4.Theory 3 social action PDF

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Social Action Theory Summarised: Origins, basics, Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic, types of action, evaluation, symbolic interactionism and their origins, labelling theory and simple examples, Phenomenology, Ethnomethodology, all laid out in a clear format with tables in each section for reference. ...

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Theory 4 – Action Theories Origins Max Weber began to challenge traditional structural theories and consider the role of the individual in society. He is most famous for being at war with Marx’s ghost and questioning the idea of economic determinism. Action theories became popular in America, especially from the 1920s at Chicago University where sociological ideas became blended with elements of anthropology. Psychology and philosophy. It was during the 1960s that British sociology embraced these ideas, especially in terms of the developing Neo-Marxist approaches.

Basic beliefs   

People are not like puppets. We have free will and choice. They emphasise a ‘micro’ level of analysis which looks at ‘PEOPLE in society’ – a bottom up approach. People possess agency – the ability to act as free agents – we can create and shape society through our choices, meanings and actions.

A. MAX WEBER – SOCIAL ACTION THEORY 1.Basic beliefs  

Appreciated the importance of both structural factors and social action. We need to consider both; (1) the level of cause (structural factors that shape behaviour) and (2) the level of meaning (understand the subjective meanings people give for actions).

Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905) Protestant reformation introduced a new religion (structural cause) – a new belief system that changed people’s word view. We also need to consider the nature of the meanings at the heart of the Calvinist religion (level of meaning) and how these shaped actions. In the case of Calvinism, this affected the economy and led to capitalism.

2.Types of Action Weber classifies the different meanings that humans can give to their actions under four headings:    

Instrumentally rational action – actor calculates most efficient way of reaching a goal. Clinical, logical and utilitarian. Value-rational action – action towards a goal that a person feels is desirable for its own sake – eg) believing in God to go to heaven. Can’t prove it is effective or efficient..but its special! Traditional action – routine, habitual actions. Not rational – almost like a reflex..only reason is because ‘we are used to doing it that way’. Affectual action – an action that expresses an emotion….impulsive and can provide release.

3.Evaluation 

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Shared nature of meanings – Schutz(1972) – Weber is too individualistic and cannot explain the shared nature of meanings, ie) raising arm in an auction = making a bid…everyone there shares the same meaning of that action. Hard to apply typology – Hard to distinguish between different meanings for actions, ie) Trobriand Islanders exchange gifts called ‘kula’ to neighbouring islands – is this traditional action (done it for generations) or instrumental rational action (cementing trade links). Problem of verstehen – however we cannot actually be that other person so we can never truly understand their motives.

B. SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM Origins and basic beliefs   

Developed at the University of Chicago in the 1920s/30s. Emphasises how humans create the social world through actions and interactions. We give meanings to situations and we convey these meanings using symbols – especially language.

1. G.H Mead (1863-1931) Symbols versus instincts 

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Human behaviour is not fixed by instincts – we respond to the world by applying meanings to it. We create a world of meanings. We attach symbols to the world (a symbol is something that represents something else, ie) red = danger, a shaking fist = anger) We do not respond to stimulus in a pre-determined way, ie) a cat’s hair stands on end when facing a threat. Humans have an interpretive phase before we act – we have to interpret its meaning. The dog example when a dog snarls at another, it acts as a direct stimulus that the second dog responds to instinctively. The second dog responds with a defensive posture. None of this conscious interpretation but driven by instinct.

Taking the role of the other    

We interpret the meanings of others by ‘taking the role of others’ – put ourselves in the shoes of others and see ourselves as they see us. We develop the skill to do this as children through ‘imitative play’ – during play we ‘take on the role of significant others’ like parents and see ourselves as others see us. Later, we see ourselves from the point of view of the wider community – ‘the generalised other’ Mead feels that through shared symbols we become conscious of how to act and what others expect of us. This creates predictability and social order.

2. Herbert Blumer (1900-1987) Blumer developed Mead’s ideas following his death. He identified three key principles:   

Our actions are based on the meanings we give to them. These meanings arise from the interaction process – these are negotiable and changeable. The meanings we give situations are the result of the interpretive procedures we use, especially taking the role of others.

For Blumer, our behaviour is partly predictable (not because of deterministic, structural forces) because we internalise the expectations of others – but this is not completely fixed. Individuals always have room for negotiation and choice in how they perform their roles.

3. Labelling Theory This is an application of Symbolic Interactionist ideas. Their key ideas include: 

The definition of the situation – how we define a situation is a label for that thing. W.I. Thomas (1966) – if we define something as real then it will it have a real consequences. If we believe something to be true then this will affect how we act, and this will have consequences for us. In other words something becomes real if we believe it is real (the social construction of reality). Labelling in education When a boy is labelled as ‘trouble’ (even though he may not actually be) then a teacher will act on this belief and treat them in a specific way. This may include punishing him more harshly etc. The definition is all. Reality is therefore rooted in our minds, and what we think shapes what we do in that reality. This contrasts with structural approaches that see reality as external to people and determining our actions.

