Title | MKTG 476 776 - Lecture 11 |
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Author | Ben Katar |
Course | Applied Probability Models in Marketing |
Institution | University of Pennsylvania |
Pages | 6 |
File Size | 200.5 KB |
File Type | |
Total Downloads | 39 |
Total Views | 423 |
Lecture Notes Fader...
Lecture 11 (Ehrenberg) Brand Performance Measures (BPM) Size-Related Market share Penetration o % of customers who buy at least once in a week or year Loyalty-Related Frequency o Average number of purchases per buyer % of one-time buyers o # of single-unit customers (buy only one time per year) % of “100% loyal” buyers “Share of wallet”/SCR (share of category requirements) o Among the people who buy that brand, what is the market share? o What percentage of customer purchases are of your brand? o = Brand Purchases (#)/ Total Category Purchases by Brand Buyers (#) Others Choice set sizes Concentration o Greater concentration for bigger brands o Since alpha is scale parameter, expect big brands and small brands to have similar alpha Mean is r/alpha Mean for big brands > mean for small brands o Bigger brands will have higher r Duplication of purchase Byron Sharp doesn’t believe in 80/20 – he says the law is “60/20”, which suggests the nature of heterogeneity is the same across all brands. Correlation What is the correlation between market share and each brand performance measure? Purchase % of “once % of “100% Penetration SCR Frequency only” buyers loyal” buyers Market Share +++ + -+ ++ O&J Brand Performance Metrics Brand Share Penetration E
33%
50%
Frequency
Once-only
100%
SCR
4.0
32%
38%
66%
A H F G D C B
15% 15% 13% 11% 7% 4% 3%
32% 29% 24% 26% 21% 11% 10%
2.9 3.1 3.5 2.5 2.0 2.0 1.8
47% 48% 58% 58% 71% 64% 60%
13% 17% 17% 19% 5% 27% 30%
42% 41% 47% 32% 27% 28% 40%
Commentary Ehrenberg would say: “the way to grow your brand isn’t by getting your customers to buy more, but rather by growing the base” (growing the base) Ehrenberg did not like exceptions to his laws; he would dismiss brands that are exceptions as not part of the market Frequency varies positively, but not that strongly Why is % of “once only buyers” negative? o Heavy category buyers are spinning their Poisson wheels with good lambda’s. Since their lambdas are so high, they roll their dice often; eventually, at some point, they end up buying the low market share brands Rolling the same dice – just more often o By random chance, heavy purchasers are “stumbling into those brands” o Conditioning for penetration – among the buyers of the brand, how many are “once only”?
List of Laws
Double Jeopardy Law: brands with less market share have fewer buyers, who are also less loyal Law of Buyer Moderation: Regression to the mean of purchase behavior over time; heavier users become lighter, lighter users become heavier buyers, and non-buyers begin to buy the brand Duplication of Purchases Law: All brands, within a category, share their customer base with other brands in line with the size of those other brands o Of all the people that bought Brand X, what percent bought Brand Y, Z,…? o When you start looking across all the brands, it gets interesting o Columns are incredibly constant across – it doesn’t matter what the initial brand (Brand X) is
Double Jeopardy Definition Buyers of small brands buy those brands less often than buyers of big brands buy big brands o Niche brands are much harder to find and sustain – this essentially rules out the existence of a niche brand o Big brands get higher frequency AND higher penetration
Reference: Double Jeopardy Revisited (Ehrenberg) o First identified by William McPhee (about Sunday comics) Also seen in the data of Facebook & other social networks
Professor Fader’s Departures
Triple Jeopardy o Even according to Ehrenberg, for major market leaders, some behave like an even bigger brand than they already are Even if we accept double jeopardy (which tells us big brands will be purchased more than the little brands), there will be even more than that Positive residual for the biggest brand – observed purchase frequency will be even higher than it should be o Professor Fader wrote a paper with David Schmittlein o Reasons include social contagion, differential retail availability (access; small stores often only carry the big brands), “mental” availability o Detecting triple loyalty Run D-M, get the “expected” penetration/frequency and compare to the “actual” (residual from model) o Reference: Excess Behavioral Loyalty for High-Share Brands Non-stationary: throw your die away, take another
Excel Implementation Orange Juice From Brand A’s perspective αA ∗α A +1 Γ ( α A +n ) S ∗α A +2 Γ ( α A) Γ (α A +n)Γ (S ) S+ 1 ∗…= P ( 100 % loyal )= = S +2 Γ ( S+n) Γ (α A )Γ (S+ n) Γ ( s) Remember: Γ ( S +n ) = ( S +n−1 ) !
