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American philosophers Dan W. Brock and John D. Arras both take a similar stance when discussing legalizing euthanasia and its lead to abuse, yet have contrasting views in regards to the possibility of a beneficial policy. In this paper, I will talk about what both Arras and Brock are concerned about and why. I will also discuss the safeguards of Brock and the factions of Arras along with the slippery slope that is discussed from both philosophers. To provide some background, Brock favors voluntary active euthanasia, while having optimism that a successful policy can be put in place to avoid abuse. On the other hand, Arras is optimistic to the idea of Physician Assisted Suicide (PAS) and euthanasia, however does not think that a legal policy can be made without negative consequences. Arras argues that society is not capable of having a successful legalized policy with respect to the clinical and social levels in the court system. Brock would respond that the consequences of this do not outweigh the benefit of having a legal policy. Brock feels strongly about this since he has evidence of success from the Netherlands. “In the Netherlands, where euthanasia is under specified circumstances is permitted by the courts, though not authorized by stature, the best estimate of the proportion of overall deaths that result from it is about 2%. In 1987, it was reported that there were approximately 1,900 cases of PAS that occurred annually.” (Brock 650, 651). Brock discusses the moral center of medicine and that if a patient is competent and makes a request, it should be granted. He believes that having a policy could be successful being that the good consequences outweigh the bad, acknowledging the fact that the bad consequences are solely surrounded by a physician’s incompatibility of euthanasia in regards to their moral and professional commitment as healers. Arras sees views it from a futuristic and literal standpoint based on how society currently operates and how they will operate if such a policy is put into effect. He mentions, “The logic of the case for PAS, based as it is upon the twin pillars of patient autonomy and mercy, makes it highly unlikely that society could stop with this modest proposal once it had ventured out on the slope.” (Arras, 666). He points out that it would be difficult to set specific guidelines that appeal to everyone’s situation, noting

that a terminal illness is an arbitrary requirement, since judges do not have the power to decide that one has suffered long enough nor evaluate their quality of life. In another sense, this potential requirement of a “terminal illness” is very specific, discriminating against those who are suffering from other illnesses that are not under the category of “terminal.” He says, “If my life is no longer worth living, why should a terminally ill cancer patient be granted PAS but not me, merely because suffering is due to my “nonterminal” arterio-lateral sclerosis (ALS) or intractable psychiatric disorder?” (Arras, 666). Arras is concerned about the involvement of the courts, lack of knowledge from doctors, and the likelihood of abuse, which is also one of his prongs of the slippery slope argument. With respects to the court and legislative involvement, the legalization policy would have to be so finely described to ensure that all backgrounds of people are considered. He notes worries that there if the details of the policy are not finely defined, a group of people would not be considered for PAS/euthanasia and would ultimately be left out and we cannot legalize something if the healthcare system is unequal. He notes, “there is the lingering fear that any legislative proposal or judicial mandate would have to be implemented within the present social system one marked by deep and persuasive discrimination against the poor and the members of minority groups.” (Arras, 667). This could be a bad thing. Contrary to Arras, Brock indirectly comments on Arras’ viewpoint of court involvement. He ultimately believes that since public policy has allowed life-sustaining treatment options and decisions to be made with the patient and physician, by legalizing euthanasia and PAS now, it would in fact bring more involvement with the court system, which would be a positive thing, since the courts would be allowed to have mor regulation of treatment decisions. Brock states, “Most agree, however, that increased involvement of the courts in these decisions would be undesirable, as it would make sound decision making more cumbersome and difficult without sufficient compensating benefits.” (Brock, 653). There is also a possibility that PAS and active euthanasia will fail the test of voluntariness if changes to how medicine is practice are not effective. Arras’ concern for the lack of doctors is another reason he is skeptical of rushing to legalized policy. When Arras talks about doctors not being trained to

