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STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION A. Statutes strictly construed Penal Laws 1. INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010 2. ELVIRA YU OH v. cOURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 125297, June 6, 2003 3. GERARDO R. VILLASEÑOR v. SANDIGA...

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STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION Freya Revamonte

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STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION A. Statutes strictly construed Penal Laws 1. INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010 2. ELVIRA YU OH v. cOURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 125297, June 6, 2003 3. GERARDO R. VILLASEÑOR v. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 180700, March 4, 2008 Statutes in derogation of rights 1. HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN v. MANDALUYONG, G.R. No. 135087, March 14, 2000 2. PHILACOR CREDIT CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 169899, February 06, 2013 3. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. KUDOS METAL CORPORATION, G.R. No. 178087, May 5, 2010 4. MAPULO MINING ASSoCIATION v. HON. FERNANDO LOPEZ, G.R. No. L-30440, February 7, 1992 Statutes granting privileges 1. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, G.R. No. 140230, December 15, 2005 2. RAOUL B. DEL MAR v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 138298, November 29, 2000 3. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. KERRY LAO ANG, G.R. No. 175430, June 18, 2012 Exceptions and provisos 1. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. THE cOURT OF APPEALS, CENTRAL VEGETABLE MANUFACTURING CO., INC., G.R. No. 107135, February 23, 1999 2. GEOLOGISTICS, INC. v. GATEWAY ELECTRONICS CORPORATION, G.R. Nos. 174256-57, March 25, 2009 B. Statutes liberally construed 1. RE: APPLICATION FOR SURVIVORSHIP PENSION BENEFITs UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9946, A.M. No. 14155-Ret., November 19, 2013 2. MARIA v. SSs, G.R. No. 147745, April9, 2003 3. IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM, G.R. Nos. 168992-93, May 21, 2009 4. THE COCA-COLA EXPORT CORPORATION v. CLARITA P. GACAYAN, G.R. No.

149433, December 15, 2010 5. REGIONAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 165155, Apr 13, 2010 Prescription 1. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. BASF COATING, G.R. No. 198677, November 26, 2014 2. RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG v. TERESITA RIVERA, G.R. No. 200148, June 4, 2014 MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY STATUTES

1. Article 5, New Civil Code: ​Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity. 2. IN RE APPLICATION OF MARIO GUARIÑA FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR, G.R. No. L-1179, January 8, 1913 Facts Relying upon the provisions of ​Section 2 of Act No. 1597​, the Mario Guarina seeks admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.​ ​The records disclose that on a former occasion Guarina took, and failed to pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received an average of only 71% in the various branches of legal learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required percentage of 75.

Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows: SEC. 2. Paragraph 1 of section 13 of Act 190, entitled "An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows: 1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Code: Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this Act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney-General, Solicitor-General, Assistant Attorney-General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney-General, prosecuting attorney for the city of Manila, assistant prosecuting attorney for the city of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, ​MAY ​be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination​, ​upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.​" Issue: ​Whether or not the word ‘may’ as used in the Act No. 1597 be given a mandatory effect in the present case.

Ruling: ​NO. The jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the Commission and confirmed to it by the ​Act of Congress would be limited and restricted​, and in a case such as that under consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from Act No. 1597, a mandatory rather than a permissive effect.

Act of Congress enacted July 1, 1902 Section 9: That ​the Supreme Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands shall ​possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by the Government of said Islands, subject to the power of said Government ​to change the practice and method of procedure​. The ​municipal courts of said Islands ​shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore ​provided by the Philippine Commission, subject in all matters to such alteration and amendment as may be hereafter enacted by law; and the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court shall hereafter be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive the compensation heretofore prescribed by the Commission until otherwise provided by Congress. The judges of the Court of First Instance shall be appointed by the Civil Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Philippine Commission: Provided, That the admiralty jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and Courts of First Instance shall not be changed except by Act of Congress. Prior to the passage of this Act the power and jurisdiction of this court in relation to the admission of candidates to the bar of the Philippine Islands had been fixed by the provisions of the ​Organic Act (No. 136) and the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190); Organic Act (No. 136) SEC . 2. Constitution of judiciary. — The judicial power of the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested in a Supreme Court, Courts of First Instance, and courts of justices of the peace, together with such special jurisdictions of municipal courts, and other special tribunals as now are or hereafter may be authorized by law. The two courts first named shall be courts of record. SEC. 16. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. — The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall be of two kinds: 1. Original; and 2. Appellate. SEC. 17. Its original jurisdiction. — The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue ​writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition,

