Pittsburgh-Lim-Reznik-Aff-4 - Indiana-Round 4 PDF

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North Korea—1AC Advantage 1 is North Korea— A North Korea war is inevitable—it’s likely AND US intervention only exacerbates it Crispin Rovere 19, a member of the Australian Labor Party and previous convenor of the ACT ALP International Affairs Policy Committee. Formerly he was a Ph.D. candidate at the ANU's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) and previously worked in Secretariat of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and published on nuclear policy. Crispin is the author of The Trump Phenomenon: How One Man Conquered America. (“Is War with North Korea Unavoidable?”, The National Interest, December 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/war-northkorea-unavoidable-103042) Many believe that North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons, along with its conventional arsenal, rules out war. A conflict would indeed prove more horrific than many apprehend, and being enthused by the prospect of another Korean war would truly be insane. However, what is even more insane is telling the President of the United States that the greatest nation in history, and all its 300 million+ citizens, must live in the shadow of annihilation at the whims of a sadistic cult. This is simply not going to happen, and observers insisting that there is no military option ignore reality and all senior members of this administration and the president himself. The United States will not live with a North Korea that can destroy American cities with a nuclear-tipped ICBM, end of story.

Those arguing against war insist that traditional nuclear deterrence with North Korea can work, just like with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Before proceeding everyone should re-read the last paragraph and understand fully that their argument is an academic exercise and not a realistic course of action. They are also totally wrong, for these reasons:

1. Deterrence has already failed This is already being demonstrated. On September 14, North

Korea stated that: “The four islands of the [Japanese] archipelago should be sunken into the sea by the nuclear bomb of Juche. Japan is no longer needed to exist near us.” Hardly a declaration that nuclear weapons are for deterrence! The very next day residents on Hokkaido island received a text – ‘a missile from North Korea has been detected, take cover.' Any

suggestion that there is a ‘lock step’ allied response to these

provocations is absurd. Imagine it was Hawaii that North Korea proclaimed would be ‘sunk’ and American citizens receiving texts with missiles flying overhead. Washington’s response would be starkly different.

Maybe North Korea could be deterred from launching a nuclear weapon directly against the United States North Korea possesses dozens of nuclear-tipped ICBMs, however, it can attack U.S. allies and even embark on a second Korean war knowing there isn’t a thing the United States can do about it without inviting a massive and unacceptable nuclear retaliation. This fact is not lost on Japan, Korea, or even Australia. Consequently, U.S. alliances in Asia will fast unravel. (and none can be certain of that). Once

2. North Korea is not the Soviet Union or China This seemed so obvious that when the comparison was first made I regrettably ignored it. Since then there

has been an increasing number of deterrence advocates who use the Soviet Union or China as examples to support their case. Starting with the basics, deterrence can only exist when an adversary would have undertaken the action if not for the deterrent. In the case of China, there was never a prospect of Mao launching a nuclear strike against the United States, regardless of America’s own nuclear arsenal. Nor did America’s nuclear

weapons deter China in any way – China fought the Korean war decades before the taboo against nuclear use had been established, and at a time when China did not even possess nuclear weapons! Moreover, the

capabilities and doctrine between Mao’s China and North Korea could not be more different. China did not possess any means of delivering a nuclear weapon to the United States until long after bilateral relations had been normalized. China also instituted a minimum-deterrent and no-first-use policy (maintained to this day), targeted at no specific country. Meanwhile, North Korea pursues nuclear ICBMs with gusto and constantly threatens the United States with nuclear destruction. Certainly, those in the 1960s who insisted that America could not live with a nuclear-armed China were fools, but to draw that comparison with North Korea today is spurious. The Soviet case is equally broken. For most of the Cold War, the United States believed itself the conventionally inferior party that had to compensate with nuclear weapons. America’s objective was not to deter a Soviet nuclear attack but rather an invasion of Western Europe. Soviet domination of Western Europe would have posed such an existential threat to the United States that it was credible for America to initiate a nuclear war to prevent it. This credibility was underscored by the fact that two European NATO allies possessed their own nuclear deterrents and could retaliate to an attack on behalf of themselves. By contrast, it is not credible that the United States will incur large-scale nuclear attack from North Korea on behalf of South Korea or even Japan. Unification of the peninsula under Pyongyang would not threaten America’s existence. The North Koreans know this and will therefore not be deterred. Others say that Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is the answer. The reason being that deterrence by punishment be combined with deterrence by denial (thwarting an attack) to effectively deter hostile aggression. After all, if North Korea believes that America can shoot down its ICBMs, it is less likely to engage in hostile acts in the first

