Plato\'s Republic essay PDF

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Question: “Some interpreters of Plato […] have held that Plato’s interest in politics was superficial.” (Balot, 2006: 188). Discuss this thesis with reference to the Republic.
I will defend the thesis that the Republic confirms that Plato’s interest in politics was genuine. In defence of my th...

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Student no.: 15069876

Question: “Some interpreters of Plato […] have held that Plato’s interest in politics was superficial.” (Balot, 2006: 188). Discuss this thesis with reference to the Republic.

Introduction I will defend the thesis that the Republic confirms that Plato’s interest in politics was genuine. In defence of my thesis, I will deconstruct the principal objective of the Republic, which is to accept Plato’s definition of political legitimacy in his Ideal City or Kallipolis (section I). Moreover, I will discuss key arguments that advanced political legitimacy in Kallipolis, which are: 1) Three characteristics of Kallipolis (secion II); 2) the Myth of Metals (section III); and 3) the city-soul analogy (section IV). These arguments should lead the reader to accept that Plato’s political interest is embedded in the Republic. Before I will defend my stance, it is worth defining the concept of political legitimacy. Throughout the Republic, the normative notion of political legitimacy is asserted, which “both explains why the use of political power by a particular body […] is permissible and why there is a pro tanto moral duty to obey its commands” (Peter, 2016). Therefore, in this essay, I explain who, in Kallipolis, the rulers and the ruled are ( section II) as well as why should the ruled obey their rulers (section III-IV). Furthermore, the notion of political legitimacy is used interchangeably with the concept of justice (Peter, 2016). Henceforth, we can comprehend that whenever Plato uses words, justice (δικαιοσύνη) and just (δικαιος), is an indicator in his analysis of emphasis on assertions regarding political legitimacy. In other words, δικαιοσύνη and δικαιος mark Plato’s arguments to persuade the reader to accept Kallipolis, namely, through his critique of competing definitions of justice (e.g. 334b; 335b-d; 350a-c; 353e-354a) and ultimately advocating his stance (e.g. 433a-b).

Section I: Socrates’ Quest for Justice The Republic is widely understood to be about Socrates’ quest to define the concept of justice which begins in Books I-II (Plato, 2003: xxxiii; Pitkin, 1972: 169) and is completed by Book IV (433a-b). Socrates, “Plato’s spokesman” (Schofield, 2006: 17) refuses alternative definitions of justice (e.g. 331c; 338c) in order to strengthen his stance (433a-b). The first definition of justice is proposed by Cephalus (331c), then continued by Polemarchus, which is, “[justice] must be the skill that enables us to help and injure one’s friends and enemies” (332d). Socrates rejected such notion of justice since: i) justice cannot be solely useful when things are not used (333e) i.e. justice is necessary in times of war and peace (332e); ii) justice seems to be “a kind of stealing” (334b). In response, the definition is reformulated (335a), however, Socrates refuses this definition too. Socrates argues that justice in the virtue of excellence (arête) cannot function to harm others, since it is the function of injustice (335b-d). Subsequently, Thrasymachus, a Sophist, challenges Socrates with his definition of justice (338c; 343b-344c), later revised by Gaulcon (358e-361d), which is “justice or right is simply what is in the interest of the stronger party” (338c). Socrates criticises this definition by claiming that, “any form of skill [does not] seek its own interest […] but that of its subject-matter” (342c) which entails that justice must also be in the interest of the subject-matter, the weaker party (342e; 346e). Thrasymachus re-assertes his definition, “the just man always comes off worse than the unjust” (343d), for instance, “in any business relations” (343d), or the relation with the state (434d). Socrates replies by stating that, “the just man is wise and good and the unjust bad and ignorant.” (350c). This argument rests on the notion that an educated, wise, good person will only compete with an individual which is unlike