habeas corpus, and quo warranto in the cases and in the manner prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, and to hear and to determine the controversies thus brought before it, and in other cases provided by law. Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190); "SEC. 13. Who may practice as lawyers. — The f​ ollowing persons​, if not specially declared ineligible, are entitled to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands: 1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Code; 2. Those who are hereafter licensed in the manner herein prescribed. SEC. 14. Qualifications of applicants. — Any resident of the Philippine Islands, not a subject or citizen of any foreign government, of the age of twenty-three years, of good moral character, and who possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability, is entitled to admission as a member of the bar of the Islands and to practice as such in all their courts. SEC. 15. Certificate of good character required. — Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must produce the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character, and must satisfactorily pass a proper examination upon all the codes of law and procedure in force in the Philippine Islands, and upon such other branches of legal learning as the Supreme Court by general rule shall provide. . . . SEC. 16. Place and manner of examinations. — Such examinations shall be conducted at Manila, by the judges of the Supreme Court or by a committee of competent lawyers by them to be appointed, and shall be held at such times as the judges of the court shall provide by general or special rules. The true intention of the legislator was to leave it within the discretion of the court to admit to the bar without examination the officials mentioned in the Act in any case

wherein the court is otherwise satisfied that they possess the necessary qualifications.

In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and never had been a practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar. We conclude therefore that this application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines should be denied. We think we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a ​special examination which will be given him by a committee of the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule.

3. ACOSTA v. ADAZA, G.R. No. 168617, February 19, 2007 4. PHILIPPINE REGISTERED ELECTRICAL PRACTITIONERS, INC. v. JULIO FRANCIA, JR., G.R. No. 87134, January 20, 2000 5. GAUDENCIO GUERRERO v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCoS NORTE, G.R. No. 109068, January 10, 1994 6. LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010 7. BOARDWALK BUSINESS VENTURES, INC. v. ELVIRA A. VILLAREAL, G.R. No. 181182, April 10, 2013

STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED - PENAL LAWS Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales VDA. De Carungcong v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010 Facts: Mediatrix Carungcong, as the duly appointed administratrix of intestate estate of her mother Manolita, she filed a complaint-affidavit for estafa through falsification of public document against her brother-in-law, William Sato. It was alleged that Sato induced Manolita, the owner of the state, to sign and thumb mark a special power of attorney which authorized the sale, assignment, transfer, and disposition of Manolita’s property. Sato moved for the dismissal of the case. He contends that in Article 332 of the Revised Code enumerates of those relatives who shall be exempt from criminal prosecution. Sato, being a relative by affinity, he cannot be held liable for the crime of estafa as stated in the law. He also adds that his wife’s death did not dissolve the mother-in-law and son-in-law relationship between him and his wife’s mother, Manolita. Issue: Whether Sato should be exempt from criminal liability for reason of his relationship to Manolita. Held:​ ​No​. The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. In particular, it calls for the determination of the following: the effect of death on the relationship by affinity created between a surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse, and the extent of the coverage of Article 332. A. First view: the relationship by affinity continues even after the death of one spouse when there is a surviving issue. The rationale is that the relationship is preserved because of the living issue of the marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties is commingled. Second view: where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the "tie of affinity" between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties. Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the family as a basic autonomous social institution are policies of the State and that it is the duty of the State to strengthen the solidarity of the family. Congress has also armed as a State and national policy that courts shall preserve the solidarity of the family. In this connection, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal. The view that relationship by affinity is not affected by the death of one of the parties to the marriage that created it is more in accord with family solidarity and harmony. B. From the plain language of the law, it is clear that the exemption from criminal liability for the crime of swindling (estafa) under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code applies to

Sato, as son-in-law of Manolita, they being "relatives by affinity in the samef line" under Article 332(1) of the same Code. Basic rule in statutory construction is that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. The courts could only distinguish where there are facts or circumstances showing that the framers intended a distinction or qualification. In such a case, the courts would merely give effect to the framer's intent. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not include the power to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein. Further, it is an established principle of statutory construction that ​penal laws are strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. However, Article 332 is strictly limited to felonies mentioned. The plain, categorical, and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it ​applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling, and malicious mischief. ​It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as estafa through falsification. Thus, Sato should not be exempt from criminal liability considering that the crime he committed falls under the nature of a complex crime which is the crime estafa through falsification of public document.

