Sanctity of Life Essay - Grade: 2.1 PDF

Title Sanctity of Life Essay - Grade: 2.1
Author Claudia Williams
Course Medical Law
Institution University of Bristol
Pages 3
File Size 92.4 KB
File Type PDF
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Summary

Essay on the sanctity of life and the measures that the law has taken around this...


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To what extent does English medical law value the sanctity of life and the autonomy of our decisions Academics such as Uslaner argue ‘many, perhaps most, of our moral standards come from religious guidance’ . Bearing this into consideration, it is unsurprising to come to the conclusion current legislative measures somewhat forgo the arguably more modern principle of patient autonomy in regards to abortion and euthanasia. However, it is through analysis of how these legal measures are practically used we can determine the prime concerns of English medical law, this is what I aim to explore throughout this essay. The principle of sanctity of life derives from, religion and asserts that it is always preferable for someone to be alive rather than dead and that the argument against purposefully killing another human must always outweigh all other arguments . Religious arguments stem from the belief that life is God-given and therefore cannot justifiably be terminated by others, even on request. In contrast, Professor John Harris has defined autonomy as ‘the ability to choose and the freedom to choose between competing conceptions of how to live’. The Abortion Act 1967 provides the legal framework for abortion in the UK where, in essence abortion is permitted if a pregnancy would involve a greater risk of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman, or to any existing children of her family and if before the 24th week of pregnancy, than if the pregnancy were terminated. The procedure also requires the agreement of two registered medical practitioners . The conditions therefore are not overly onerous which may be borne out to some extent by the Department of Health statistics which record that in 2014 the number of terminations was 184,571 in England and Wales. Due to attention being given to the ever increasing number of abortions annually within the UK, It has been questioned whether there is a sufficiently strong public interest in reducing the incidence of terminations to justify interference with a woman’s right to private life and, in this context, particularly her interest in physical and psychological integrity . Pro-life supporters such as Brody affirm the more traditional view that a woman cannot justify an abortion, even in circumstances where her own life is at risk down to the obligation not to take life surpassing all other principles. This seems in line with current legislation in place in Northern Ireland where legal, moral and religious issues have had a significant impact on the Northern Ireland Government official statistics recording a mere 16 legal terminations for the year 2014-2015 .Northern Ireland may be an extreme example in the context of a country with deeply differing religious beliefs forming the backdrop to political and social troubles over the last 40 years but nevertheless the recent and important Judicial Review case referred to below demonstrates the potential for a legislative review in terms of the evolution of a movement towards greater self-determination and autonomy in line with the far less restrictive abortion laws in England and Wales. Despite great restrictions in Northern Ireland, another recent case of a young woman earlier this April in Belfast was given a suspended sentence of three months for the purchasing online and taking of two drugs that induced a miscarriage in 2014 .Through the courts seeming unwillingness to fully prosecute under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 this illustrates a possible shift of society as a whole towards a future where greater respect is given to patient autonomy, even where strict religion prescribes otherwise. It may, in fact, be argued that the reason the Abortion Act 1967 has lasted almost 50 years without alteration is due to its flexibility and how it has been in effect malleable in order to address changes in society. Despite the Act laying down grounds for abortion (of which at least one must be met) the Government report on Abortion Statistics in England and Wales 2014 reveals 98% of women who received abortions came under ground C where ‘the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the continuation of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman’. This brings light to the fact though superficially there appears to be respect for foetal rights, since a ground must be met, in practise ground C appears to be applicable in almost all circumstances.

