Nomos, Music and the Athenian Democracy PDF

Preview

Summary

Nomos, Music, and the Athenian Democracy Abstract Despite a 30-year explosion in our understanding of nomos, ancient Greek music, and the Athenian Democracy, the relation between nomos (law) and music remains a mystery. The author clarifies the relation between nomos and music by examining the evolu...

Description

Nomos, Music, and the Athenian Democracy Abstract Despite a 30-year explosion in our understanding of nomos, ancient Greek music, and the Athenian Democracy, the relation between nomos (law) and music remains a mystery. The author clarifies the relation between nomos and music by examining the evolution of the Athenian Democracy. Pre-classical musicians followed customary (nomos) melodic, rhythmic, and structural norms. However, the blossoming of 5th century Athenian Democracy, with its emphasis on eleutheria (freedom) loosened customary musical norms leading to greater musical innovation under the “radical democracy” (428-410). Artistic freedom promoted innovations in scales, rhythms, musical form and structures, instrument construction, and performance practices. A marked similarity exists between the Athenian and modern democratic musical experience. Greek scholar Martin Ostwald, in his masterful—and to date the most definitive—studies of nomos (law) and the Athenian Democracy, does not discuss the relation of nomos and music (Ostwald, 1969; 1968), and this leaves a very large body of musical nomoi unexplained. We are particularly unclear on the relation of musical nomoi to Greek social and political life. The writings of Aeschylus, Aristophanes, Plato, and Aristotle provide a glimpse of the linkage between musical nomoi and Greek political and social life. However, systematic efforts to understand the relation between Greek nomos and musical nomoi have foundered. This left a discussion of nomos to Greek music scholars.i Edward Lippman, in his Musical Thought in Ancient Greece, devotes few words to the role of nomos in Greek music; although, he is not unfamiliar with the role that law plays in “Greek musical ethics” (Lippman, 1975, 78-86 and

1

Chapter 2). Andrew Barker, Greek Musical Writings, devotes several pages to the musical meaning of nomos and its historical evolution. He accurately notes that there is a “virtual absence of the word nomos in its musical usage in pre-fifth-century texts. . . .” (Barker, 1984, 254). M. L. West's Ancient Greek Music, broadly discusses nomos by referring to the social context in which it is used; its application to melodies and embedded rhythms; and the derivation of particular regional, religious, and instrumental nomoi. However, his analysis of Greek musical instruments, rhythm, scales and modes, melody, and musical form, and his suggestive “historical syntheses” do not clarify the relation between music nomoi and politics. West’s analysis is strengthened by a discussion of the changes that took place in Greek music from the Archaic Period through the early Fourth Century (West, 1992, 214- 217, 327-385). In sum, these authors lay the foundation for understanding the very deep relationship that exists between the musical nomoi, nomos in a political sense, and the Athenian Democracy, which serves to link the political and musical use of nomos. In this paper I will argue that nomos of the archaic period could best be understood as “social custom.” During this period, geographically isolated Greek city-states (poleis) developed their own legal, political, social, and cultural forms, and music seems to be central to life in the polis. New musical scales and rhythms developed in different city-states or geographic regions, and this music became part of the customs of that city-state or region. In Athens, the early Fifth century discovery of freedom (eleutheria) produced a musical revolution in the last three decades of that century; so much so, scholars refer to music in the latter third of the Fifth century as the “new music.” This innovative music challenged the customary musical nomoi. Marked by musical innovation in instruments, the application of rhythms and melodies in new ways, and the rise of the “professional” musician, these new forms departed from the customary and traditional

2

Greek music (nomos). This innovation was stemmed with the oligarchic revolutions of 411 and 404. A conservative reaction sought to restore the orthodox, "ancient" musical nomoi, and reformers proposed to use the power of the polis to protect them from future change. Conservative philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, argued that the state should promulgate musical law to shape the moral and political character of its citizens. Our understanding of the relation between nomos used in a legal and a musical sense rests upon three leg of a tripod: an understanding of the evolution of nomos, the musical use of nomos, and the evolution of the Athenian Democracy. The First Leg: Nomos Individuals in all societies are shaped by law and social custom, and this is true of the ancient Greeks. Ostwald provides evidence that two terms referring to law, thesmos and nomos, are used prior to 508 (Ostwald, 1969, 12-19). Thesmos is used as a fundamental law handed down by some authority. Aristotle’s description of thesmos suggests that it is unchanging and exists in perpetuity. Thesmos can also be a fundamental law establishing social and political institutions such as Drakon’s Council of 401 (Arist. Ath. Pol. 4.3). Aristotle notes that the ancient constitution, existing before Drakon, included Archons that recorded thesmoi for future litigants, and Drakon compiled Athenian thesmoi, including law related to homicide (Arist. Ath. Pol. 3.4, 4.1, 7.1). Herodotus remarks that even the tyrant, Peisistratos, he did not change the city’s thesmia or τεσµια (Hdt. 1.59.6). However, nomos differs from thesmos. Nomos plays a central role in social life. Nomos can refer to a social norm, customary way of doing something, a tradition, an order of things, or a common usage. In pre-507 textsii, nomos refers to customary laws that shape the social behavior of humans and gods. Nomos is associated with divine law and song. The Greek polis was a distinct community shaped by nomos. Its