ELVIRA YU OH V COURT OF APPEALS G.R.No. 125297, JUNE 6, 2003 FACTS: Petitioner Elvira Yu Oh purchased pieces of jewelry from Solid Gold International Traders, Inc., a company engaged in jewelry trading. She failed to pay the purchase price so Solid Gold filed civil cases against her for specific performance before the RTC of Pasig. On September 17, 1990, petitioner and Solid Gold, through its general manager Joaquin Novales III, entered into a compromise agreement to settle said civil cases. It provided that petitioner shall issue a total of 99 post-dated checks in the amount of P50, 000.00 each, dated every 15th and 30th of the month starting October 1, 1990 and the balance of over P1 million to be paid in lump sum on November 16, 1994 which is also the due date of the 99th and last postdated check. Petitioner issued 10 checks at P50, 000.00 each, for a total of P500, 000.00, drawn against her account at the Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC), Grace Park, Caloocan City Branch. Novales then deposited each of the ten checks on their respective due dates with the Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC). However, said checks were dishonored by EBC for the reason Account Closed. Dishonor slips were issued for each check that was returned to Novales. On October 5, 1992, Novales filed criminal cases before the RTC of Quezon City charging petitioner with violation of B.P. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.

RTC convicted her of ten counts of violation of BP 22 with a penalty of one year imprisonment for each count, or a total of ten years, and to indemnify complainant in the amount of P500, 000.00. CA affirmed the decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not giving retroactive effect to R.A. 7690 in view of Article 22 of the RPC. HELD: No. The court did not err in not granting retroactive effect to R.A. 7691. Petitioner argues that the failure to give retroactive application to R.A. 7691 giving MTC the exclusive original jurisdiction is a violation of Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of the felony. A penal law, is an act of the legislature that prohibits certain acts and establishes penalties for its violations. It also defines crime, treats of its nature and provides for its punishment. R.A. No. 7691 does not prohibit certain acts or provides penalties for its violation; neither does it treat of the nature of crimes and its punishment. Consequently, R.A. No. 7691 is not a penal law, and therefore, Art. 22 of the RPC does not apply in the present case. R.A. No. 7691 which took effect on June 15, 1994, amended B.P. Blg. 129, and vested on the Metropolitan, Municipal and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts jurisdiction to try cases punishable by imprisonment of not more than six (6) years. Since R.A. No. 7691 vests jurisdiction on courts, it is apparent that said law is substantive. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. R.A. No. 7691 was not yet in force at the time of the commencement of the cases in the trial court. It took effect only during the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals. There is therefore no merit in the claim of petitioner that R.A. No. 7691 should be retroactively applied to this case and the same be remanded to the MTC. The Court has held that a law vesting additional jurisdiction in the court cannot be given retroactive effect.

STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED - PENAL LAWS Gerardo Villaseñor v. Sandiganbayan Gr. 180700, March 4, 2008 Facts​: On August 18, 2001, in the wee hours of the morning, the Quezon City Manor Hotel went ablaze resulting in the death of seventy-four (74) people and injuries to scores of others. Investigation into the tragedy revealed that the hotel was a veritable fire trap. Petitioners, together with other officials of the City Engineering office of Quezon City, are presently facing ​criminal charges before the 5th Division of the Sandiganbayan for the crime of multiple homicide through reckless imprudence and for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. They were also charged ​administratively with gross negligence, gross misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service in connection with the Manor Hotel inferno. Petitioners Villaseñor and Mesa were preventively suspended for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of the suspension order. During the pendency of the criminal case, respondent special prosecutor Louella Mae Oco-Pesquerra led a motion for ​suspension pendente lite ​of petitioners. Petitioners opposed the motion, ​contending that they had already been suspended for six (6) months relative to the administrative case​, based on the same facts and circumstances. They posited that any preventive suspension that may be warranted in the criminal case was already absorbed by the preventive suspension in the administrative case because both the criminal and administrative cases were anchored on the same set of facts. The court granted the prosecution’s motion for suspension. ​It ordered the suspension for a period of 90 days. Romeo M. Montallana, Romualdo C. Santos, Gerardo R. Villaseñor, and Rodel A. Mesa- ​90 days suspension Alfredo N. Macapugay- already dismissed from the service, hence, he can no longer be subjected to this suspension order. Issue​: 1....