Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion David Hume PDF

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David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion was published in 1779, three years after his death. Likely this delay was because it dealt with sensitive religious issues. It was a progressive era, and the last witchcraft trial in the British Isles had occurred at the start of the century. Nonetheless, it remained exceedingly sensitive to publicly debate religion in the 18 century. th

However, it was popular to apply tests of reason to all human affairs. Economics, politics, society, and religion were all subject to these tests, which were part of the greater Enlightenment occurring across Europe. Hume was a (if not the) leading figure in Scotland in the 18 century Enlightenment. th

Characters Hume was a great author, as evidenced by the fame he found with his History of England. The subject matter, Hume believes, is best pursued in dialogue form. The Dialogues span a conversation with five participants. Pamphilus and Hermippus frame the dialogue, and Cleanthes, Philo and Demea are the three voices through which Hume speaks. Hume writes down their different positions at the start of the Dialogues. Any question of philosphy shich is so obscure and and uncertain that human reason can reach no fixed determination with regards to it ... seems to lead us naturally into the style of dialogue and conversation.

Pamphilus

Pamphilus is the narrator and a student of Cleanthes.

Hermippus

Hermippus is the recipient who receives what Pamphilus says.

Cleanthes

"Accurate philosophical turn"

Philo

"Careless skepticism"

Demea

"Rigid inflexible orthodoxy"

Hume is intentionally ambiguous about his personal position. Religious subject matter was very sensitive. Hume is not inflexible like Demea, so he must be either like Cleanthes and Philo. Hume aligns himself with Philo. I make Cleanthes the Hero of the Dialogue. ... To strengthen that Side of the Argument will be most acceptable to me. Any Propensity ... to the other Side crept in upon me against my Will ... . The best way of composing a Dialogue would be for two persons ... of different Opinions ... to write alternately the different Parts. ... I should have taken on the character of Philo, ... which ... I could have supported naturally enough.

Table of contents The first three Dialogues outlay the subject matter for the rest. In talking about the first three Dialogues, the intricate play between Demea, Cleanthes and Philo is very important -- who is taking which position on behalf of whom? Dialogue I

Should natural theology be taught sooner or later?

Dialogue II Dialogue III The themes begun in the first three Dialogues are then expounded in subsequent Dialogues. Dialogue IV

Problems with the design argument.

Dialogue V

Problems with a posteriori arguments.

Dialogue VI

Problems with anthropomorphism.

Dialogue VII

Organic versus mechanical models.

Dialogue VIII

Dialogue IX

Problems with facts and a priori arguments.

Dialogue X Dialogue XI Dialogue XII

Philosophical religion and vulgar superstition.

Dialogue I Should natural theology be taught sooner or later? Demea assert that students absolutely must first have piety and reverence. Once their religious attitudes are firmly established, they will see how confused philosophy is. Thus, natural theology arguments will not dent the student's faith. Philo agrees with Demea that philosophy lacks concreteness. Philo agrees with Demea that ordinary people lack respect for philosophy because of its constant disputes -- two philosophers will come up with five perspectives. However, Philo argues that learned people still find reason useful for natural theology. Philo puts forth his skeptical position There is a problem: reason is week and the senses deceive us. Even a basic object like a stone becomes a mystery when we consider its coherence, cause, effect, space and time. If we know so little about a stone, how can we know much about anything else? Cleanthes is suspicious of Philo's piety. Skepticism was often used to defend religion against philosophy. Nonetheless, Cleanthes wonder if Philo actually wants to attack, not defend, religion. Cleanthes responds: You propose ... to erect religious faith on philosohpical skepticism. ... If certainty or evidence be expelled from every other subject, ... it will all retire to those theological doctrines. ... Whether your skepticism [is] ... sincere, we shall learn bye and bye