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Student no.: 15069876 her, i.e. uneducated, ignorant and bad one (350a-b). Whereas, an uneducated individual will compete with both educated and uneducated individuals (350a-b). Priori to this argument, Thrasymachus agreed with Socrates, that a just man will only compete with unlike individuals, whereas an unjust man will compete with alike and unlike individuals (349b-d). Therefore, Socrates concludes that “the just man is wise and good and the unjust bad and ignorant” (350c). Following from this conclusion, Socrates asserts two implications. Firstly, injustice “[breeds] hatred and dissension” among unjust men (351d), whereas justice produces “unity of purpose” (351d). Secondly, being just leads to a happy life, whereas being unjust leads to a miserable life (353c-354a). Some would insist that Socrates’ quest for justice, as explained above, indicates fundamentally Plato’s interest in ethics rather than political philosophy, especially due to his assertion about happiness (353e) (Coumoundouros, no date). Such argument rests upon Socrates’ methodology to analyse the notion of justice, firstly, on a larger scale, in the community, then on a smaller scale, in the individual (368d-369a) (Coumoundouros, no date). However, such position does not acknowledge that, since modernity, we treat the nature of ethics and political philosophy as separate subjects (Coumoundouros, no date). Nevertheless, for many ancient thinkers addressing the key question of ancient ethics, “what is the happy life?”, included also engaing with political philosophy (Coumoundouros, no date). Since an individual’s happiness is constrained by a political community in which this particular individual lives in, therefore, Plato’s political interest is intertwinned in his ethics (Coumoundouros, no date). Plato’s interest in politics and ethics is ultimately linked with Plato’s objective in the Republic, which is to provide justifications of political power and political authority held by rulers over the ruled in Kallipolis (section II-IV ). It should be noted that political power of a government is “the ability to exercise such expansive controlling power”, for instance, to “punish, imprison, and […] even kill people who refuse to comply” (Talisse, 2016: 74). Whereas, political authority of a government implies, “the moral right to issue directives and commands and the moral capacity to impose moral requirements on citizens” (Talisse, 2016: 74). Thus, political authority infers that the state has “the moral ability to require obedience” (Talisse, 2016: 74); the notion of obedience is fundamentally questioned by the story of the Ring of Gyges (359d-360b). This reflect why Plato carefully defined justice as political and ethical notion. Neverthlesss, the question still remains, how Plato envisioned Kallipolis?

Section II: Three characteristics of Kallipolis In Book II, Socrates begins to sketch out key features of Kallipolis. The first characteristic of Kallipolis is that “it orginates […] from our needs” (369c) because individuals are “not selfsufficient” (369b). Socrates’ response seems to be in accordance with Glaucon’s assertion on “the nature and origin of justice” (358e) since Kallipolis will ensure justice as the solution to “most desirable”, avoidance of punishment from wrongdoings, and “most undesirable”, inability to systematically redress wrongdoings (359a). In such “true” and “in health” society (372e), our fundamental needs are: “food” (369d) (mainly vegetarian diet (372a-d)), “shelter” (369d) and “clothing” (369d). The second feature of Kallipolis is that each and every individual has “different natural aptitudes which fit [them] for different jobs” (370b) or techne. Plato justifies such societal organisation since it will produce easier “Quantity and quality” within Kallipolis (370c). Thus, following from the first component of Kallipolis, there ought to be, at least farmers to provide food (370c), builders to build shelters (370d) and weavers and shoemakers to make weave clothing and shoes (370d). Furthermore, there will be class of citizens, such as: “merchants” (371a), navigators (371b), “wage-earners” (371e) who will handel the import and export of goods within Kallipolis (371a). (The class of citizens already mentioned here are what Plato refers as Craftspeople (Rice, 1998).) Thus, Kallipolis