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The looking glass self – Charles Cooley (1922) uses this idea to show how we develop our self-concept. Our self-concept arises from our ability to take the role of the other. We are able to see ourselves as others see us. Others act like a looking-glass (a mirror) and the way they respond to us mirrors how they see us. Basically we become what others see us as (a self-fulfilling prophecy). The effects of labelling An individual may find that relatives who define them as mentally ill will treat them in a way that reflects their view of them as sick or abnormal. Through the looking glass self, this judgement (label) becomes part of their self-concept. He may take on the role of ‘mental patient and a self-fulfilling prophecy is created where he acts out the role of the mentally ill. This happens even if the label was originally untrue. The definition has real consequences for him…the actions of others have affected his identity and actions.

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Career – Becker (1961) use this concept to explain how people pass through stages once labelled. Essentially we are a novice and gradually we progress over time and become more deeply involved with labels attached to us. Becker studied groups like drug users who once labelled develop an identity over time until the label, new identity and lifestyle are second nature to them. Developing a career In the case of the mental patient, we see the development of their career. Initially they are ‘pre-patient’ with symptoms. A medical professional may label them as mentally ill and set them on a course of treatment, such as becoming a hospital in-patient. Here they are treated and develop the role of being mentally ill, where they learn the routines, expectations and behaviours that go with that role. This role becomes what Becker calls a ‘master status’ and we respond to this accordingly and others treatment of us is based on it too.

Some people accuse labelling theory of being too deterministic and seeing people being shaped by the way others label them. 4.Erving Goffman Erving Goffman (1963) overcomes the critique aimed at labelling theory as being too deterministic and people being passive victims of other people’s labels. He argues that we actively construct our ‘self’ by manipulating other people’s impressions of us.

-The dramaturgical model His approach is called the dramaturgical model because he describes humans actors like actors on a stage - ‘following scripts’, using props, resting backstage, presenting to ‘audiences’ etc. We aim to carry out a convincing performance of the role we have adopted. -Impression management Goffman uses two key concepts when explaining dramaturgy – presentation of the self and impression management. We seek to present an image of ourselves to our audiences. We have to control the impression our performance gives and to do this we need to read our audiences to see how they are responding to us. We then adjust our performance accordingly. We can do many things in effective impression management, such as; language, tone of voice, gestures, facial expressions as well using props etc. We can use these techniques to ‘pass’ for the kind of person we want our audience to believe we are. Goffman also notes how behind the scenes – backstage – we can ‘drop the act’ and step out of our roles and be our true selves. This may well of course involve a different act altogether. -Roles Goffman sees a gap between our real self and our roles – he calls this ‘role distance’. We do not internalise roles as part of our identity like Functionalists suggest. We are not really the roles we play – they are loosely scripted and we have a degree of freedom in how we play them, eg) some teachers are strict and others are easy going. We also don’t always believe in the roles we perform. We can be cynical or calculating at times. We can manipulate our audiences and can trick people or conceal our true self and real motives. For Goffman appearance is everything. 5. Evaluation of symbolic interactionism     

Avoids determinism – highlights how people create society through their choices and meanings. A loose collection of concepts – rather than a coherent, organised theory. Ignores wider social structure – fails to explain the origins of labels and how the patterns in human behaviour are consistent (which Functionalist call norms that dictate our behaviour). Not all action is meaningful – much action is unconscious, routine and has little meaning to it. Limitations of dramaturgy – most interaction involves being both actor and audience and most interactions are improvised or unrehearsed.

C. Phenomenology 1.Basic beliefs   

Focus on ‘phenomenon’. This refers to ‘things as they appear tour senses’. There is no definite knowledge of what the world outside our minds is really like ‘in itself’-all we can know is what our senses tell us about it. The philosopher who developed this idea was Edmund Husserl (1859-1938).

2. Husserl’s philosophy The world only makes sense because we impose meaning and order on it by constructing categories that we use to classify and ‘file’ information coming in from our senses. Categories in our minds Think about how we perceive the world around us. We observe something and in our minds we ask what sort of thing is it ie) a table is a form of FURNITURE…it shares things with a chair or a wardrobe…but it can be found in another sub-category in our mind…FURNITURE TO EAT FOOD OFF.