Cleanthes argues that skepticism does not threaten faith. Cleanthes holds that not even skeptics truly take themselves seriously. If they deeply, seriously doubted their own challenges to reason or sensation, then they would not get through the day. The skeptic is not serious, and if his doubts are not serioues, then he is no threat to religion. Philo responds that skepticism does have flaws when applied entirely. Philo agrees that skepticism may seem erratic and inconsistent, because a full skeptic still has to get through the day. Practical needs are not vulnerable to skepticism, but anything remote and detached from practical needs (such as cosmology and theology) are good targets for skepticism. However, Philo puts forth that skeptical positions may be effective when restricted to philosophy. A skeptical, questioning, doubting skeptical attitude can be good, if a full skeptical worldview. Skepticism is weak against ordinary, practical observations; but it is strong against metaphysical abstractions including those in theology. A consistent skeptic will simply suspend judgment about theological issues. But that in itself is a victory for skepticism, because suspended judgment means there is no confidence in metaphysical abstractions. Thus, skepticism can bring down theology. Cleanthes does not like Philo's position and asserts two form of skepticism: vulgar skepticism, and philosophical skepticism. This is in the context of Greek skepticism, which systematically doubted all knowledge. However, it's also in the context of Isaac Newton, who was the greatest hero of Hume's time. Newton had provided a world system that gave understanding of the universe as a whole. So Cleanthes puts forth an unusual skepticism: that cohesion of a rock may be inexplicable, but rigorous mathematical proof may reveal the universe's structure. Vulgar skepticism

Vulgar (traditional) skeptics reject all results of reasoning and if it worked, would undercut all reasoning and threaten knowledge -- even math and physics. Vulgar skeptics are not taken seriously, because

if they took themselves seriously they would not make it through a day. Vulgar skepticism is no threat to faith and religion. Philosophical skepticism

Philosophical (unusual) skeptics simply treats some things, not everything, as inexplicable. This is unusual: the philosophical skeptic holds something as true if it has enough evidence. They take the cohesion of a stone as inexplicable, but astrophysics not. The philosophical skeptical with agree with something in proportion to the evidence.

Skepticism had historically been used both for and against religion. If the philosophical skeptic can have confidence in physics, then why not theology? After all, Aquinas' Five Ways begins with observations. In that era, skepticism had been used to dissolve philosophical reasoning. Theology stood over discredited philosophy. However, an anti-theology skepticism would later develop. Skepticism became synonymous with atheism, though in prior centuries that had not at all been the case. John Locke tried developing a rationalist natural theology as a foundation for religious belief. Once that happened, a new wave of skepticism (focused around Pierre Bayle in late 17th and early 18th centuries) turned skepticism against philosophical religion. At that time, skepticism became distinctly anti-religious and anti-Christian in the eyes of most 18th century people who knew anything about it. At this point, Philo says, "The Fool, in his heart, says there is no god." Philo, remarking on that quotation from Psalms, says that not just in his heart does the fool say this -- the fool now says it out loud, too. Cleanthes ties this to skepticism, which he says is worrisome because it just cannot be valid. Philo says that Cleanthes is a two-faced rational-skeptic, using skepticism to both support and attack theology. Cleanthes, in a sense guily of that, responds that these issues of faith and theology are very important and it is reasonable to use the tools available.

Thus, Hume hammers out the relationship between natural theology and skepticism.

Dialogue II Two terms come into use: a priori and a posteriori. A priori

A priori refers to something that comes before experience and observation. Hume uses a priori to mean reason independent of observation.

A posteriori

A posteriori refers to something that comes after experience and observation. Hume uses a posteriori to mean observations based on the senses.

Demea throws in his dislike for natural rationalist theology. He holds that god's existence is certain and self-evident, and that natural theology is unnecessary. God's nature, god's properties, is simply incomprehensible and unknown to humans. Demea goes so far as saying that there ought be no positive theology: trying to directly understand god is sinful. Demea states that there ought only be a negative theology. Having started with god's existence as self-evident, it is possible to study god's nature only by making statements about what god is not. This is negative theology. Instead of saying, god is merciful, one says god is not unmerciful or god is not unjust. God's nature is incomprehensible. God does not have the qualities characteristic of humans. Philo states that it is plain and evident that god exists. His only question is god's nature. Philo puts forth an argument that he contends is not skeptical, and as such it does not argue that there is no knowledge. Nor does it undercut faith in general. God is perfect

He takes the pious, reverent position that god has all perfections.

