Nyo Nyo Aye v Kevin Sathiaseelan a l Ramakrishnan & Ano PDF

Title Nyo Nyo Aye v Kevin Sathiaseelan a l Ramakrishnan & Ano
Author Wong Yuki
Course Tort
Institution Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
Pages 26
File Size 571.5 KB
File Type PDF
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Download Nyo Nyo Aye v Kevin Sathiaseelan a l Ramakrishnan & Ano PDF


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Date and Time: Wednesday, 17 November 2021 1:46:00 PM +08 Job Number: 157976587

Document (1) 1. Nyo Nyo Aye v Kevin Sathiaseelan a/l Ramakrishnan & Anor,

[2020] 4 MLJ 380

Client/Matter: -NoneSearch Terms: professional negligence Search Type: Natural Language Narrowed by: Content Type MY Cases

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NYO NYO AYE v KEVIN SATHIASEELAN A/L RAMAKRISHNAN & ANOR CaseAnalysis | [2020] MLJU 287 | [2020] 4 MLJ 380

Nyo Nyo Aye v Kevin Sathiaseelan a/l Ramakrishnan & Anor [2020] 4 MLJ 380 Malayan Law Journal Reports · 25 pages

COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) IDRUS HARUN, SURAYA OTHMAN AND STEPHEN CHUNG JJCA APPEAL NO W-02(NCVC)(W)-12–01 OF 2018 4 March 2020

Case Summary Limitation — Accrual of cause of action — Action against solicitor — Plaintiff sued defendants as plaintiff’s solicitors for professional negligence in the conduct of plaintiff’s first suit — High Court found defendants professionally negligent but dismissed plaintiff’s claim on the basis that plaintiff’s claim was time-barred — Accrual of cause of action — Whether plaintiff’s claim time-barred Tort — Negligence — Professional negligence — Plaintiff sued defendants as plaintiff’s solicitors for professional

negligence in the conduct of plaintiff’s first suit — High Court found defendants professionally negligent but dismissed plaintiff’s claim on the basis that plaintiff’s claim was time-barred — Accrual of cause of action — Whether plaintiff’s claim time-barred — Whether defendants failed to inform plaintiff on the consequence of nonpayment of security for costs — Whether plaintiff’s first suit had prospect of success — Whether plaintiff had established standard of care which had been breached by defendants The plaintiff had filed an action against the executor of the estate of the plaintiff’s late husband (‘the executor’) (‘the first suit’), praying for a declaration that the alleged will tendered by the executor to obtain the grant of probate of the estate of the plaintiff’s late husband was null and void on the ground that it was forged. On 24 August 2009, on the application by the executor, the first suit was struck off for non-compliance by the plaintiff of the payment of security for costs (‘SFC’) order. The plaintiff subsequently brought an action against the defendants for breach of agreement (retainer) and/or professional negligence in the defendants’ conduct of the first suit. At the end of the trial, the learned judicial commissioner (‘the JC’) found the defendants were in breach of agreement (retainer)

Page 2 of 25 Nyo Nyo Aye v Kevin Sathiaseelan a/l Ramakrishnan & Anor and/or professionally negligent but dismissed the plaintiff’s claim on the basis that her claim was time-barred, hence, the present appeal. On the issue of limitation, the plaintiff submitted that the cause of action had accrued on 24 August 2009, which was when the first suit was struck off by the court but the defendants submitted that the cause of action accrued on 9 November 2008 which was the last date for the plaintiff to pay the SFC and the date when the plaintiff’s application for stay was dismissed. On the issue of negligence , the plaintiff argued that the defendants were negligent in failing to inform and advise her that the first suit would be struck off if she failed to deposit the SFC. Further, the defendants were negligent in failing to [*381] secure an application for an extension of time for her to comply with the SFC order. The defendants contended that there was no loss suffered by the plaintiff when the first suit was struck off since the plaintiff had no reasonable prospect of success in the said suit. The defendants further submitted that the plaintiff failed to establish the standard of care which had been breached by the defendants. Held Held, allowing the plaintiff’s appeal; dismissing the defendants appeal with costs of RM15,000 subject to payment of allocator; and remitting back the case to the High Court for assessment of damages:

(1) The JC had erred in holding that the cause of action accrued on 9 November 2008 when the application for stay of the SFC order was dismissed by the High Court judge. The SFC order by the deputy registrar which stated that the first suit ‘hendaklah dibatalkan’ meant literally that it shall be dismissed. Be that as it may, there must be an application by counsel for the first suit to be dismissed for non-compliance with the SFC order, in the absence of such application, the first suit remained alive. This was the reason why the executor had made an application to have the first suit be struck off for non-compliance of the SFC order which application was heard and allowed by the JC on 24 August 2009. Further, as a general rule, the court will not make or grant a useless order. The High Court would not make an order to strike off the first suit on 24 August 2009 if it had already been automatically struck off on 9 November 2008 (see paras 40– 41 & 44). (2) In the case of Muhamad Solleh bin Saarani & Anor v Norruhadi bin Omar & Ors [2010] 9 MLJ 603 , the court held that ‘in negligence actions, since damage is an essential part of the cause of action, the period of limitation runs from the date of the damage and not of the act which causes the damage’. In this context, the act which caused the damage was the non-compliance by the plaintiff of the SFC order, ie the failure to pay or deposit into court the sum of RM80,000. But the date of damage only commenced when the plaintiff’s first suit was struck off by the High Court on 24 August 2009. Thus, the cause of action accrued on 24 August 2009 and would have expired six years therefrom which was on 23 August 2015. Since the present action was filed on 29 April 2015, the plaintiff was well within the six years’ time limit. As such, the plaintiff’s claim against the defendants was not barred by limitation (see para 35 & 45). (3) On the issue of negligence , the JC’s findings were correct as it was premised on the facts presented before him. The JC had meticulously examined and scrutinised the testimony of the witnesses before coming to his findings. The JC had made a finding of fact that the first defendant had not informed the plaintiff of the consequence of the non-payment of [*382]

Page 3 of 25 Nyo Nyo Aye v Kevin Sathiaseelan a/l Ramakrishnan & Anor the SFC. This was so since the first defendant in his testimony had repeatedly said that he had never informed the plaintiff that she had one day left to make payment and that the reason the first defendant gave for this failure to inform, was due to the fact that the plaintiff had known all along when she had to pay the sum ordered as SFC (see paras 48–49). (4) The JC found that the plaintiff had a reasonable cause of action and ‘had an appreciable chance to win’ against the executor of her late husband’s estate in the first suit since he found that ‘contrary to the first defendant’s view that the plaintiff’s prospect was weak, the plaintiff’s learned counsel successfully pointed out that there were a number of factors that he could rely upon to show that the signature of the plaintiff’s late husband was forged’. Further, the defendants who represented the plaintiff in the first suit should not have taken up the case against the executor if they had felt that there was no prospect of success of winning the case (see paras 53–54). (5) The present case was in relation to the duty of a practitioner to inform and advise the client of the consequence of non-payment of SFC which would result in the case being struck off. It involved the duty of the practitioner to be diligent, to ask for an extension of time if time had expired and foremost to inform the client on the prospect of success of the client’s case and not lead the client on and when the case got struck off to turn the table against the client by alleging that the case had no prospect or chances of winning after all. The learned JC had extensively delved into the facts of the case before His Lordship made his findings that the defendants were negligent and in breach of their retainer. The JC also found the defendants version improbable as against the plaintiff’s version which was probable since the defendants, as professionals , had not kept any records of correspondences of their communication with the plaintiff on matters of great importance. In such circumstances, the JC’s findings were correct and therefore did not warrant appellate intervention (see para 64). Plaintif telah memfailkan tindakan terhadap wasi harta pusaka arwah suami plaintif (‘wasi’) (‘saman pertama’), bagi memohon pengisytiharan bahawa wasiat yang dikemukakan oleh wasi untuk mendapatkan pemberian probet dari harta pusaka arwah suami plaintif adalah tidak sah dan terbatal dengan alasan ia telah dipalsukan. Pada 24 Ogos 2009, atas permohonan wasi, saman pertama dibatalkan kerana ketidakpatuhan oleh pihak plaintif terhadap perintah pembayaran wang jaminan (‘SFC’). Plaintif kemudiannya mengemukakan tuntutan ke atas defendandefendan kerana melanggar perjanjian (penahan) dan/atau kecuaian profesional dalam pengendalian saman pertama oleh defendan-defendan. Di akhir perbicaraan, pesuruhjaya kehakiman yang terpelajar (‘PK’) mendapati defendan-defendan telah [*383] melanggar perjanjian (penahan) dan/atau cuai secara profesional tetapi menolak tuntutan plaintif dengan alasan bahawa tuntutannya terhalang oleh had masa, oleh itu, rayuan semasa. Mengenai isu had masa, plaintif berhujah bahawa kausa tindakan telah bermula pada 24 Ogos 2009, iaitu ketika saman pertama dibatalkan oleh mahkamah tetapi para defendan berhujah bahawa kausa tindakan bermula pada 9 November 2008 yang merupakan tarikh terakhir bagi plaintif untuk membayar SFC dan tarikh permohonan plaintif untuk penangguhan ditolak. Mengenai isu kecuaian, plaintif mendakwa bahawa defendan-defendan cuai kerana gagal memberitahu dan menasihatkan plaintif bahawa saman pertama akan dibatalkan sekiranya dia gagal mendepositkan SFC. Selain itu, defendan-