This liberal application underlines the true prominence of patient autonomy and respect for women’s right to do as they please with their bodies, notwithstanding the still arguably paternalistic requirement of two medical practitioners ‘approval’ of the decision. In this way it could be argued that both the pro-choice and pro-life principles are to some degree taken into account, hence the longevity of the legislation. When examining Human Rights it can be noted the right to abortion has long been disputed. This issue is in deciding whether it stands as a right under article 8 of the ECHR (the right to a private life). RR v Poland observes that 'the decision of a pregnant woman to continue her pregnancy or not belongs to the sphere of private life and autonomy' , confirming compatibility and standing. This decision reflects the view of the UK courts in a great majority of its deliberations. Furthering this, legislation prohibiting abortion in Northern Ireland in respect of pregnancies, albeit in the limited extent of pregnancy as a result of rape or sexual crime , has been deemed a breach of Art 8, as was held in The High Court in Belfast in November 2015 in the case of Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, Re Judicial Review . Article 8 ECHR provides a common thread to both the arguments in relation to Euthanasia and abortion and indeed was considered by Horner J in the Judicial Review .He reiterated the Judgment of Lord Steyn in the controversial case of Pretty, concerning assisted suicide, where he drew comparisons between the fundamental beliefs and issues relating to the two, highly emotive subjects. “It is of great importance to note that these are ancient questions in which millions in the past have taken diametrically opposite views and still do . The issues of abortion and medically assisted death are very much linked, in that many protagonists in the abortion debate confront each other similarly regarding assisted suicide and euthanasia In Euthanasia: The strengths of the middle ground , McCall Smith questions whether divergence applied in the courtroom towards abortion should produces a parallel to a shift in decisions regarding euthanasia, strengthening a zeitgeist argument. However, there remains conflict as to whether lawyers and judges alike should be omitted from decisions in this emotive moral area and should be left solely to legislators. In England and Wales there is an important distinction currently between killing and letting die. The former (a positive act) is prohibited, whereas the latter (an omission) is generally not. It is the case that taking positive steps to end another person’s life (active euthanasia) such as by lethal injection, is unlawful. According to Harris, in his work The Value of Life, Killing may be the caring thing to do. Harris further argues that ‘it is only by the exercise of autonomy that our lives become in any real sense our own….When we are denied control at the end of our lives we are denied autonomy.’ However, the current legal position in the UK on euthanasia strongly negates this patient autonomy and puts a limit to which choices we can lawfully make. The case of Tony Nicklinson confirms this prohibitive framework. Nicklinson suffered from locked-in syndrome as the result of a stroke in 2005, which left him paralysed from the neck downwards and unable to speak or move any part of his body except his head and eyes. He expressed his wishes to die shortly after his stroke. The High Court concluded only Parliament had the power to change the law relating to murder and turned down his plea for the right to assisted euthanasia. Prior to the 2012 judgement, in an article he wrote for the BBC, Nicklinson had described his life as "a living nightmare". He added: "It cannot be acceptable in 21st Century Britain that I am denied the right to take my own life just because I am physically handicapped." Tony died a few days later after refusing treatment for a pneumonia he contracted. This stagnation of progression towards a future that values patient autonomy illustrates the reluctance to permit practise that puts an end to life, no matter what the circumstances are. This is likely down to the fact we are part of a society where deep set medical intuition upholds an “almost universal, value of reluctance to take human life” as summarised in the BMJ by Shimon Glick .Professor Penney Lewis, professor of law at the Centre of Medical Law and Ethics at King's College London, said that Mr Nicklinson's plight would continue to raise questions about a change in the law that holds dear the principle of sanctity of life.

This being so, it can be argued that there are avenues of lawful euthanasia established within our legal system. Passive euthanasia, where a competent patient is able to refuse lifesaving/sustaining treatment is not unlawful. This was illustrated in the case of Re B where it was held Mrs B should have been respected in her choice to refuse ventilation in her competent state. This can also be seen in the case of Re JT where a 25 year old suffered renal failure and refused dialysis and later died. And she was deemed competent her refusal was valid. This blurred line of distinction between scenarios of allowing someone to take their own life by active choice or through refusing treatment seems questionable due to continuous claims of ethical likeness. The inability to separate niceties reinforces the argument put forward by draft bills that call for a change in the law. In 2004 Lord Joffe introduced a Private Members’ Bill in House of Lords (The Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill) to enable an adult who has capacity and who is suffering unbearably as a result of terminal illness to receive medical assistance to die at his own considered and persistent request. This bill was however defeated in the House of Lords and scrutinised by House of Lords Select Committee on Assisted Dying in 2005 who recommended numerous items, such as the provision of a distinction between assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia , recommended in chapter 7 of their report, paragraph 246. More recently Lord Falconer introduced in the House of Lords in June 2014 The Assisted Dying Bill to enable competent adults who are terminally ill to be provided at their request with specified assistance to end their own life. However progression came to a halt after the second day of committee stage on 16 January 2015 when due to lack of parliamentary time. This highlights that though there is a great driving force for legal change there remains a lack of urgency and circumspection within the legislature. In conclusion, when it comes to the taking of life, at any stage, English law is hesitant in taking any major steps in either direction. Patient autonomy, however, seems to taken as a prime concern in issues where one’s own life is not in question, medical law seems to take more paternalistic view in appreciation of the sanctity of life principle within the contrasting scenario. However the net movement of any calls for change tend to suggest greater support is now being sought for patients to be allowed to exercise their right of personal autonomy and one can assume with time the law will follow....


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