What is Moore trying to achieve in his “Proof of an External World” Does he succeed PDF

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Part of the Scepticism third year module, discussing externalism....

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What is Moore trying to achieve in his “Proof of an External World”? Does he succeed? In this essay, I will be analysing G.E. Moore’s “Proof of an External World” and evaluating whether he is successful in his claim that we can have knowledge of the external world. In doing so I will evaluate some of the objections to Moore’s arguments, and respond accordingly. This essay will attempt to show that Moore is incorrect in saying that it is possible for us to have conclusive knowledge of things external to us and that the sceptic is successful in his attempts to refute Moore’s argument.

The central claim of Moore’s Proof of an External World is that it is possible to prove that there is a world that exists independently of our experiences, and by proving this external world we are able to render scepticism as being false. Moore spends a large part of his time discussing exactly what he intends to prove, and in doing so we come across many terms which have often been used interchangeably. In order to establish the class of things doubted by the sceptic, Moore begins with his distinction between two kinds of objects, things presented in space, and things to be met within space. The former can be defined as something which can only be perceived by one person, and their existence depends on them being perceived. The latter is what the external sceptic doubts, that is, the existence of things which can be met within space. In addition, Moore outlines exactly what he means by ‘a thing external to our minds’.

“to say of anything, e.g., my body, that it is external to my mind, means merely that from a proposition to the effect that it existed at a specified time, there in no case follows the further proposition that I was having an experience at the time in question.” 1 For Moore, to prove the existence of such objects is to prove the existence of something which could exist without being perceived. With the concept of external objects established, Moore’s argument aims to refute external world scepticism, and conclusively prove that we are able to have knowledge of the external world, contrary to Cartesian thought.

1 Moore, G. E. and Baldwin, T. (2013). Selected writings. London: Routledge, p163

To support his anti-sceptical argument, Moore states that there are three criteria for a good argument 1. The premises must be different from the conclusion. 2. The premises must be known to be true. 3. The conclusion must follow from the premises.2

In his attempt to overcome the external world sceptic, Moore provides us with a simple and straightforward argument which he believes powerful enough to conclude that we are able to know the external world. P1. Here (holding up one’s left hand) is one hand. P2. Here (holding up one’s right hand) is another. C1. Therefore, there are at least two hands. C2. Therefore, there are at least two things to be met with in space.

The first objection the sceptic may raise against Moore’s proof of an external world corresponds with Moore’s criteria for a good argument. It would appear that the sceptic is unable to refute Moore’s criteria that the premises differ from the conclusion, or that the conclusion does not follow from the premises. Firstly, the premises adduced in the proof were different from the conclusion, and secondly, Moore states it is quite certain that the conclusion follows from the premises. Thus, the sceptic contends that Moore does not know the premises of his argument to be true, and as such he does not fulfill the second claim of his three part criteria for a good argument. The very nature of external world scepticism is to deny those things external to us, so naturally the sceptic will contest Moore’s premises P1 and P2, that here is one hand, and here is another. Moore is assuming the falsity of the sceptical position, without providing us with necessarily true premises.

However, Moore contests that at the time he most certainly did know what he was expressing to be true. By a combination of certain gestures and with saying the words ‘There is one hand and 2 Moore, G. E. (1939). Proof of an External World, p143

here is another’, Moore claims to know his premises as true. So convinced is Moore of his claim that he labels it “absurd” to suggest that he did not know and only believed. 3 In spite of Moore’s inability to provide an account of how any such claim of the external world can be known, he does not think that this affects his argument against scepticism. Moore is admitting that he cannot prove his premises, he makes a bold statement in claiming “I can know things, which I cannot prove”.4 Whilst this admission is not going to satisfy the sceptic, it is a condition critical to his argument. Moore insists that he can know his hands are there, as clearly as he knows he is talking or standing up, essentially he is appealing to common sense to validate his argument. There are certain scenarios in which Moore’ says we can give accounts of how to establish truths. To strengthen his response, Moore uses his example of the misprints to illustrate how we might come to know things, namely that he knows that he has a hand in front of him. “Suppose, for instance, it were a question whether there were as many as three misprints on a certain page in a certain book. A says there are, B is inclined to doubt it. How could A prove that he is right? Surely he could prove it by taking the book, turning to the page, and pointing to three separate places on it, saying ‘There’s one misprint here, another here, and another here’: surely that it is a method by which it might be proved! Of course, A would not have proved, by doing this, that there were at least three misprints on the page in question, unless it was certain that there was a misprint in each of the places to which he pointed. But to say that he might prove it in this way, is to say that he might be certain that there was. And if such a thing as that could ever be certain, then assuredly it was certain just now that there was one hand in one of the two places I indicated and another in the other.”5