Page 4 of 25 Nyo Nyo Aye v Kevin Sathiaseelan a/l Ramakrishnan & Anor defendan cuai kerana gagal mendapatkan lanjutan masa untuk plaintif mematuhi perintah SFC. Defendandefendan berhujah bahawa tidak ada kerugian yang dialami oleh plaintif apabila saman pertama dibatalkan kerana plaintif tidak mempunyai prospek yang munasabah untuk berjaya dalam saman tersebut. Defendan-defendan seterusnya berhujah bahawa plaintif gagal menetapkan standard berhati-hati yang telah dilanggar oleh defendandefendan. Diputuskan Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan plaintif; menolak rayuan defendan-defendan dengan kos RM15,000 tertakluk kepada bayaran alokator; dan mengembalikan kes ke Mahkamah Tinggi untuk taksiran kerugian:

(1) Pesuruhjaya kehakiman telah terkhilaf dengan memutuskan bahawa kausa tindakan timbul pada 9 November 2008 ketika permohonan penangguhan perintah SFC ditolak oleh hakim Mahkamah Tinggi. Perintah SFC oleh timbalan pendaftar yang menyatakan bahawa saman pertama ‘hendaklah dibatalkan’ bermaksud secara harfiah bahawa ia akan ditolak. Walau bagaimanapun, permohonan mesti dibuat oleh peguam untuk saman pertama ditolak di atas ketidakpatuhan kepada perintah SFC, jika tidak ada permohonan tersebut, saman pertama akan terus berkuatkuasa. Inilah sebab mengapa wasi membuat permohonan agar saman pertama dibatalkan di atas ketidakpatuhan kepada perintah SFC di mana permohonan tersebut telah didengar dan dibenarkan oleh PK pada 24 Ogos 2009. Selain itu, sebagai prinsip umum, mahkamah tidak akan membuat atau memberikan perintah yang tidak berguna. Mahkamah Tinggi tidak akan membuat perintah untuk membatalkan saman pertama pada 24 Ogos 2009 jika ia telah dibatalkan secara automatik pada 9 November 2008 (lihat perenggan 40–41 & 44). (2) Dalam kes Muhamad Solleh bin Saarani & Anor v Norruhadi bin Omar & Ors [2010] 9 MLJ 603 , mahkamah memutuskan bahawa ‘in negligence actions, since damage is an essential part of the cause of action, the period of limitation runs from the date of the damage and not of the act which causes the damage’. Dalam konteks ini, tindakan yang menyebabkan kerugian tersebut adalah ketidakpatuhan oleh plaintif terhadap perintah SFC tersebut, iaitu kegagalan untuk membayar atau mendeposit ke [*384] mahkamah sejumlah RM80,000. Tetapi tarikh kerugian hanya bermula apabila saman pertama plaintif dibatalkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi pada 24 Ogos 2009. Oleh itu, kausa tindakan timbul pada 24 Ogos 2009 dan akan berakhir enam tahun daripada tarikh tersebut iaitu pada 23 Ogos 2015. Memandangkan tindakan semasa difailkan pada 29 April 2015, plaintif masih berada dalam had masa enam tahun yang ditetapkan. Oleh itu, tuntutan plaintif terhadap defendan-defendan tidak dihalang oleh batasan had masa (lihat perenggan 35 & 45). (3) Mengenai isu kecuaian, dapatan PK adalah betul kerana ia berdasarkan fakta yang dikemukakan di hadapannya. Pesuruhjaya kehakiman telah menyemak dan meneliti keterangan saksi-saksi dengan teliti sebelum membuat dapatan. Pesuruhjaya kehakiman telah membuat dapatan fakta bahawa defendan pertama tidak memberitahu plaintif mengenai akibat kegagalan membayar SFC tersebut. Ini dibuktikan apabila defendan pertama dalam keterangannya berulang kali mengatakan bahawa dia tidak pernah memberitahu plaintif bahawa dia mempunyai satu hari lagi untuk membuat pembayaran dan alasan yang