Creatures are imperfect

However, god's perfect traits are not found in any of god's creatures.

Ideas from experience

Philo points out that when we think, we think with or through ideas, and he claims that we don't have any ideas not derived from experience. This was conventional in Western tradition. Aquinas himself says, "There is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses."

No experience of god

Philo's point is that we have no experience of god's attributes and operations, and so we have no idea of god's attributes and operations. Thus, it is easily proven that we have no idea of god's properties because we cannot observe these qualities.

Cleanthes disagrees, thinking Philo is defending Demea. Cleanthes sarcastically characerizes what Philo is saying as the pious declamations of Philo, not believing tht what Philo is sayig is pious. But Cleanthes' response argues more against Demea than Philo. Cleanthes begins his a posteriori argument (not a priori) to prove god's similiarity to a human mind and intelligence. Cleanthes starts: observe the world, and marvel at it. What we observe is a big machine composed of smaller machines. Also, each machine is fitted to one another with means adapted to ends. To understand Hume's meaning of machine, recall that this is in the enormous aftermath of Isaac Newton and the Industrial Revolution. Newton had elucidated the universe's workings. Within the universe, The smaller machines are like the solar system; the earth revolving around the sun; the moon around the earth; and so on, all the way to the human body. These are progressively smaller machines. Also, the Industrial Revolution meant that very complex machines became common in Europe. These machines hugely impacted people's lives, and among the thinkers, machines were a significant topic. There is also an adaption of means to ends.

This is more vague, but is clarified by an analogy: a human eye. Just as the universe has many interacting parts, so does the human eye. Each part constitutes a complex whole with a purpose: vision. Each anatomical component interacts as a means to fulfill a purpose, an end: seeing. Cleanthes gets to his point: God is to the natural machinery of the cosmos as humans are to artificial machines. An architect is to a house as god is to the universe. Cleanthes tries to get us to understand something unfamiliar (the whole universe) by comparing it to something familiar (a house, an ordinary artificial machine). Then Cleanthes takes the second step, which is to state that a human is the maker of an artificial machine just as there is a designer of the larger natural machine. God stands to the natural cosmic machinery as a human stands to an artificial machine. An architect stands to a house as god stands to the universe. Just as artificial machines must have had designers, so does the natural machine (the universe). Artificial machines must have had designers, as they do not just come togetheer randomly. Similarly, the natural machine (the universe) must have had a designer. Both artificial machines and the natural machine are machines, and thus similar. Therefore their causes are also similar: god is like human beings. Cleanthes would have difficulty making this same argument before Newton and the Industrial Revolution. In earlier centuries, most Europeans were unfamiliar with machines other than grinding mills. It was only in the 18 century that they became prominent in the public mind. th

Machinery was not part of earlier philosophicl arguments as it was for Hume. Demea rejects Cleanthes' argument on two grounds: it is a posteriori and god is not like human beings.

