights that a State enjoys within its maritime zones. As regards to independent surveillance schemes, as the vessel subject to the scheme plays no active role, the issue is simply a question of which State has jurisdiction over a given maritime area in which the vessel sails, thereby has the legal right to undertake surveillance in this area. In terms of the rights of coastal States as regards maritime surveillance and security, the situation can be summarised as follows: 4-1 Territorial sea and internal waters The right of a coastal State to conduct surveillance and to take other measures to ensure security within its territorial sea and internal waters derives from the absolute sovereignty that it enjoys over such waters. For instance, subject to the right of innocent passage, a coastal State is entitled to undertake security measures to prevent passage which is not innocent within its territorial sea. Consequently, a coastal State clearly has the exclusive right to undertake monitoring and surveillance activities within its territory including its territorial sea. This observation is

equally valid for dependent surveillance regimes as well as independent surveillance schemes. Mandatory port entry reporting requirements are an obvious example. 4-2 Contiguous Zone Within its Contiguous Zone, if was claimed, a coastal State enjoys no particular additional surveillance powers. It is, however, as described above entitled to undertake control measures for the purposes of preventing violations of customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary legislation and punishing infringement of these laws and regulations. 4-3 Exclusive Economic Zone Within its EEZ, a coastal State has the exclusive right to undertake surveillance in connection with activities relating to living and non-living resources and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of that EEZ and the continental shelf, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds. In this connection it is important to note that the exclusivity of the rights of the coastal State to undertake surveillance depend entirely on the scope of activities in respect of which it claims sovereign rights. Thus, unless claimed an EEZ or derivative zone such as a fishery zone, a coastal State has no exclusive right to undertake fisheries surveillance activities in the waters immediately beyond its territorial sea except as regards sedentary species (articles 68-77). As regards both dependent surveillance and independent surveillance, a coastal State has the exclusive right to undertake monitoring and surveillance in connection with the previous mentioned activities. For instance, a coastal State has the exclusive right to establish VMS regime within its territorial seas. All vessels engaged in fishing activities within the EEZ can be required as a matter of international law to effectively participate in such VMS system. Concerning mandatory SRS that apply to specific stretches of water, a large number of mandatory ship reporting systems are to be found worldwide. However these too are adopted through IMO to “contribute to the safety of life at sea, the safety and efficiency of navigation and/or the protection of the marine environment”, ships are required to report into a shorebased authority and such authority shall have the capability of interaction with participating ships. The IMO instruments providing for the establishment of ship reporting systems are the Safety of Life at Sea Convention, Chapter V, regulation 11, in addition to “the Guidelines and Criteria for Ship Reporting Systems” resolution MSC.43 (64), as amended by resolution MSC.111 (73), and also “the General principles for ship reporting systems and ship reporting requirements, including guidelines for reporting incidents involving dangerous goods, harmful substances and/or marine pollutants” resolution A.851 (20). Therefore while a mandatory reporting scheme may apply within the EEZ of a coastal State in practice there is no formal legal link between the status of such waters and the obligation of a vessel to comply with the reporting regime. Regarding security and enforcement issues, the powers of the coastal State are restricted essentially to the enforcements of the rights that it enjoys within its EEZ namely those rights relating to economic activities and environmental protection. As far as the smuggling of people or illegal goods is concerned, the presence or otherwise of an EEZ is largely irrelevant as regards the competence of a coastal State is concerned.

4-4 High Seas In areas beyond national jurisdiction, the high seas, all States have the implied right to undertake surveillance but not to the extent of interfering with the exercise of the freedoms of the high seas by ships flying a foreign flag. As a general principle, enforcement measures on the high seas, including those relating to illegal activities such as smuggling, are based around the competence and consent of the flag State. However, as a way of exception to this general principle, pursuant to article 110 of UNCLOS (the right of visit) a warship may, in certain circumstances, board a foreign ship in cases where there is reasonable ground for suspecting that a ship is: (a) engaged in piracy; (b) engaged in the slave trade; (c) engaged in unauthorized broadcasting (provided the flag State of the warship has jurisdiction under article 109 of UNCLOS; (d) without nationality; or (e) in reality of the same nationality as the warship although flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag. In such cases, maritime surveillance is with no doubt a key provider of “reasonable ground” for suspicious activities. 5

Operational framework

Recognizing the inherent importance of maritime surveillance and its added value for the maritime security at sea, this concept needs to be translated in practice through an operational structure and mechanism. In fact, maritime surveillance procedures can be found primarily within established naval principles, its surface combatant’s weapon systems and coastal defence systems. Indeed, maritime surveillance is something navies and coast guards have done for a long time. Based on this, operational framework of the maritime surveillance can be shaped from the traditional naval process, where an object must first be detected (establishing its presence), localized (its location), classified and identified (its type/class generally without relying on prior information) or recognized (matched with a pre-defined particular object) and targeted before it can be effectively engaged (doing nothing, boarding and searching, seizing, or taking it to port). Important is the tracking of the detected object (maintaining the display or recording of its positions). In general, effective maritime surveillance is more than simply collecting data about situation at sea. It is a process that comprises both knowledge and understanding of all actions in the maritime domain. In this context, the US National Strategy for Maritime Security defined knowledge as the “Familiarity or awareness gained through experience or study. The sum or range of what has been perceived, discovered, or learned.”, whereas understanding is the “ability to comprehend the sense or meaning of something based on the application of knowledge against data, information, and intelligence”. (US DHS, 2005) The understanding of detected targets is a final process providing processed data output. This process includes tracking, analysing, fusing information, data base searches (such as Lloyd’s Register or Port State Control databases as well as from the Internet) for unknown linkages and anomaly detection. Fundamental to this, is the knowledge as a primary process with its raw data output collected by means of monitoring, detection and tracking of vessels, cargo, crew and passengers.

Both knowledge and understanding are in the heart of the maritime surveillance system and together, they should build a comprehensive common operational picture (COP) which in turn will lead to the situational awareness and increase effectiveness in the planning and conduct of operations. 6

Structural framework

The objective of maritime surveillance is to reach a level of situation awareness which allows the timely detection and prevention of events threatening maritime security, environment and ensure border control (Fischer and Bauer, 2010). To reach the required level of quality in maritime surveillance, it is necessary to use a heterogeneous network of sensors and a global multi-sensor tracking and fusion infrastructure capable of processing the data. In order to better understand the structural framework of maritime surveillance it is necessary to first describe its components. In this context, Craig Carthel et al. (2007) listed four components, highlighted in Figure (1), that an overall maritime surveillance system should include:

Figure (1): A notional closed-loop maritime surveillance system Source: Carthel et al., 2007 1. Multi-sensor signal and information processing that generates contact-level data for all available sensors (coastal radar, Search and Rescue (SAR), video, etc.); 2. Global multi-sensor fusion and tracking that is capable of processing (potentially anomalous) AIS tracks and contact-level or track-level data from other sensors to produce a single, consolidated surveillance pictur...