(nuclear retaliation) can place.

Again, this is wrong. The hostile reaction of China and Russia to BMD aside, missile defense is more like a Kevlar vest than an impregnable bank vault – the bad guy will still shoot at you, you are hoping to reduce some of the damage. It will take decades of proven efficacy before long-range BMD systems have any deterrent effect at all. In the interim, BMD systems must be assessed as an operational capability, not a strategic one. However, the most significant issue is that nuclear deterrence simply doesn’t work the same way in the context of a major power-weak state dyad. Nuclear deterrence was effective with Russia and China because both saw themselves as massive and great civilizations in which nuclear weapons were guarantors of ultimate security, not instruments of first response. The risk of uncontrolled escalation created a disincentive against threatening the core interests of rival nuclear powers, and reduced (but hardly eliminated) the threat of major power war.

The incentive for North Korea is exactly opposite. Far from avoiding threatening America’s core interests, doing so directly advances Pyongyang’s own strategic goals. This is because the costs to the United States of intervening will greatly outweigh those of acquiescing to what are, relative to major power competitors, modest North Korean objectives (even though the long-term consequences for the United States’ position in Asia is profound). Moreover, unlike with America’s major power rivals, any level of American military intervention taken against North Korea would necessarily be interpreted by Pyongyang as an existential threat to regime survival, meaning that dramatic escalation is assured and not merely a risk. In short, North Korea will increasingly engage in hostile aggression below the nuclear threshold, without fear of conflict. The bottom line is that the United States will be deterred, not North Korea, despite the wide gap between their respective nuclear capabilities. A better example than China or Russia would be India and Pakistan, were Pakistan only aggressive toward distant Indian allies and not India itself. It is inconceivable that India would incur a major nuclear exchange on behalf of these

allies, and therefore Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal would serve as a deterrent for India, but not the other way around, thereby encouraging Pakistani hostility. The differing nature of each country’s political system should not be ignored either . In the case of both Russia and China, there is an advanced political structure in which the leaders who emerge have risen during a long career. These individuals must possess a degree of reason, patience, and resilience as prerequisite of their station. In the case of North Korea, however, the requisite qualities are dynastic pedigree, personality worship, and absolute brutality – hardly a dependable catalog for nuclear restraint. Deterrence advocates rely heavily on Kim Jong-Un’s rationality to support their case. Leaving aside the fact that nuclear first use by North Korea could be rational, given the nature of the regime it is irrational for a U.S. president to stake millions of American lives on this assumption. In timeless wisdom, the Ancient Greek historian Thucydides

outlined the three causes of war: fear, honor, and interest. All three are at play on the Korean peninsula. The United States fears a North Korean nuclear weapon could detonate over an American city. Its status as a major power in Asia and credibility as an ally is on the line. And it has profound interests in North Korea not becoming an established nuclear power . At present, only

two nations can credibly threaten the United States with nuclear destruction, Russia, and China. A North Korean nuclear ICBM is entry to a very exclusive club. If this picture seems wrong instinctively, it is. Some with impressive nuclear resumes believe traditional nuclear deterrence strategies are adaptable to North Korea. They are totally wrong about this, and no-one should be seduced by this fantasy. Creative diplomatic solutions have been suggested, of which former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s ‘Grand Bargain’ the probability of success is desperately remote and time is fast running out. War is the inevitable, and only, alternative. North Korea’s nuclear weapons are not merely about regime survival, for all would agree that its existing capabilities are more than sufficient for dissuading unprovoked regime change. Rather, it seeks mutual nuclear vulnerability with the United States to prevent military responses to North Korea’s current and future aggression towards U.S. allies in the region.