Demea rejects any a posteriori argument in this context, because as it is based on observations it is merely probably and and cannot replace an a priori argument, which is certain. Philo responds that Demea is right (and Demea, in turn, disagrees with Cleanthes). Philo agrees that a posteriori arguments are inherently weaker than a priori arguments, but holds that some knowledge can be a posterior if an experiment is repeated enough. For example, fire always burns. However, consider this: blood circulates in human beings; and blood circulates in amphibians; and thus, sap circulates in trees. Wait! No, sap does not circulate. The analogy is weak. Likewise, Philo insists that Cleanthes' analogy is weak. Philo is in agreement with Demea that Cleanthes is weak in comparing a house to the universe. Cleanthes is right to say that a house must have a designer as we have regular experience of it, but it is not right to compare it to the universe because they are unlike one another. Unlike a house, we have no regular experience of the whole universe. Cleanthes concedes that a posterior arguments are weaker and that houses and the universe are somewhat dissimilar. Cleanthes agrees that a posterior arguments are of a lower status than a priori arguments, as the former is only probably and never certain. However, Cleanthes adds that an a posteriori should not be automatically dismissed as it may provide some conviction. Cleanthes then reaffirms his key point: houses and the universe are similar in each having a means-end relationship. Demea responds that this is nonsense. Demea insists that an argument for god's existence must be absolutely certain if it is any argument at all, and thus must be a priori. Philo tries to strike down Cleanthes' a posteriori argument and force the latter to attempt an a priori argument, as Philo thinks he has proof that god's existence cannot be proven a priori.

Philo tries to do this by eroding confidence in Cleanthes' argument, insisting that it is mere a posteriori fancifulness. Philo then subtly alters Cleanthes' argument in order to refute it. First, Philo asserts that ideas come together on their own, and thus order is intrinsic in the mind. Matter does not associate itself into a complex machine. However, thoughts can have order, as is clear when put into sentences (the stone is in front of me). Ideas seem to associate themselves into complex mental machines. Therefore, Philo suggests a revised argument: as the mind stands to a thought, a divine mind stands to the universe. Philo goes on to say that inferences we make assume reciprocal (two-way) similarity. For example, all houses we have seen were caused by architects; so we can assume that a house we have not seen was caused by an architect. On the basis of similarity, a relationship can be argued (that this unseen lawn was landscaped). But in order to be certain, the causes must be exactly alike, and the effects too. Also, one must be very familiar with the causes and effects. According to Phio, Cleanthes' argument is thus totally undercut. It fails Philo's test of likeness and familiarity. First of all, we observe only a fraction of the universe and for just a tiny time. We barely experience it. How can we reach conclusions about the universe if we barely know it? The experience of which one is capable does not support an argument about the whole universe. House 1 : architect 1 as House 2 : architect 2

This argument is valid. As there is House 1, you know there must be Architect 1. As there is House 2, there must be Archictect 2. One knows exactly what a house is, and exactly what an architect is.

House 1 : architect 1 as Universe : something

The something stands to the universe as architect 1 stands to house 1 -- it is god. However, the house is not (or at least not enough) like the universe. Also,

one is not familiar with the universe as one is with a house. Experience with the whole universe is much more limited. And experience with god is completely unlike experience with architects, as god is unique. T : T as T :? 1

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Consider two sets of ordinary things: T and T . Whenever a T is observed, so is a T . For example, whenever birdsong is observed, so are birds. By observing that T exists, it may be inferred that T exists. But T is absolutely unique. There is nothing else like T . Thus there can be no inference with T as there is with T and T ; there is not even any constant conjunctions of T 's with other things, as there is only one T . The universe is a T because there is only one universe. 1

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1

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U

U

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Cleanthes responds that the same objections could be raised about Earth, but we have knowledge about Earth. Earth can barely be observed by a single person, and it is unique too, but it is certain that the whole earth moves about the sun. In Hume's time, humans were completely on the ground. So why does Philo have a problem with conclusions about the universe? Philo responds that knowledge about Earth's rotation is from its similarity, not uniqueness. Earth's movement around the sun was determined based on observing other planetary bodies. Thus, it is actually Earth's commonness with other planets that allows us to know about it as a whole. When Galileo studied the motion of Juper and its moons, he used that as a model to deduce that Earth was a body in orbital motion around the sun.

Dialogue III This Dialogue goes further into the argument about design. The argument has tremendous force, and is powerfully felt by so many people. This Dialogue responds within that framework.

Cleanthes is reaching for a centuries-old analogy: the nature/art analogy where 'art' means craft or technology. The argument is that it is possible to understand the order in nature by comparing that order with the order that is purposefully built into an artificial ob...