Page 5 of 25 Nyo Nyo Aye v Kevin Sathiaseelan a/l Ramakrishnan & Anor diberikan oleh defendan pertama di atas kegagalan untuk memberitahu tersebut, adalah disebabkan oleh fakta bahawa plaintif telah mengetahui sejak awal lagi bila dia harus membayar jumlah yang diperintah sebagai SFC (lihat perenggan 48–49). (4) Pesuruhjaya kehakiman mendapati bahawa plaintif mempunyai kausa tindakan yang munasabah dan ‘mempunyai peluang yang besar untuk menang’ terhadap wasi harta pusaka mendiang suaminya dalam saman pertama kerana dia mendapati bahawa ‘bertentangan dengan pandangan defendan pertama bahawa prospek plaintif lemah, peguam terpelajar plaintif berjaya menunjukkan bahawa ada beberapa faktor yang boleh dia andalkan untuk menunjukkan bahawa tandatangan mendiang suami plaintif dipalsukan’. Selanjutnya, defendan yang mewakili plaintif dalam saman pertama tidak seharusnya mengambil kes terhadap wasi jika mereka merasa tidak ada prospek kemenangan bagi kes tersebut (lihat perenggan 53–54). (5) Kes semasa adalah berkaitan dengan tugas seorang peguam untuk memberitahu dan memberi nasihat kepada klien mengenai akibat tidak membayar SFC yang akan mengakibatkan kes tersebut dibatalkan. Ini melibatkan tugas peguam untuk bersikap rajin, memohon pemanjangan tempoh masa jika masa telah habis dan yang lebih utama untuk memberitahu klien mengenai prospek kejayaan kes klien dan tidak memimpin klien dan ketika kes tersebut dibatalkan untuk mengubah kedudukan klien dengan mendakwa bahawa kes tersebut tidak mempunyai prospek atau peluang untuk menang. Pesuruhjaya kehakiman yang bijaksana telah menyelidik keseluruhan fakta kes sebelum Yang Arif membuat dapatannya bahawa para defendan cuai dan [*385] melanggar perjanjian penahan. Pesuruhjaya kehakiman juga mendapati versi defendan-defendan adalah mustahil berbanding versi plaintif yang mungkin berlaku kerana defendan-defendan, sebagai golongan profesional, tidak menyimpan apa-apa catatan surat-menyurat komunikasi mereka dengan plaintif mengenai perkara-perkara yang sangat penting. Dalam keadaan tersebut, dapatan-dapatan PK adalah betul dan oleh itu tidak memerlukan campur tangan rayuan (lihat perenggan 64).] Cases referred to

Arthur JS Hall & Co (a firm) v Simons; Barratt v Ansell (trading as Woolf Seddon (a firm)); Harris v Scholfield Roberts & Hill (a firm) [2000] 3 All ER 673 , HL (refd) Muhamad Solleh bin Saarani & Anor v Norruhadi bin Omar & Ors [2010] 9 MLJ 603 , HC (refd) Noorianti bte Zainol Abidin & Ors v Tang Lei Nge [1990] 2 MLJ 242 ; [1990] 2 CLJ Rep 545, HC (refd) Pang Yeow Chow (practising at Messrs YC Pang, Chong & Gordon) v Advance Specialist Treatment Engineering Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 MLJ 490 , CA (refd) Pitt and another v Holt and another; Futter and another v Futter and others [2013] 3 All ER 429 , SC (refd)