In this passage, Moore is showing us how circumstances exist in which we conclude we know things analogous to the premises of his proof. When the sceptic says that Moore hasn’t proven each of his premises, he effectively replies saying ‘I know them’, and not only does Moore know them, but we all know them to be true. Whilst Moore is saying he cannot prove that he has a 3 Moore, G. E. (1939). Proof of an External World, p166 4 Moore, G. E. (1939). Proof of an External World, p170 5 Moore, G. E. (1939). Proof of an External World, p147

hand in front of him, he says he knows his premise to be true. To know his premise to be true, Moore says it must be true, he must believe it, and he must have more conclusive evidence to affirm his knowledge of a given proposition. His conclusive evidence likely comes from sense evidence, he can see his hand, he can touch his hand with the other, he can even taste his hand if he so wished to. His premise that he is holding up his hand satisfies these conditions and as such Moore states that he knows his premises to be true, even though he cannot necessarily prove it.

In his Meditations, Descartes argues that belief cannot pass as knowledge unless it passes some sort of evidential test, and until we can know for certain that we are not being deceived, a belief cannot be identified as knowledge. It seems in contrast that Moore is arguing that at least some of the beliefs we hold can be knowledge, even though we have no conclusive way to test them. Moore is stating that we are directly aware of the hands in front of us, we are not making an inference from our experiences, but the sense evidence alone provides us with knowledge. Moore is using the knowledge of his hands as a starting point, from which he states it simply follows that he knows there exists things to be met with in space, and ipso facto, that is proof of an external world and scepticism is false. This denial of inference categorizes Moore as a direct realist, in contrast to Descartes who says that we have knowledge of things through inference from facts about experience. Moore is starting with his knowledge of his hands in the same way as we start with knowledge of our mental states.

Moore’s position, “I can know things, which I cannot prove,” is based on his argument that: 1. Premise (1) cannot be proved. 2. Premise (1) is known. 3. Therefore, proof is not required for knowledge.

If Moore were able to prove premise 2 to be true, then this would present itself as a strong argument. Rather, Moore does not think that these types of proofs are possible, but without a sufficient proof, we cannot assert premise 2 to be true, and Moore’s argument becomes considerably weaker.

Moore fails to properly deny the sceptic’s claim that he does not know the premises of his argument to be true. To further the objection, the sceptic contends that proof is required for knowledge, and Moore does not prove his premises to be true. Additionally, as Moore has not really proven all the premises to be true, he has not proven his conclusion to be true. This direct realism is an issue for the sceptic as he argues once again, how can you know that you have hands? The response I know because I see them will likely not satisfy the sceptic. However, a direct realist like Moore would no doubt suggest that he knows he has hands in front of his non inferentially in the exact same way that a non-direct realist like Descartes would say that he knows he has mental states. If Descartes can know the mind, then he sees no reason as to why we cannot know objects in the world in the same way. If we are able to have immediate knowledge of our minds, Moore claims that we can have the same immediate knowledge of things to be met with in space.

This appeal to common sense raises another issue for the sceptic, as common sense is not the equivalent of knowledge, nor is certainty. Moore appeals to common sense but dismisses any idea that he may be dreaming or being deceived in another way. Much like with prior objections, Moore states it to be the case that he is not dreaming, but does little to prove that he is not, instead he says he has conclusive reasons to confirm that he is not dreaming, but cannot prove it. As Moore does not provide proof that he is not being deceived or dreaming, we naturally look back to Descartes to provide an argument as to why Moore may be incorrect in his assumptions.