3

distinctiveness was influenced by a rugged, mountainous geography that isolated poleis and permitted them to develop differing economic and political systems, gods and cults, dress, and music (Thuc. 1.2-21, 2.15; Hdt. 2.53). Nomos shaped this life. Greeks believed that divine nomoi governed the relations between the gods. The gods gave humans law that shaped human interaction toward justice (Hesiod, Works and Days, 274-85). In economic matters, nomos provided guidance on sewing, tilling, and reaping crops (Hesiod, Works and Days, 60-67). Regarding nature, Alcman says that he knows all the nomos (the way) of the birds, and this opens the possibility that bird song (a particular bird’s song), is linked to nomos (Lyra Graeca, I, 93, 367). Plato notes that certain musical modes (musical scales conveying different feelings and ethical qualities) organically developed in different poleis (Pl. Resp. 398d-399a). Thus, nomos was organically integrated into the social fabric of Greek tribal life.iii The Second Leg: The Athenian Democracy The development of the Athenian Democracy traverses several periods: the early period of Drakon and Solon which increased popular participation in government; the founding and deepening of the Athenian democracy in the age of Kleisthenes, Ephialtes, and Pericles; and the establishment of a "constitutional," law-governed democracy after the two oligarchic revolutions in 410 and 404. Along with equality, freedom (eleutheria) was a hallmark of the Athenian Democracy (Thuc. 2.37; Pl. Resp. 562c-564a; Aristotle, Pol., 1317a39-1317b16). As democracy deepened in the Fifth century, the character of social freedom changed from one restrained by law and custom to one that was largely unrestrained. Greater social freedom permitted greater artistic freedom and musical innovation. The origins of the Athenian democracy are rooted in the law-giving of Drakon and Solon. Prior to this, Athens was governed by an oligarchy where the poor were enslaved to the rich. The

4

conflict between the rich and the poor grew and Drakon (c.a. 624) gave Athens its first written laws administered by the oligarchic Council of the Areopagos. While the laws made justice less arbitrary, it didn’t stem the social crisis that existed between the rich and poor (Arist. Ath. Pol., 3.1-3, 5.3-4). Under the archonship of Solon, the rich and poor gave him the authority to address the social crisis. He instituted laws that abolished slavery and personal and public debt, and he established a peoples’ court (Heliaia) on which the poor first sat (Arist. Ath. Pol., 6.1-2; Pol., 1274a 1-2). Solon also created a Council of 400—one hundred drawn from each of Athens four tribes whose function was to recommend measures brought to the Assembly. However, the Areopagos possessed the power to oversee actions by the Assembly (Plut. Sol. 19.1-2; Arist. Ath. Pol. 8.4-5). In the final analysis, Solon created a government that gave both the rich and poor a stake in the governing process. The struggle between rich and poor was not solved by Solonic legal and political reform, and it was left to Kleisthenes to address vexing problem. To reduce economic and tribal conflict, Kleisthenes divided Athens into ten rather than four tribes, assigned heroes to each tribe, and divided Athens into demes—he allocated demes to each of the ten tribes. These demes effectively integrated individuals of different tribes into one a greater political unit. The Council of 400 was expanded to 500 with 50 members selected from each tribe. Lastly, to prevent political conflict from destroying the polis, Kleisthenes introduced ostracism whereby factious leaders could be banished for 10 years (Arist. Ath. Pol. 21.3-4, 6; 22.1-2; Pol. 1275b34-7). It was left to Ephialtes and Pericles to deepen the Athenian Democracy. Kleisthenes’ reforms did not affect the power of the Areopagos which retained the traditional powers of guarding the laws, overseeing the city’s affairs, punishing wrong-doers, and conducting trials of those conspiring against the Athenian Democracy and of those accused of homicide (Arist. Ath.

