Phil of religion essay draft PDF

Preview

Summary

1820936What is D. Z. Phillips’ defence of the claim that it is not the role of philosophy to seek rational grounds for asserting the existence of God? Is it a successful defence?In this essay, I will argue that D Philips’ defence of the claim that it is not the role of philosophy to seek rational gr...

Description

1820936 What is D. Z. Phillips’ defence of the claim that it is not the role of philosophy to seek rational grounds for asserting the existence of God? Is it a successful defence? In this essay, I will argue that D.Z Philips’ defence of the claim that it is not the role of philosophy to seek rational grounds for asserting the existence of God is a justifiable and credible defence of Wittgensteinian fideism. I will do by this by explaining the Wittgensteinian approaches to religious as pertaining to the existence of God and stating Phillps’ stance on philosophy not being able to provide a rational justification for the existence of God. Second, this essay will argue that found within the context of the Christian school of thought, philosophy can proffer a rational reasoning and understanding for the existence of God, however, cannot give a rational justification without the use of the appropriate means and grammar or in other words religious discourse and set of rules required to give a definite justification for the existence of God. Wittgensteinian approaches examined by Phillips to issues in the philosophy of religion argues that the philosophical investigation the reality of God then becomes the philosophical investigation to an assertion of a matter of fact. That this is a misrepresentation religious concept is made obvious by a brief comparison of with talk about God [ CITATION DZP63 \l 2057 ]. Wittgenstein' s view on the concept of the term 'language games’, the distinction between the real and the unreal propose that whatever is meant by the reality of God, it is not akin to the reality of anything which comes to be and passes away. Thus no definite conclusion can be reached to ultimate reality of whether God exists or does not exist. Phillips argues that, to ask a question about the reality of God is to ask a question about a kind of reality, not about the reality of this or that, in much the same way as asking a question about the reality of physical objects is not to ask about the reality of this or that physical object[ CITATION DZP63 \l 2057 ]. For example, we find ourselves saying that we would not engage in religious language games unless first we believed in the existence of God. But this 'belief' cannot be the external justification of the language games, since it is only in the context of these language games that belief in God has any meaning[ CITATION Phi93 \l 2057 ]. Therefore to make an accurate inquiry into asserting the existence of God the grammar of God must be utilized to proffer a logical justification for religious beliefs. According to Christian thought, in an old testament the prophet Isaiah states: “Come now, and let us reason together saith the Lord(1:18).” If found within the grammar and set of rules of God in context to Christian thought, the possibility of inferring that God can be regarded as an agent whose activities, like that of any other agent, are capable of being understood, assessed and judged. Therefore philosophical inquiry into the existence of God can be critically examined and expressed ontologically as function of words and structured arguments, not just expressions of strong emotional attitudes. If there is a God who is essentially omnipotent and omniscient and reasoning with such a being is permissible, questioning his existence and laws is a rational approach to coming into an awareness of his existence. However, If someone is to be rational in practising the Christian, Islamic or Jewish religion, he needs to believe to some degree the credal claims which underlie the practice. These claims include as their central claim, one presupposed by all the other claims, the claim that there is a God[ CITATION Phi01 \l 2057 ]. Religious doctrines are the product of religious experiences, hence, should a person believe what goes beyond their experience? How far and in what manner may we add to our experience in forming our beliefs? We may go beyond experience by assuming that what we do not know is like what we do know; or, in other words, we may add to our experience on the assumption of a uniformity in nature.

1820936 Philosophers of religion must therefore learn the grammar of God to give a clear coherent account of the nature of God (broadly consonant with what has been believed about him by Christian, Islamic and Jewish thinkers of the past two millennia), thus providing cogent justifications for the existence of such a God can only be given credence by faith. [ CITATION Cli77 \l 2057 ] argues that ‘It is wrong in all cases to believe on insufficient ·evidence; and where it is presumption to doubt and to investigate, there it is worse than presumption to believe.’ Consequently, the overall shape of one’s life might give one personal reason to believe in God, but it is misleading to call this a form of ‘evidence’. Analogously, one might say, it is possible to employ the phrase ‘extraordinary’ evidence in the religious context, but that does little to make it any more similar to what one ordinarily calls evidence. The language games are very different here. It is for these reasons that Wittgenstein thinks that religious believer and atheist do not necessarily have a disagreement at all but are rather engaged in different activities[ CITATION Gen15 \l 2057 ]. No evidence, therefore, can justify an individual in believing the truth of a statement which is contrary to, or outside of, their experience. Judging according to alien standards, Finally, this essay believes that religious beliefs can only be justify by faith, although philosophical methods can challenge and enquire into for the existence of an unseen God, however it cannot give a rational justification without the using the right methods and conceptual apparatus for justifying the existence of God. Faith’ and ‘dogma’ rather than ‘opinion’ and ‘hypothesis’, are the non-technical terms commonly used for extraordinary beliefs; extraordinary beliefs are not on the scale of being confirmed or falsified by empirical evidence, the divergence between the role played in our lives by religious beliefs and by empirical evidence is so systematic and pervasive that they must be acknowledged to be very different kinds of belief. This essay believes that, Consequently, believer and unbeliever do not necessarily have a ‘disagreement’ at all, for this presupposes that one can deny what the other affirms. But if, as I have argued, one first has to learn the grammar of religious beliefs before one can have disputes about them with the believer, then one cannot criticize religious beliefs by inspecting the words, or the putative ‘propositional’ content....