Page 6 of 25 Nyo Nyo Aye v Kevin Sathiaseelan a/l Ramakrishnan & Anor

Shearn Delamore & Co v Sadacharamani a/l Govindasamy [2017] 1 MLJ 486 , CA (distd) Tetuan Theselim Mohd Sahal & Co & Ors v Tan Boon Huat & Anor [2017] 4 MLJ 207 ; [2017] 6 CLJ 368, CA (distd)

Thameez Nisha Hasseem v Charijah Bt Ameerdin Mohamed Shariff & Anor (refd) The Great Eastern Life Assurance Co Ltd v Indra Janardhana Menon (representing the estate of the deceased, NVJ Menon) [2006] 2 MLJ 209 ; [2005] 4 CLJ 717, FC (refd) Legislation referred to

Limitation Act 1953 s 6(1)(a) Appeal from: Civil Suit No 22NCVC-219–04 of 2015 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur)

T Gunaseelan (Abd Razak bin Hashim and Ahmad Muslim bin Rozlan with him) (Sri Ling & Assoc) for the appellant. Tan Keng Teck (Janet Tang Yii Chi with him) (Lim Kian Leong & Co) for the respondents. [*386]

Suraya Othman JCA (delivering judgment of the court): INTRODUCTION [1] [1]There are two appeals before us which are as follows: (a) W-02(NCVC)(W)-2614–12 of 2017 (‘Appeal No 2614’); and (b) W-02(NCVC)(W)-12–01 of 2018 (‘Appeal No 12’).

[2] [2]These two appeals arise from the decision of the learned judicial commissioner (‘learned JC’), delivered on 29 November 2017 which dismissed the plaintiff’s claim against the defendants. The plaintiff, Mrs Nyo Nyo Aye, had brought this present suit against the defendants for breach of agreement (retainer) and/or professional negligence in the defendants’ conduct of the Kuala Lumpur High Court Civil Suit No S3-22–890 of 2007 (‘the first suit’). The plaintiff had alleged that the defendants, as her solicitors, had failed to inform and advise her and take the necessary actions which resulted in the first suit being struck off by the High Court on 24 August 2009. At the end of the trial of this present suit, the learned JC found the defendants, as solicitors, were in breach of agreement (retainer) and/or professionally negligent but however dismissed the plaintiff’s claim on the basis that her claim was time-barred.

Page 7 of 25 Nyo Nyo Aye v Kevin Sathiaseelan a/l Ramakrishnan & Anor

[3] [3]Both the plaintiff and the defendants were aggrieved with the decision of the learned JC and each filed separate appeals contending that the learned JC was plainly wrong in arriving at the said decision. Appeal No 2614 is the appeal by the defendants (Kevin Sathiaseelan a/l Ramakrishnan — first defendant and Messrs Syed Alwi Ng & Co — second defendant) against the decision of the learned JC which held that the defendants as solicitors were in breach of agreement (retainer) and/or professionally negligent in their duty as the plaintiff’s solicitor in the the first suit while Appeal No 12 is the appeal by the plaintiff (Mrs Nyo Nyo Aye) against the decision of the learned JC which held that her claim against the defendants is time barred.

[4] [4]On the hearing date, by consent of both parties, the defendants Appeal No 2614 was withdrawn on the agreement that the issues which were raised in Appeal No 2614 can also be raised in Appeal No 12 and that the plaintiff will not raise any objection if there is any need to file a leave application or an appeal proper to the Federal Court. On that agreement by parties, we struck out Appeal 2614 and proceeded to hear Appeal No 12.

[5] [5]We then proceeded to hear the appeal, and after taking into consideration the submissions of parties, both oral and written, we were unanimous in our view that there were merits in the plaintiff’s appeal. We therefore allowed the plaintiff’s appeal and set aside the decision of the learned [*387] JC on the issue of limitation. However, we are unanimous that there is no merits in the defendants’ appeal. We therefore dismissed the defendants’ appeal and we affirmed the decision of the learned JC on the issue of the breach of agreement (retainer) and negligence . We then remitted the case to the High Court for a...


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