JOHN Taurek Should the Numbers Count PDF

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UWO Intro to Philosophy 1020...

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JOHN TAUREK: Should the Numbers Count? We have resources. We can use them to bestow benefits or prevent harm (or both). There are limitations to what we can do with our resources. John Taurek focusses on one kind of limitation. In some cases - "trade-off cases" - we have to decide whom to benefit or prevent from being harmed. In such cases we can benefit or prevent harm from befalling either group A or group B. We cannot help/prevent harm from befalling both A and B. A and B are distinct, non-overlapping groups. Taurek's question: Should the relative numbers of people in the cases make a moral difference to what we ought to do / whom we ought to choose to benefit or prevent from being harmed? Taurek's answer: No! The numbers should not count. ⤷ Suppose that A is a group of 5 and that B is a group of 1. You have to decide to help the 1 or the 5. You cannot help all 6. You have some medicine: each member of A needs one-fifth; the 1 in B needs it all. Ross agrees: "if we are ever under no special obligation such as that of fidelity to a promisee or of gratitude to a benefactor, we ought to do what will produce the most good; and even when we are under a special obligation the tendency of acts to promote general good is one of the main factors determining whether they are right." NOTE: Things might be otherwise if the one in B was especially instrumentally valuable or the five in A were living especially poor poor (or lives not worth living). February 5th, 2020

Taurek thinks it false that other things equal you should to save the five because it is worse that five die than that one die. It is not the case that you should save the five rather than the one because it is worse that five die than that one die. Consider the following: suppose David is the party in B; the five in A are strangers. Suppose you know and like David (295); you are acquainted with David (297). Taurek says that it is permissible to give the medicine to David. BUT: if you agree, you have to reject that we ought to save the five because it is worse that five die than that one die. It is important to be clear on Taurek's reasoning here. It is not permissible to save David because it is worse that he dies. It is not permissible because you have a special obligation to save David (ie, you promised David the drug, or had a contract to supply it to David if he needed it, or you are David's physician or David is your benefactor or your child) What permits you saving David is that you know and like him and his well-being matters more to you (297). It is fine to let your preference for David dictate what to do. But if we accept this we have to reject that we ought to save the five in such cases. The preference for David, unlike a promise or a contract or a familial or professional relationship, is not weighty enough to defeat the obligation to save the five. It is not like another obligation or moral requirement (e.g., a promise). That the preference permits saving David, according to Taurek, implies that the absence of an obligation to save the five. We might be skeptical of the idea that it is permissible to save David. Consider this reply: It is not wrong for David to give himself the medicine. That others might die is not a reason for David to give up his life. No reason for him to think it is better that others live than that he lives. PI: If it is not wrong for David to give himself the drug if he owns it, then it is not wrong for you to give David the drug if you own it. P2: It is not wrong for David to give himself the drug if he owns it. CI: Therefore, it is not wrong for you to give David the drug if you own it. It is David's medicine. David's life is more important to him than the lives of the others. David has no special obligation to the others. David violates no one's rights by giving the medicine to himself. It is my medicine. David's life is more important to me than the lives of the others. I have no special obligation to others. I violate no one's rights when I give David the medicine. David is described as a "friend" (296, 297, 305). We might have special obligations to

friends capable of defeating an obligation to give it to the five? Perhaps this is a slip up on Taurek's part. But -let's think- is knowing and liking alone sufficient to permit giving the medicine to David If David gives the medicine away to the five, it imposes a serious cost on David. We might think that morality cannot ask David to make that sacrifice. That is what permits David to give the drug to himself. But there is no such sacrifice if I give the medicine away to the five. In the absence of such a cost we might think that I ought to give it to the five. In the case we considered all are threatened with the same loss if they do not get the medicine. What happens in cases where the losses are not the same? Suppose you can spare B the loss of her arm or C the loss of her life. What should you do? Taurek says it is fine for B to choose to save B's arm. So fine for you to choose to save B's arm (in the absence of special obligations, etc.) What about a case in which the choice is between saving B's finger and C's life? Taurek says that we ought to save C's life. B ought to, too. But why would this be if we have no general duty to benefit people? Suppose we have to choose between saving B's finger and sparing the lives of C and D. Many think we ought to do it because it is worse that C and D lose their lives than that B loses her finger. But Taurek rejects this form of reasoning. What happens in cases where all six people are strangers? Choosing between saving one life or five lives. Taurek says that the right thing to do in this case is flip a coin: this gives everyone an equal chance of survival. This best expresses equal concern and respect. Are you sure? What about a case in which we are choosing between saving one life and 100 lives? It seems insane to flip a coin here. But what matters, says Taurek, is the loss to people, not the loss of people). Cannot combine individual claims into general claims each tends to laun the sume n each gets an equal chance at survival. Why not? What about the weighted lotteries view? This is a random process that gives the greater number a higher chance of being saved. Is this not expressive of equal concern and respect? Taurek's position on what we should to in 1 v 5 (stranger) cases is the same as what he holds we ought to do In 1 v 1 (stranger) cases. Might the extra people in the first case complain about this! Enter Scanlon....