For Descartes, the experience of a dream could potentially be indistinguishable from the experiences we have in waking life, and as such he is left unsure of the existence of the things surrounding him, due to the doubt that he could in fact be dreaming still. The central thought is that if we were dreaming, our sensory experience might be exactly as it actually is, and as such our sensory evidence doesn’t discriminate between ‘p’ and ‘I am dreaming that p’. Descartes ‘Dream Argument’ has similarities to his ‘Evil Demon’ argument, in which one can never be sure of anything he believes as they may be being deceived by a malevolent demon. Whilst the content varies, both arguments have the same structure: Nothing can rule out my being duped

into believing I am having experience X, when I am really in state Y, hence I cannot have knowledge Z, about my current state.6 Hilary Putnam’s brain-in-a-vat hypothesis (BIV) offers a contemporary variation on Descartes’ workings, used to illustrate global scepticism. We are instructed to imagine the possibility that we are actually a brain connected to a sophisticated computer which is stimulating our experiences of the external world. We can never be aware that we are not a BIV as the computer is so sophisticated it can stimulate all of our experiences. The skeptical argument maintains that we cannot possibly rule out that we are a brain-in-a-vat, and as such we cannot rule out the possibility that all of our beliefs about the external world are also false. [...] imagine that a human being (you can imagine this to be yourself) has been subjected to an operation by an evil scientist. The person’s brain (your brain) has been removed from the body and placed in a vat of nutrients which keeps the brain alive. The nerve endings have been connected to a super-scientific computer which causes the person whose brain it is to have the illusion that everything is perfectly normal. There seem to be people, objects, the sky, etc; but really all the person (you) is experiencing is the result of electronic impulses travelling from the computer to the nerve endings.7 Descartes and Putnam’s thought experiments all provide us with potential reasons for doubting the existence of the external world we see around us, unlike Moore who fails to provide us with any such proof. The Sceptical Argument from Doubt can be simply illustrated as follows: 1. For any proposition p about the external world, I know p only if I have no reason whatsoever for doubting p 1. But the dreaming/ evil demon/ BIV conjecture is a reason for doubting any p 1. Therefore, I don’t know p The argument is deductively valid and sound, leading us to conclude that external world scepticism is true, and Moore is mistaken in his assumption that his rigorous proof denies the 6 7 H. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, pp. 5-6.

sceptic. Without providing any proof, and aiming to circumvent objections by denying that such proofs can be given, Moore leaves himself open to understandable criticism as he is not able to back up his statements and strengthen his argument.

A final objection may attack Moore on different grounds. The sceptic may accept Moore’s response and admit that his proof does in fact meet the criteria outlined, but may object that the criteria outlined by Moore are sufficient enough for an argument to be considered as a genuine proof. Rather, it may be argued that a fourth condition should exist in which a proof may not be a circular argument. Another objection which can be raised regarding Moore’s Proof of an External World is the contested circularity of his argument, or that his proof begs the question. The objection that Moore is guilty of an Epistemic Circle aims to find an issue in the relationship between the 1st and 3rd points of his criteria for a good argument. These two points are that (1) the premise is different from the conclusion and (3) the conclusion follows from the premises. In putting forward his first premise, here is one hand, he is already assuming his conclusion, thus forming a circular argument. His assumption that there are external objects gives rise to his first premise, without this conclusion assumed he has no first premise. Without his assumed conclusion, that hands are external objects, he is not able to present the first premise, here is one hand. As a result, Moore is essentially arguing that we know that there are things external to us, things to be met with in space, because there are things to be met with in space. Moore’s argument suggests that in order to be justified in believing the premises, we need to first be justified in believing the conclusion. The sceptic is arguing that Moore is assuming the existence of external objects in order to prove that external objects exist, whereas it can be contested that if you aren’t to know that external objects exists, then you cannot know that you have hands.

To conclude, Moore has attempted to show that we can have knowledge of an external world, but he has been unsuccessful in his aim. For an work labelled as a proof, Moore does surprisingly little in the way of providing anything of the sort. Rather, Moore attempts to circumvent the sceptic’s objections, instead of offering any valuable response. Therefore, Moore does not succeed in proving an external world....