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Student no.: 15069876 ultimately will produce enough goods to satisfy our basic needs, and to exchange with foreginers (371a). Glaucon nevertheless argued that Kallipolis, as defined so far, would found “a community of pigs” (372d), since such society only satisfy its citizens’ basic, animalistic needs (Roochnik cited in crt zornik, 2014). Glaucon urges Socrates to identify a further feature of human desire which is to want “luxuries” (373e) (Roochnik cited in crt zornik, 2014). This component develops Kallipolis, into a society which contains “houses, clothing, and shoes, but [also] must add the fine arts of painting and embroidery, and introduce materials like gold and ivory” (373a). Furthermore, the notion of luxuries indicates that a meat-eating society (373c), which infers that there is a greater demand of territory to plough crops and pasture livestock (373d). Socrates argues further that if citizens of Kallipolis find themselves in shortage of resources within their territory, then the citizens will have to “cut a slice off our neighbours’ territory” (373d). Moreover, in similar circumstances, neighbouring cities to Kallipolis would act identically, which inevitably leads to war (373d-e). On the basis of the first two features of Kallipolis, we comprehend that if luxury is our neccesity, which can be only satisfied by waging war with neighbouring cities, then Kallipolis ought to have specialised citizens in the skill of soldering (374c-e). The skill of soldering entails having “speed in pursuit of his quarry, and […] strength to fight” (375a). A further role that Socrates dictates to this new class of citizens, the “Guardians” (375b), is “to be gentle towards their fellow-citzens, and dangerous only to their enemies” (375c). Hence, Socrates characterises the Guardians as being “courageous” (375a), “high-spirited” (375b) and simultaneously “gentle” (375c), which is later acknowledged to be an inherent juxtaposition (375c). Socrates to solve this puzzling thought argues that dangerous high-spiritness can be tamed through “a philosophic disposition and a love of learning” (376c). By this token, Socrates throughout Book III pursuits to explain that the Guardians’ training (376d412b) ought to be balanced between physical and mental training (411a-412a). From such premise, for instance, Myles Burnyeat concluded that the Republic is primarily concerned with education (Schofield, 2006: 35-6). I would certainly agree that Plato is aware that our upbringing mouldes our character (e.g. 424a; 548e-549a; 554b-c; 559b-d) and hence education ought to be strictly controlled by the Guardians to preserve harmony within Kallipolis (412a). Furthermore, the discourse on education presents Plato’s interest in politics, since education is used as a mechanism to justify Socrates’ notion of justice. This emphasis implicates that obedience of citizens in Kallipolis relies on the premise, ‘the Guardians are wise’; here the Guardians’ right to rule is based on their expertise, their knowledge how to govern, and not based on common approval (426d; 494a) (Brooks, 2006: 53). Thus, we discovered that Plato’s notion of justice is linked to “expert authority” (Tailsse, 2016: 70). Such authority carries “a special kind of epistemic weight” (Tailsse, 2016: 67) leading us to conclude that acting against an expert’s opinion would be “ irrational” (Tailsse, 2016: 71). Hence, following the Guardians’ rule is rational for all of the citizens of Kallipolis, primarily due to the justice implemented, which is “in the interest of the community” (412e) . To ensure that the Guardians rule properly, Socrates explains that there is a division between the Rulers, the elder Guardians who govern, and the Auxuliaries , the young Guardians who aid the Rulers in enforcing laws (412c; 414b). Moreover, Socrates emphasises that the Guardians’ training also will consist in building their resistence to “theft or witchcraft or force” (413a) which will soldify their understanding of what justice is. Nevertheless, the query has to be asked, what mechanisms does Plato impliment to justify his claim that citizens of Kallipolis ought to be obedient? In the following sections III-IV, I will argue that these mechanisms are: i) the Myth of Metals and ii) The city-soul analogy.

Section III: The Myth of Metals

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Student no.: 15069876 Plato well aware of that the Guardian’s expert authority, which is morally and rationally supreme to authority of Craftspeople, needs to convince all of the citizens of Kallipolis implements his “Noble Lie” (Lay Williams, 2013) or “magnificient myth” (414b) via the Myth of Metals (415a-c). The objective of the myth is to introduce the enforcement of a collective identity of citizens, as being born to the same mother, the Earth, which should be protected by all means possible (414d-e). The Myth of Metals explains that god fashioned each individual from a particular metal: gold to fashion the Rulers, silver to mould the Auxiliaries, iron and bronze to form Craftspeople (415a). Although the story also communicates that usually children resemble their parents, i.e. children are made from the same metal (415a), notwithstanding, ocassionally abnormalities occur when, for instance, a golden child can be born to silver parents (415b). Furthermore, the “most important of god’s commandments to the Rulers” (415b) is to support each individual to fulfill her function in a society according to their mixture of metals. Finally, the myth prophecises that “the State will be ruined when it has Guardians of silver or bronze” (415c). The Myth of Metals essentially rests upon the second feature of Kallipolis, that division of labour is based on our natural ability to preform a particular function in Kallipolis (370b). It should be acknowledged that the Myth of Metals is introduced with a hesitation (414c) for two reasons. Firstly, Plato’s aim is to alternate the contemporary Athenian politics from a democratic regime to “a more autocratic one” (Lay Williams, 2013: 372). In that sense, Plato asserts revolutionarily and consistently with his previous assertions in the Republic that the notion of lie (389b) can be legitimately used in the interest of Kallipolis. Plato claims that falsehoods have “no use to the gods and [are] only useful to men as a kind of medicine” (389b). Socrates argues that fictional stories ought to be used “against our enemies, or when […] our friends tries to do something wrong from madness or folly” (382c-d). The Rulers can solely exercise such ability to lie for the common good (389b-e) since, as already identified in this essay, the Guardians claim rational and moral superiority over Craftspeople. Thus, Plato introducing the Myth of Metals to preserve justice which is ultimately healthy for all of the citizens. Secondly, I suggest that Plato acknowledges that the Guardians, as the educated, rationally and morally superior class in Kallipolis, will be the least persuaded, if at all, by the Myth of Metals than Craftsmen (415d). In response to Socrates’ hestitation on the power of persuasion of the myth, Glaucon claims that not the first but succeeding generations of citizens in Kallipolis will be more persuaded by the story (415d). Glaucon’s ‘faith’ in the myth to strengthen justice in Kallipolis, could lead some scholars to conclude that Plato’s realisation of Kallipolis rests upon his religious beliefs (Popper, 1952: 141-2). However, such conclusion become questionable, if we consider again that Plato’s usage of lie is justified as “a kind of medicine” for men but useless for gods (389b). Thus, I would agree with Karl Popper’s statement (1952: 143) that Plato’s “religious matters in their relation to politics, his political opportunism sweeps all other feelings aside.” Popper (1952: 143) continues to state that Plato’s stance to restrict politico-religious poetry via the Guardians’ supervision (e.g. 378a-e; 379b; 380a-c) is a substantial evidence for Plato’s political interest preceding his religious beliefs. Thus, the Myth of Materials does not represent Plato’s religious beliefs per se but rather his political justification for the Guardians’ superiority over Craftspeople. As acknowledged by Plato, the myth alone is a substanitally weak justification for obedience in Kallipolis. However, when the myth is treated as a complementary element to the city-soul analogy, then Plato’s account of justice in Kallipolis becomes complete. The city-soul analogy justifies further the expert authority of the Guardians’ via characterising fundamental motivations or mental capabilites of each class of citizens in Kallipolis.