is likely the best. But

Uncertain motives make the Peninsula susceptible to war—Kaesong demolition proves a brink and North Korean disdain for the alliance Scott Snyder 20, Senior Fellow for Korea Studies and Director of the Program on U.S.-Korea Policy (“Back to Square One for Inter-Korean Relations”, Council on Foreign Relations, June 2020, https://www.cfr.org/blog/back-square-one-inter-korean-relations) On the eve of the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, the two Koreas face a dramatic breakdown in relations. Tensions rocketed on 16 June when North Korea demolished a liaison office that had stood as a symbol of hope for improved communications. For the South Korean Moon administration, the re-establishment of inter-Korean summitry in 2018 represented an historic step toward establishing a permanent peace, coexistence and economic integration on the Korean Peninsula. But now, the motives of the Kim family regime appear increasingly instrumental. North Korean leader Kim Jongun’s 2018 diplomatic summitry and charm offensive failed to unblock monetary flows from South Korea or achieve Kim’s desired diplomatic rapprochement on equal footing with the United States. North

Korea’s slogan appears to be no cash flow, no peace —

and certainly no denuclearisation. A statement on 4 June by Kim Yo-jong — Kim Jong-un’s influential sister — identified the spread of anti-North Korean leaflets by North Korean defectors as the cause of the rapid unravelling of inter-Korean relations. But the statement also targeted the Moon administration for its failure to contain the leaflets in contravention of the April 2018 Panmunjom Declaration.

Kim Yo-jong’s 14 June statement ordered the demolition of the inter-Korean liaison office and was even harsher in its criticism of the Moon administration. She accused the South of failing to open economic cooperation and instead bowing to US pressure and UN sanctions resolutions. A subsequent statement on 17 June directly insulted South Korean President Moon Jae-in and berated him for shifting responsibility for removing obstacles to inter-Korean cooperation by using the US alliance as a pretext. North Korea’s demolition of the accomplishments of inter-Korean summitry is a cold slap in the face to the Moon administration, which had finally gained political and policy momentum. The resounding success of the majority party in South Korea’s April National Assembly election affirmed Moon’s crisis leadership amid a pandemic, removing legislative opposition to his domestic policy agenda and restoring his public approval ratings. But North

Korea has now pulled the rug from under Moon’s feet and put South Korea at risk of just the sort of military confrontation that Moon most wanted to avoid. The apparent ramping up of military tensions as North Korean authorities move to return the inter-Korean relationship to the status quo prior to 2018 is most worrisome. The Korean People’s Army General Staff announced its intention to redeploy forces to the Mount Kumgang tourist area and the Kaesong Industrial Zone, reinstall guard posts at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that were removed under the September 2018 Comprehensive Military Agreement, and resume regular military exercises near the border. Despite holding out hope that inter-Korean summitry and special envoys could save the day, the Moon administration finally responded to two weeks of ever-increasing North Korean rhetoric by declaring that Kim Yo-jong’s words are ‘fundamentally damaging the trust that the leaders have built up to date’. The director of operations for South

Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff warned North Korea not to resume regular military exercises near the border or restore guard posts in the DMZ, stating that ‘if the North actually takes such a move, it will certainly pay the price’. It is uncertain what North Korea’s motives are for rekindling tensions. They could be about succession or other internally-driven factors, or be designed to humiliate South Korea, split the US–South Korea alliance, or pressure the Trump administration. In any case, South Korea’s immediate goal — with necessary visible political support from the Trump administration and US Forces Korea — must be to contain tension escalation, avert and minimise possible loss of life, and reinforce a US–South Korea commitment to defence and deterrence.