Depends on how many purchases you’ve made o In the first period, our expectation of their probability of buying brand A is equivalent to market share o In the second period, we condition on the first (conditional expectations) As well as which brand we’re considering When calculating P(100% loyal) based on Dirichlet, on the aggregate, it should be similar to the P(100% Loyal) found in the data o Note: Ehrenberg noted that P(100% loyal) doesn’t line up as well as the other metrics
Note: this is a static, stationary model! The changes are due to conditional expectations – as we see a customer over time, we reduce some of the uncertainty and zoom in on their true underlying propensity. Γ ( S +n−α A ) Γ ( S−α ) ( S−α A ) ∗( S+1−α A ) Γ ( s +n−α A ) Γ ( S ) Γ ( S+n ) S Penetration= 1− P ( 0) =1− = ∗…= S+ 1 Γ (s ) Γ ( S−α ) Γ (S+n) Penetration lines up pretty well % Once Only=n
Γ ( S −α A + n −1 ) Γ (S) α A ( S−α A ) ( S +1−α A) +…=n α A /¿ S+2 S S +1 Γ ( S−α A ) Γ (S+n)
“n” possible sequences (could purchase once at any of the n purchase opportunities) Solve for one sequence, and multiply by n
Donation Amount Dirichlet Multinomial on donation amounts There is still double jeopardy! But there is no triple jeopardy
Ehrenberg’s Slide Deck
Giant companies (CPG and media) would pay Ehrenberg a lot to find out what their alpha’s were (and the other metrics) o If there were deviations, he would say they were transient He has a big ego, but he was very productive
Overview “In near steady-state markets (mostly)” Emphasizes BPM o From Professor Fader’s perspective, if you get the alpha’s, everything else comes along for free – this is more important than the BPM Attitudes change with behavior (in other words, they follow alpha) o You are endowed by alpha, and everything follows from there o Can answer attitudinal questions based on alpha o For example, with toothpaste, we consider perceptions such as: freshness, whitens your teeth, etc. Biggest toothpaste brands have the most checkboxes on these features People associated good features with the biggest brands Ehrenberg makes the model seem incredibly complex & technical to make it inaccessible o Estimated parameters using Means and Zeros, as a choice process o From aggregate-level data, not customer-level
Aside Quorn Example – “meat substitute Quorn is broadening its market from vegetarians to appeal to the mass of healthy eaters in a quest to become a $1 billion global brand” Instead of making it narrowly appealing, they tried to “check as many boxes as possible” to get the availability Reference: “Simply Better” o Be broadly appealing & pretty good at everything, instead of excellent in one specific area o Everything else will follow from that Note: Professor Fader does not see the two as a causal link, but it’s interesting to think about Interesting Case Study New US instant coffee o Break-even market share is 5% o This equates to 8 purchases per year per 100 households We have two options for strategies o Niche: 1% buying 8 times = 8 purchases per 100 HH’s o Add-on: 8% buying 1 time = 8 purchases per 100 HH’s Ehrenberg says you have no choice between the strategies (and he’s mostly right) o You will end up among the distribution of other companies in the market o For example, given a market share of 5%, you will be between Sanka and Highpoint Sanka’s Market Share is 9%, % buying is 5%, purchases per buyer is ~3 High Point’s: 9%, 1%, ~2.6 It’s really hard to change or boost your alpha o E.g., you advertise to maintain your alpha where it is o Professor Fader thinks it’s really hard to tell for a young brand Strategic & incorrect assumptions Differentiating our brand is a vital marketing task Loyalty metrics reflect the strength, not size, of our brand Customer retention is cheaper than acquisition Price promotions boost penetration not loyalty Who we compete with depends on the positioning of our brand image Mass marketing is dead and no longer competitive Buyers have a special reason to buy our brand Our consumers are a distinctive type of person 20% of our customers make 80% of our purchases Ehrenberg challenges all of these assumptions Approximate shortcuts Double Jeopardy: Brand X’s purchase rate w0 approximately as: w x = 1−b x
w x relates to its penetration b x
o Frequency∗( 1−Penetration )=k , where k is a constant o What does variation in k mean? High “k” brand niche brand Low “k” brand a lot of people buy, but not very often change-ofpace brand E.g., ginger ale o Can start to look, at the margin, for niche-ness vs. change-of-pace-ness o Can also do this at the category level Examples of things in the grocery store that not a lot of people buy, but people who buy make many purchases Cigarettes, organic foods, baby products, pet products What do they have in common? High margins Can equate the k in each category to different kinds of marketing characteristics Duplication of Purchase o b x/ y , how many buyers of Y also buy X, relates to b x , approximately as: b x/ y =D b X Remarkably constant Brand Y doesn’t matter; only Brand X does Those who buy X in additional to Y is just a function of X’s penetration o Example in Instant Coffee Dataset 2.8 x Brand Y’s Penetration is basically equal to the percent of Folger’s buyers who are also Brand Y’s buyers
The Long Tail
Chris Anderson’s Hypothesis o Back in the old days, we were held hostage by brick-and-mortar stores o Brick-and-mortar stores carried the most popular brands o Now with technology, can supply more niche brands there is a lot of value in the tail o People who buy the long-tail content are the weird, infrequent buyers Long tail is not real! o People who buy the long-tail content are the heavy category purchasers o Role of hits is greater than it ever was before o Music industry should run like this: give the hits away for free, and look at this array of other products by the same label Get the heavy consumers to pay for the long-tail content Spotify (Daniel Ek) is aware of this Reference: “The Long Tail” by Chris Anderson (Why the future of business is selling less of more), “Should you Invest in the Long Tail?” (Elberse), “Blockbusters” by Elberse...