notice psychological disorders such as depression, it effects the the success of treatment, available medications, and a potential leap for an alternative such as PAS. These worries and concerns tie together into his slippery slope. Morally, Arras views the legalization policy as okay, but just doesn’t think it is feasible right now. Since PAS and active euthanasia are chose, abuse of the system will follow. Here, Arras calls this the empirical slope. To reassure the skeptics of the justifiable policy, there are three requirements. “This area must meet at least the following three requirements. First, all requests for death be truly voluntary; second, all reasonable alternatives to PAS and active euthanasia must be explored before acceding to a patient’s wishes; and third, a reliable system of reporting all cases must be established in order to effectively monitor these practices and respond to abuses.” (Arras, 667). Again, one of the major fears is that these requests of PAS would not be voluntary. Arras says that the most slippery idea of the slope is, the high prediction that physicians would not properly diagnose and treat clinical depression; especially in the elderly population. This is a good slippery slope because it achieves both of the necessary attributes. A and B of the slope are closely related in that the patients who are off of the grid for justifiable criteria, will be candidates for death. “This is based not on the close logical resemblance of concepts of justifications, but rather on an empirical prediction of what is likely to happen when we insert a particular social practice into our existing social system.” (Arras, 667). Here, Arras is suggesting that if PAS and euthanasia are legalized, it will be a new practice being used by physicians. Typically when there is a new practice being used, you want unknowingly (or knowingly) try to make it fit with every criterion that it could possibly fit, ultimately letting the new practice trump all of the old practices when there it is not necessary. On the other hand, Brock is concerned about the lead to active euthanasia caused by legalizing justified euthanasia is NOT a slippery “enough” slope (although it could have fateful consequences) to “warrant prohibiting it if it is otherwise justified.” (Brock, 665). It is not a good slippery slope because there is no evidence to support this potential “slope.” The important slippery slope that Brock is most concerned with is about the incompetent patients. We begin to do involuntary acts simply because they

cannot specify their wishes. He says, “Why continue to force unwanted life on patients just because they have now lost the capacity to request euthanasia from us?” (Brock, 656). Brock would respond to Arras’ slippery slope by suggesting his four safeguards, which discuss why having a policy to legalize PAS and euthanasia is the best thing to do now. In short, on page 655, Brock briefly shares some examples of the four safeguards: The first: the patient should have all information about his medical condition along with treatments and their side effects. The second: There should be a procedure verifying that the patient who request euthanasia was stable, voluntary, and competent. The third: all alternatives must be explored before reliving the patient of any pain. Lastly: A psychiatric evaluation should verify that the patients voluntary request is not a treatable psychological impairment. These safeguards protect against the abuses of legal policy. Since it’s legal already in the Netherlands, he sticks with his evidence that not many people have taken advantage of euthanasia or PAS. It merely as if it were an insurance policy that simply secures the idea that you can have the option of PAS or euthanasia if you need it. On page 654, Brock argues that, “If we can’t legalize euthanasia, then we might as well restrict the rights to self determination and the choice regarding life-sustaining treatment.” In respect to Brock’s attempt to address the slippery slope argument, Arras would respond that, people would be being killed for unjustifiable reasons, and the unfortunate possibility that PAS and euthanasia can become a barrier to a decent death. He believes that the legalization would be good, but not now. In the text, on page 665, Arras discusses three factions. These three factions represent the opponents of pass and euthanasia. First: A person can strongly condemn the practice as immoral or as violations to the moral code against killing innocent people. The second faction: objects to the idea that physicians are being called on for the killing. This takes away from the idea that we should only see our physicians as healers. The third faction: says that in certain, rare instances, the early release from a painful existence might constitute both a good and important existence of personal autonomy for the individual. Arras also believes that society is not ready for such a legalization. To conclude his point of view, he believes that in order for this policy to be successfully physicians would need to learn to listen to their patients “unflinchingly” and have sensitive discussions in which they truly understand the patient. He

makes note, that on a social level, the opponents of PAS must create major medicinal education initiatives in regards to pain control (Arras, 674). Until physicians, legislation, and society is ready, we are not ready to handle the legalization of PAS and euthanasia....