5

Pol. 3.6, 8.4). What laws did the Areopagos guard? In the Sixth and Fifth centuries, these laws certainly included laws (nomoi) similar to those described by Hesiod: laws flowing from the gods and humankind. However, the Areopagos would enforce other customary and religious law, too. Second, Aristotle says the Areopagos punished wrong-doers or offenders. Offenders of what? As the kind of law is not specified, one must conclude it includes not only law given by Solon, passed by the Assembly, and accepted as customary law. Regarding Solon’s law, Aristotle discusses laws cancelling debts and selecting the nine Archons by lot (Arist. Ath. Pol. 6.1, 7.1, 8.1). Aristotle also refers to how Solon consolidated the his legal code for the future and discusses the people’s concern about the new laws (Ath. Pol. 8.3, 9.2, 10.1, 11.1). Therefore, the Areopagos seemed to have broad power guarding and executing the laws of Athens.iv In 462, Ephialtes stemmed the authority of the Areopagos. With the support of the demos, Aristotle reports that Ephialtes stripped the Areopagos of all its powers to safeguard the constitution and parceled them out to the Council of 500 or to the jury-courts. Did the Areopagos lose all its powers to safeguard the constitution? In his exhaustive study of cases that were brought before the Areopagos, Robert Wallace concludes that The Council had jurisdiction over premeditated homicide and wounding, arson, and poisoning if fatal. It had no jurisdiction over building regulations or argia, probably no jurisdiction (but only the authority to investigate) in cases of treason, and only minimal jurisdiction in matters of religion (Wallace, 1989, 121). As we shall see, it is probable that it also had authority over matters regarding music. The net effect of this reform was to loosen the grip that the Areopagos—and the more conservative segment of society—had on Athenian life (Arist. Ath. Pol. 26.1). Finally, Perikles’ contribution to deepening democracy rested in paying citizens for public service, persuading the Assembly to adopt the law of citizenship, and exercising his political skills to maintain a moderate democracy. Regarding the first, he instituted a law paying citizens 6

for jury service. In Plato’s mind, this led to a weakening of the moral fabric of the Athenian demos, and Aristotle believed it a corrupted the jury system (Aristotle, Pol. 1274a8-10; Ath. Pol. 27.2, 4; Pl. Grg. 515e). Second, Perikles pushed for the adoption of a citizenship law whereby only a child of Athenian citizens could claim Athenian citizenship (Arist. Ath. Pol. 26.3). Finally, Perikles reinforced the political position of the demos by strengthening the power of the navy. By increasing the size of the navy, Perikles increased the need for oarsmen—who became part of his political base (Arist. Ath. Pol. 27.1). As the demos became more politically active in the Assembly, they were susceptible to pleas of demagogues such as Kleon the tanner, Kleophon the lyre-maker, and Alkibiades (Arist. Ath. Pol. 28. 1-5; Thuc. 3.36-40, 6.15-18, 30-31, 90-91). Aristotle and Thucydides attest to the changing Athenian constitution. Being stripped of many powers over the Constitution, the Areopagos no longer exercised its conservative, moderating influence over the Assembly. As a result, the Constitution became much more popularly oriented (Arist. Ath. Pol. 25.2-26.1). The reforms of Ephialtes and Perikles strengthened the demos relative to the oligarchy and led to the rise of the demagogues who manipulated the demos into passing law inconsistent with the Athenian Constitution, i.e. time honored law handed down over the last two centuries (1274a9-10). This occurred because the demos no longer honored the rule of law. In his discussion of democracies, Aristotle explains why obedience to the law weakened: humans are more inclined to seek a life of pleasure rather than self-restraint, they begin to "live as they like" (1319b25-30). Aristotle and Thucydides further attest to the transformation that took place in the latter half of the Fifth century. Aristotle notes that with the collapse of the Areopagites’ political leadership of Athens, the Athenian Democracy succumbed to bad judgment fostered by manipulative political leadership. The countervailing power exercised by the oligarchs vanished as the demos became ascendant. When