We can only gain knowledge about the world through the mental act of categorising and giving meaning to our experiences. The world as we know it, can only be a product of our mind. 3.Schutz’s phenomenological sociology Alfred Schutz (1899-1959) applies these ideas to the social world. He argues that the categories and concepts we use are not unique to ourselves – we share them with others. Typifications These shared categories are called typifications. These help us organise our experiences into a shared world of meaning.  

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The meaning of any given experience varies according to its context, eg) raise your arm in class means something different to doing this in an auction. Context is vital. Because meanings are rooted in context, this makes them potentially unclear and unstable. Imagine if someone classified your action differently to you –it would be chaotic! Typifications are a way of stabilising and clarifying meanings –so we are all ‘speaking the same language’. Shared meanings are vital to make social order possible.

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Members of society have a shared ‘life world’ – a bank of shared typifications or common-sense knowledge. Common-sense knowledge includes shared assumptions about how things are, what things mean, what people’s motivations are etc. Schutz calls this ‘recipe knowledge’ – like a recipe we follow it without thinking too much about it and enjoy the end product!

The natural attitude 

Society appears to us as real- something objective which exists outside of us. Posting a letter A man can post a letter to a bookshop to order a book. In doing so, we assume that some unknown individuals (postman/bookshop owner etc) will perform a series of operations in a particular sequence which will result in us receiving a book. Because we get the book – this encourages us to adopt ‘the natural attitude’- that is to assume that the social world is a solid, natural thing out there. But for Schutz, this is not so. All this shows us is that all those involved share the same meanings which allow us to cooperate and achieve goals.

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Berger and Luckmann (1971) – agree with the idea of a shared common-sense knowledge but they disagree that society is merely an inter-subjective reality. Once social reality has been ‘socially constructed’ it takes on a life of its own and becomes an external reality that reacts back on us.

D. Ethnomethodology 1. Origins and basics    

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Emerged in America in 1960s, mainly from the work of Harold Garfinkel. Garfinkel developed the ideas of Schutz, and he also believes that society is not a real objective structure ‘out there’. Garfinkel concerned with social order and why this happens. He believes that social order is ‘accomplished using common-sense knowledge’. Garfinkel is interested in how we create social order by studying the methods we use in making sense of the world. They differ to interactionism which looks at the effects of meanings. They are interested in the methods or rules that we use to produce the meanings in the first place.

Indexicality and reflexivity Meanings are always potentially unclear. Garfinkel calls this indexicality. Nothing has a fixed meaning. Everything depends on the context and the same act can mean something different in other contexts. This problem of indexicality is a threat to social order. There is a paradox here as indexicality suggests we can’t take meanings for granted, yet in everyday life this is exactly what we do. We behave in a way that treats meanings as clear and obvious. This is called reflexivity. Reflexivity is how we use common-sense knowledge in everyday interactions to construct a sense of meaning and order to avoid indexicality occurring. This is like Schutz’s idea of typifications. Language is vital for achieving reflexivity. When we describe something we are simultaneously creating it. Our description gives it reality – removing uncertainty about what is going on and making something seem clear and meaningful. Language gives us a sense of reality that exists ‘out there’ – in fact all we have done is construct a set of shared meanings.

Experiments in disrupting social order Garfinkel and his students did a number of ‘breaching experiments’ to show how fragile social order is and to reveal how we make social order possible. His students would disrupt social order in a number of situations:    

Acting as lodgers in their own homes – by being over-polite, avoiding getting personal etc. Sitting on buses in places set aside for elderly passengers and pregnant women. They would push in queues. They would negotiate the price of items at supermarket tills.

The aim was to disrupt people’s sense of order and challenge their reflexivity by undermining their assumptions about the situation. In other words, they studied how people interpreted their actions and the ways others tried to re-establish order in situations. Garfinkel concluded that by challenging taken-for-granted assumptions, these experiments show how the orderliness of everyday situations is not inevitable but is negotiated and created by those involved (‘an accomplishment’). Suicide and reflexivity Coroners make sense of deaths by selecting features from the many facts about the deceased – such as their mental health. They treat these features as a real pattern and conclude that a ‘typical suicides’ has mentally illness. Garfinkel sees these as just social constructs and they become part of the coroners taken-for-granted knowledge about what suicides are like. This assumed pattern becomes self-reinforcing. It says nothing about any external reality.

Garfinkel criticises conventional sociology as merely peddling common-sense rather than exploring true, objective knowledge. Evaluation  

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Findings are trivial – focuses too much uncovering taken-for-granted rules which we all know anyway. Structure of society – they state that this is merely a shared fiction. By analysing how people apply general rules or norms in contexts they assume that structure of norms exist beyond these contexts…which is what functionalist claim about norms being social facts and not fictions. Ignores power and inequality – Marxists argue that the meanings in capitalist society are linked to the power of the ruling class and these meanings are ‘ruling class ideology’ which serve capitalism....