Economic issues, COVID, and perception increase the propensity for provocative action Tae-jun Kang 20, a correspondent and columnist for The Diplomat (“How Will South Korea and the US Respond to North Korea’s Latest Provocation?”, The Diplomat, June 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/how-will-south-korea-and-the-us-respond-to-north-koreas-latestprovocation/) North Korea’s provocations are gaining steam. After the dramatic demolition of the iconic inter-Korean liaison office, now Pyongyang is gearing up to deploy military units to what were previously demilitarized areas of cooperation between the Koreas, escalating tensions in the peninsula. On the surface, it seems that Pyongyang has no intention to talk to South Korea anymore. The North even humiliated the South by openly rejecting Seoul’s offer to send special envoys for talks, which was seen as a slap in the face by officials in South Korea who wanted to be discreet about the request.

There are many different interpretations of Pyongyang’s moves emerging from South Korea and its neighbor Japan. The dominant views are that North Korea will escalate its provocations until it sees the reactions from South Korea and the United States that it wants. “North Korea is pressuring South Korea to largest conservative-oriented newspaper, in an editorial.

demand the U.S. to ease sanctions,” argued Chosun Ilbo, South Korea’s

“The U.S. is showing a cold response. President Trump completely ignored the North’s actions. The North will escalate the crisis until the U.S. shows interest,” the paper added.

Chosun Ilbo also said that military provocations against the South are a set step, and there is a high possibility of local provocations targeting South Korea’s territory and territorial waters. South Korea’s major liberal daily, Kyunghyang Shinmun, shared a similar view. The paper said in its latest editorial that North

Korea’s hard-line stance seems to be due to its unprecedented economic difficulties, caused by sanctions against the North coupled with the outbreak of COVID-19. In response to the pandemic’s emergence in China, North Korea closed their shared border in January – which had the side effect of gutting trade with Pyongyang’s top partner. The recent drama could be a “brink-end tactic” to force action from U.S. President Donald Trump ahead of the November presidential election, the paper noted. Although North Korea has not made it clear what it wants to achieve with the recent moves or where it is heading exactly,

there are signs

that help understand Pyongyang’s motive. One of the latest signs is a report from Choson Sinbo, a Tokyo-based pro-North Korea newspaper. It is published and managed by the General Association of North Korean Residents in Japan, locally known as Chongryon. Even though the newspaper is not directly governed by the North, it maintains close ties with Pyongyang and acts as a mouthpiece for the Kim regime. The paper said on June 18 that the

intensity and timing of North Korea’s next move would be determined by the reactions of the South Korean government. The paper warned that reckless remarks and actions by the South Korean government, which is blinded by the belief that the South Korea-U.S. alliance takes priority over inter-Korean agreements and siding with the U.S. brings peace, would trigger “ tougher retaliatory measures” from the North.

If the United States, which has failed to abide by the spirit of the North Korea-U.S. summit for the past two years and blocked progress in inter-Korean relations, keeps intervening in inter-Korean relations, which is an internal issue of the nation, it could face “something difficult to handle,” the paper warned. The message is clear: The North is going to decide its next move based on reactions from South Korean and the United States. And thus these reactions should be favorable to Pyongyang. Unfortunately, North Korea’s hope is unlikely to be realized, given current reactions from Washington and Seoul.

AND, internal dynamics make escalation a viable diversionary strategy Ashley A.C. Hess 18, Specialist in Northeast Asia and CBRN working in the Department of State. Holds a Ph.D from George Mason University (“Why Does North Korea Engage in Provocations?”, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, March 2018, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2347797017749044 Unfortunately, due to lack of data, internal regime dynamics are not included in this analysis. Many

authors find, through both qualitative and quantitative studies, that internal causes are an important driver of the DPRK’s provocations. Instability and uncertainty over succession and consolidation, including an actual succession process, is one of these internal drivers (Armstrong, 2009; Beck, 2011; Bennett, 2012, 2014b; Gause, 2015; Han, 2012; Kim, 2013, 2014; Lee, 2012; Moon, 2012; Yoo & Kim, 2017). External shows of force engender an internal image of leadership strength and power (Bennett, 2013, 2014a). Similarly, leadership shuffles and power struggles are also considered to b...