7

the last capable leader, Perikles, died in 428, demagogues such as Kleon, Kleophon, and Kallicrates manipulated the demos. Thucydides attests to the change in political leadership. Perikles exercised wise leadership in peace and war. After the Peloponnesian War began, Perikles rightly judged the power of Athens, strengthened the navy, did not venture into new conquests, and limited the impact of the war on the citizenry. However, under the leadership of the demagogues—pursuing personal ambition at the expense of sound public policy—the demos did just the opposite. In pandering to the demos, the demagogues created factional divisions leading to policy gridlock and civil discord, and they engaged in a series of catastrophic military ventures, the most serious of which was the disastrous expedition to Sicily (Thuc. 2.65). Aristotle’s discussion of governments and the changing Fifth century Athenian social structure lends support to the Athenian regime change thesis. Following the reforms of Kleisthenes, Athens was a polity: a government in which the people ruled in accordance with the law. A balance of power existed between the social classes:v the demos controlled the jury and assembly and the oligarchs the Areopagos. In this constitutional arrangement, neither the wealthy nor the poor controlled the polis: rule was balanced between the classes. However, population growth in the middle third of the Fifth century created a society that was poorer. The demos increased their political power vis à vis the wealthy. Consequently, the Constitution became a democracy—rule by the poor with little respect for the law. Aristotle argues that Athens became more “lawless.” This conclusion is further amplified by his analysis of freedom where Aristotle concludes that extreme democracies (such as the Athenian Democracy in the late Fifth century) defines freedom as allowing each man to live as he likes (Arist. Ath. Pol. 26.1-2; Pol. 1278b1280a6, 1295a25-1297a12, 1310a32-36).

8

As argued by Plato, Aristitle, and Thucydides, the ideological core of democracy rests on the twin values of equality (isonomia) and freedom (eleutheria). Scholar Kurt Raaflaub, in his close analysis of the origins and nature of freedom, notes freedom in the Archaic period described the condition of a person and never as an ideal to which humans aspire. A person might be free from punishment or a free citizen, but he never sought freedom in social, economic, or political life (Raaflaub, 2004, 23-29). The first use of freedom as an end that individuals find worthwhile pursuing occurs in 470 in Pindar’s First Pythian Ode; but it is directly associated with democracy after 430 (Raaflaub, 2004, 90, 205-206). All this begs brief discussion on the Athenian conception of freedom.vi In Fifth century texts, there is no systemic discussion of the definitions and meanings of freedom; however, there exists descriptions of it.vii Perikles describes freedom as being free from governmental constraints in social life but restrained in regard to public life (Thuc. 2.37). Aristotle explores this description of "social freedom" in the Politics. Freedom is the goal of democracy and consists in two forms: civil and social. On the one hand, civil liberty denotes ruling and being ruled in turn. Civil liberty is making and living by law made by the demos, and for this to occur, individuals have the freedom to 1) participate, debate, and vote on the laws according to which they live; 2) administer the polis; and 3) serve on juries. On the other hand, social liberty consists in living as one likes and this requires individuals to be free from governmental interference (Arist. Pol. 1317b1-16). Thus, Perikles and Aristotle seem to be describing similar conceptions of freedom. Aristotle’s discussion takes place in the context of his analysis of the basic values characterizing a democracy, and his comments refer to democracy (one of the three worst forms of government) and not polity (which is one of the three best forms). A "democratic freedom" requires him to admit that the people—and not a higher, fundamental law—is sovereign. Thus, the law in a

9

democratic state is subject to the will of a majority of the demos. In fact, Euripides in the Suppliant Women, produced in 422, has Theseus make the argument that freedom consists in citizens giving advice and proposing laws to be considered by the Assembly (Euripides, Sup, 435-442). In the Republic, Plato presents a similar but also a more disturbing vision of freedom in his critique of democracy in “Book VIII.” In the first place, Plato envisions an ordered democratic freedom in which citizens are free within the bounds of the law. In moderate democracies, individual freedom is restrained by the moral virtue of temperance. As such, citizens willingly limit their choices in life within the broad parameters of the law. In the second vignette of democracy, Plato pictures democracy on the verge of anarchy. Individuals, free from moral constraint, believe that they are free to do as they like. The polity is analogous to a beautiful garment—filled with many colors and embroidered with many hues. As individuals choose their own life style, so they can choose whether or not to participate in the political process, to refuse military service in a time of war, or to follow the law (557b-e). Thus, Plato posits two visions of democracy and freedom: the first, a democracy where freedom is restrained by virtue and law, and the second, a democracy where freedom is living as one likes without moral or legal restriction. What characterizes Fifth century Athenian Democracy is a changing conception of freedom: from choice exercised within the law to license. As we saw above, Aristotle noted there are two kinds of popular rule: rule in accordance with law (polity) and rule by the will of the people (democracy). Aristotl...