Section IV: The city-soul analogy

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Student no.: 15069876 Another mechanism implemented by Plato to justify that Kallipolis is perfect is the city-soul analogy . Socrates advocates that a perfect city would be founded on four cardinal virtues (427e): i) wisdom (428b-429a); ii) courage (429a-430c); iii) self-discipline (430d-432a); and iv) justice (433a-434c). The success of the analogy depends upon the analogous implication of the four cardinal virtues in Kallipolis and in Individual or Soul ( psyche). In this manner, Plato intends to complete Socrates’ analysis of justice (368d-369a). Wisdom, defined as in the interest of Kallipolis, is the quality of the Guardians (428c). (Plato explictily argues that Craftspeople’s knowledge of their skill, such as, carpentry or farming, only implies that Craftspeople are good at this particular skill (428c).) Courage, as identified in section II, is a fundamental characteristic of the Guardians, and is solely referred to the Guardians , since this class “campaigns for” (429b) this quality in Kallipolis. Self-discipline functions as “some sort of harmony” between classes to control their desires and appetites (430e). Greater kinds of desires can be found in Craftspeople, whether children, women or slaves, and to lesser extent in “so-called free men” (431c). Whereas, “simple and moderate desires”, which are guided by reason, can be found in the well-educated minority, i.e. the Guardians (431c). Thus, Plato advocates that all of the citizens of Kallipolis should strive for “self-mastery”, or being guided by their reason rather than desire (431b). This element creates harmony in Kallipolis, since every class of citizens consent to obey the Guardians (432a). Justice essentially derives from wisdom, courage and self-discipline co-existing harmoniously within Kallipolis and is adminstered by the Guardians (433d-e). It would seem that the city-soul analogy is primarily about moral psychology, especially what motivates citizens in Kallipolis. Some philosophers, such as, Williams (1999) or Blössner (2007) engage their efforts to prove that the analogy, as the fundamental argument in the Republic, weakens or strengthens Plato’s definition of justice (433b). However, it should be noted that Plato’s objective in the Republic is to legitimise Kallipolis by all means (as proved in sections I-III). Hence, the moral psychology discourse again intends to persuade the reader that the Guardians (guided by reason, wisdom, courage and self-discipline) should rule Craftspeople (enslaved by their desires, and who have some self-discipline). Thus, Plato’s discourse on moral psychology has essentially political aims, to legitimise the expert authority of the Guardians.

Conclusion Throughout this essay, I argued that Plato’s Republic is substantially concerned with politics. Firstly, I argued that Socrates’ quest for justice although seemingly concerned only with ethics, de facto was an inquiry of politico-ethical nature. Secondly, through the analysis of the three features of Kallipolis, it could be concluded that the Republic essentially strived to establish education system in Kallipolis, but such statement is far-fetched. Plato in his political pursuit had to acknowledge a creation of education system which legitimises the ruling class, the Guardians, over ...